Christine Tier

The appellant, who held himself out as a healer, appealed his convictions on five counts of sexual assault against adult female patients.

He argued the trial judge erred in allowing the cross-count application of similar act evidence and in his approach to the issue of consent regarding one complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's admission of the similar act evidence to establish the actus reus, nor in his conclusion that the complainant did not subjectively consent and that the appellant failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving causing bodily harm and sentenced to 39 months in jail.

At trial, the Crown had requested a sentence of two years less a day, while the defence sought an intermittent sentence.

The trial judge imposed 39 months without notifying defence counsel that he was considering a sentence significantly higher than the Crown's position.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found this lack of notice to be a procedural error.

The court varied the sentence to two years' imprisonment, followed by three years of probation, accommodating the appellant's request to serve his sentence in a penitentiary.

The appellant, a high school teacher, was convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a former student.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof, applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and erred in assessing credibility.

He also appealed his one-year sentence as harsh and excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments and concluding the sentence was fit given the extent of the manipulation and grooming.

The applicant, awaiting trial for obstruct justice, brought a motion to exclude the transcript of his compelled testimony from his mother's preliminary inquiry, alleging violations of sections 7 and 13 of the Charter.

The applicant had refused to answer substantive questions at the preliminary inquiry, leading to the obstruct justice charge.

The court dismissed the section 7 claim, finding no principle of fundamental justice that balances the necessity of evidence against a witness's psychological integrity.

However, the court granted the section 13 claim, holding that the transcript constituted incriminating evidence and that the obstruct justice charge, which was based on a refusal to provide material evidence rather than giving false evidence, did not fall within the perjury or contradictory evidence exceptions to section 13.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm offences and his sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter application to exclude a loaded handgun found during a warrantless search incident to arrest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellant based on corroborated information from multiple confidential informants.

The court also agreed with the trial judge's s. 24(2) Charter analysis admitting the evidence.

The sentence appeal was allowed on consent solely to increase the appellant's pre-trial custody credit to a 1.5 ratio in accordance with R. v. Summers, but was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for the death of his domestic partner, whose body was never found.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of the appellant's sister, to whom he confessed and who helped him dispose of evidence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable, the jury instructions were flawed regarding post-offence conduct, his confession, the lack of a Vetrovec warning, and the manslaughter charge, and that a mistrial should have been ordered due to prejudicial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict reasonable and the trial judge's instructions and mid-trial cautions adequate to ensure a fair trial.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for stabbing his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment with 15 years of parole ineligibility.

He appealed the conviction on grounds including an inflammatory Crown opening, failure to repeat a W.D. instruction for a jury question, misstating expert psychiatric evidence, and errors in the provocation charge.

He also appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's instructions adequately addressed the Crown's opening and the jury's questions, and that the charge on provocation and expert evidence was fair.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge's balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors was entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention in a medium secure unit rather than a minimum secure unit.

The Board relied on the appellant's recent alcohol use, antisocial activities, and elopement risk.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board's decision was reasonable and reflected the least onerous and least restrictive alternative, given the appellant's history of violence when intoxicated and his treating psychiatrist's evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and possession of child pornography relating to a young girl.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in restricting cross-examination under s. 276 of the Criminal Code, misapprehended evidence, and improperly used child pornography evidence.

He also sought to introduce fresh evidence and appealed his six-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or factual findings.

The fresh evidence application was dismissed as it lacked sufficient probative value.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the six-year global sentence was fit given the serious aggravating factors.

The appellant appealed her convictions for assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm against her ten-year-old son, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence in making credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that any alleged errors did not meet the test for material misapprehension of evidence under Lohrer, and noting the complainant's evidence was corroborated by physical scarring.

The appellants were convicted of fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud in relation to a high yield investment scam.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in admitting expert profiling evidence, giving confusing jury instructions on conspiracy, and admitting preliminary inquiry evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the expert evidence was properly admitted and the preliminary inquiry evidence met the statutory requirements.

However, the trial judge erred in his conspiracy instructions by presenting it as an 'all or nothing' proposition and failing to properly explain the Carter stages.

The conspiracy convictions were set aside.

The court also reduced one appellant's restitution order by two-thirds to reflect the shared responsibility of all three co-accused.

The appellant challenged a penitentiary sentence imposed following a manslaughter conviction arising from failure to provide necessaries of life to a young child who died after severe burns and delayed medical treatment.

The court rejected arguments that the sentencing judge overstated moral blameworthiness, failed to properly weigh remorse, rehabilitation, restraint, and other mitigating factors, improperly relied on a victim impact statement, or imposed a sentence outside the acceptable range.

The court held that the sentencing judge properly focused on the deliberate withholding of urgently required medical care to protect the offender from blame, and that denunciation and deterrence properly predominated.

However, the Crown conceded an error in the calculation of pre-sentence custody credit under s. 719 of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was allowed only to increase credit for pre-sentence custody, reducing the effective sentence to nine years and six months.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon and sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility, finding that his exercise of authority vitiated her consent, and rejecting his evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's credibility findings were justified and supported by the evidence of the appellant's reign of terror and religious indoctrination in the household.

The court concluded the appellant's exercise of authority vitiated the complainant's consent and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault.

At trial, he argued the complainant consented, relying on evidence from the complainant's former common law spouse.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, characterizing the issue as mistaken belief in consent and failing to address the spouse's evidence.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the courts below fundamentally misunderstood the defence advanced and failed to consider critical evidence, rendering the reasons inadequate for appellate review.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder after shooting his sister and her fiancé.

At trial, the defence conceded the shootings and intent but argued provocation, while the Crown argued the murders were planned and deliberate 'honour killings'.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting expert evidence on the cultural context of honour killings and in failing to give a W.D. instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the expert evidence was relevant, balanced, and properly admitted, and that the jury instructions as a whole correctly conveyed the burden of proof without setting up a credibility contest.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault and uttering threats and received a suspended sentence.

Almost three years later, he applied for an extension of time to appeal, which was dismissed by the summary conviction appeal court.

The accused then filed a notice of application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Crown brought an application to have the leave application determined by a single judge in advance of the appeal hearing.

The Court of Appeal held that a single judge has jurisdiction under s. 839(1) of the Criminal Code to deny an application for leave to appeal.

The Crown's application was granted and the accused's application for leave to appeal was refused for lacking merit and failing to raise a significant question of law.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment, arguing the trial judge failed to consider the impact of his despondent mental state on the proof of mens rea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the issue was not raised at trial and was negated by the appellant's own testimony.

The trial judge properly found all essential elements, including mens rea, established beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to give a cautionary charge regarding his flight from the scene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence of flight was relevant to link the appellant to the apartment, and the risk of it being used for consciousness of guilt did not require a caution.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was entirely warranted on the facts.

The appellant appealed his provincial offences convictions, including operating a motor vehicle without insurance, failing to wear a seatbelt, and operating without a validated permit.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence establishing that the appellant had automobile insurance at the time of the offence.

The conviction for operating without insurance was set aside and an acquittal substituted.

The appeal regarding the remaining charges was dismissed as the appellant provided no substantive defence or explanation for missing his first court appearance.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the finding of murder during forcible confinement under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code was unreasonable.

The appellant contended that the act of killing was not discrete from the act of confinement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that the appellant confined the victim by tying him up, beat him, and subsequently strangled him, taking advantage of the dominance gained through the confinement.