Cindy Afonso

The respondent, facing a first-degree murder charge, subpoenaed a federal Crown counsel who had previously stayed a drug charge against him.

The respondent sought to question the Crown counsel about his reasons for staying the charge to support an abuse of process argument regarding the admission of disreputable conduct evidence.

The Crown counsel brought a certiorari application to quash the subpoena.

The Superior Court held that while the court clerk properly issued the subpoena based on defence counsel's representations, the subpoena must be quashed because the respondent failed to establish that the Crown counsel likely had material evidence to give, as prosecutorial discretion is presumed to be exercised properly absent evidence of bad faith.

The appellant was convicted of two offences under the Customs Act and received a conditional discharge.

The summary conviction appeal judge set aside the sentence, finding the trial judge erred in law regarding the mens rea requirement.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding the summary conviction appeal judge misapprehended the trial judge's comments, which were directed at whether the conduct was planned and deliberate for sentencing purposes, not mens rea.

The trial judge's sentence was restored, and a request for a Kienapple stay was declined.

The Crown brought an application for a ruling on the voluntariness of statements made by the accused at Primary and Secondary Inspection at Pearson International Airport, and during an RCMP interview following his arrest for importing marijuana.

The court found that the accused was not detained during routine questioning at Secondary Inspection prior to the discovery of the drugs.

The court also found that the accused's subsequent statements to the RCMP were the product of an operating mind and made voluntarily, without fear, oppression, threat, or inducement.

The statements were ruled admissible.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging a breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The overall delay from charge to anticipated trial was approximately 70 months.

Applying the framework from R. v. Morin, the court analyzed the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, and prejudice.

Significant portions of the delay were found to be waived by the defence or attributable to inherent time requirements, with only 14 months of unwaived institutional and Crown delay.

Although some prejudice was inferred from the length of delay, the court found the prejudice modest and concluded the delay was not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing that the police officer's search of the vehicle's glove box and console violated her s. 8 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the search constituted a s. 8 violation, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

Applying the Grant factors, the court noted the officer acted in good faith, the appellant's privacy interest in the vehicle was minimal, and the seized evidence was central to the charge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the trial judge erred in finding reasonable and probable grounds for his arrest and failing to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant contended the trial judge misapprehended evidence by reconciling the arresting officer's identification with defence witnesses who testified that a re-enactment showed it was impossible to identify the driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the totality of the circumstances, including informant information and the officer's recognition of the appellant's distinctive hairstyle, which had been altered before the defence simulations.

The appellant was stopped for speeding and arrested for breaching his recognizance curfew.

During a search of the vehicle incident to that arrest, the officer smelled raw marihuana, leading to a second arrest for possession and a further search of the trunk, which revealed 18.1 pounds of marihuana.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the search violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the initial arrest, the search of the front of the car was justified for officer safety, and the officer's testimony regarding the smell of marihuana was credible, making the subsequent search of the trunk lawful.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing his arrest was unlawful and merely a ruse to search his backpack.

He also argued the trial judge failed to provide clear reasons for accepting one officer's evidence over another's.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge explicitly rejected the appellant's position and had a legitimate basis for the arrest.

The Court further held that there was likely no section 8 Charter breach regarding the backpack search, and even if there was, the evidence was properly admitted under section 24(2) applying the Grant framework.

The appellant, a criminal defence lawyer who represented himself at trial, appealed his conviction for providing drugs to an inmate at the Don Jail.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding a jail guard suspected of drug trafficking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence did not undermine the trial judge's critical factual findings, which included the inmate being searched before and after the meeting, an officer observing their hands touching, and the appellant hiding an incriminating envelope.

The court also rejected arguments regarding trial fairness, reasonable apprehension of bias, and the trial judge's handling of a letter received about the appellant.

The appellant, a lawyer convicted of supplying narcotics to an inmate client, brought a motion for the production of third-party records in the possession of the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services.

The records related to allegations that a correctional officer had smuggled contraband into the jail.

Applying the McNeil framework, the Court of Appeal balanced the appellant's right to access potentially relevant material for a fresh evidence application against the privacy interests of the correctional officer.

The court ordered the production of edited versions of the documents, subject to a non-publication order.