Brandin O’Connor

The applicant union sought judicial review of an interest arbitration award that set the terms of a renewal collective agreement for employees of a long-term care home.

The union argued that the wage adjustments awarded were unreasonable and that the arbitration board failed to provide adequate reasons, placed too much reliance on a master agreement, and failed to properly apply the statutory criteria under the Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the board's decision was reasonable, adequately explained, and fell within the range of acceptable outcomes given the legislative nature of interest arbitration and the deference owed to such awards.

The appellant, a former employee, appealed the striking out of her statement of claim without leave to amend.

Her claim sought further compensation for alleged racial discrimination, arguing that correspondence with the CEO constituted a binding agreement, despite having signed a full and final release upon dismissal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the letters did not form an enforceable contract and that the elements of promissory estoppel were not pleaded.

The court reiterated that claims with no reasonable chance of success should be struck.

At the first scheduled date of a grievance arbitration, the employer brought a motion to commence the hearing immediately.

The union opposed the motion, relying on the established practice at the Grievance Settlement Board to use the first date for mediation, case management, and preliminary issues before adjourning.

The arbitrator dismissed the employer's motion, finding that while the employer's desire for efficiency was justifiable, the established practice ought to prevail because the employer had not clearly put the union on notice in advance of its intention to move to commence the hearing.

The plaintiff, a former employee of Torstar who signed a full and final release upon her dismissal in 2017, brought an action claiming that subsequent correspondence with the CEO in 2020 constituted a binding agreement to pay her compensation for alleged anti-black racism.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim.

The court granted the motion, finding it plain and obvious that the correspondence did not constitute an enforceable contract and the claim had no reasonable prospect of success.

The statement of claim was struck in its entirety without leave to amend.

The court continued a summary judgment motion in two wrongful dismissal claims.

In the Ratigan claim, full summary judgment was granted for $73,076.

In the Bouttier claim, partial summary judgment was previously granted, and the court now determined the method of payment for the remaining balance of $304,079.41, ruling it should be a lump sum.

The defendant failed to participate meaningfully despite adjournments.

Both plaintiffs were awarded substantial indemnity costs under Rule 49, totaling $10,000 for Ratigan and $15,000 for Bouttier, in addition to previously ordered costs.

This endorsement addresses two wrongful dismissal actions brought by Diane Ratigan and Thomas Bouttier against Premier Conferencing (Canada) Limited, heard together as summary judgment motions.

The core dispute revolved around the defendant's obligation to pay severance as a lump sum versus periodically, with mitigation having been waived as an issue.

The court granted full judgment to Ratigan for six months' severance and partial judgment to Bouttier for the first six months of his twelve-month entitlement, including salary, relocation, benefits, and RRSP contributions.

The remaining portion of Bouttier's motion was adjourned to determine the lump sum versus periodic payment for the latter six months, given the defendant's counsel's withdrawal and potential new counsel.

The parties requested a teleconference to discuss procedural matters in advance of scheduled hearing dates.

The arbitrator directed that the hearing proceed via videoconference on the Zoom platform.

The employer agreed to provide a compendium of documents and proceed first with its evidence.

The parties were granted leave to request an in-person hearing for later dates if circumstances permit.

Following an order to merge two local unions into a larger local, the former locals attempted to amend their trust and building corporation documents to distribute assets pro rata to their members rather than transferring them to the merged local.

The court found these actions were taken without authorization, violated the union's constitution, and constituted a breach of fiduciary duty by the trustees and directors.

The court declared the amendments null and void, imposed a constructive trust, and ordered the assets transferred to the merged local.

In a civil procedure appeal, the appellants challenged orders permitting amendment of a statement of claim through a representation order after expiry of a limitation period.

The central issue was whether the order improperly added parties or merely corrected the naming of the legal entity represented by previously named individuals.

A majority held the request was properly treated as correction of a misnamed party, with members having notice before the limitation deadline and no demonstrated prejudice after extensive participation in the litigation.

The appeal was dismissed, with one dissenting judge who would have allowed it.

The respondent brought an action for wrongful dismissal against a union local and its directors.

The union pleaded that section 3(2) of the Rights of Labour Act precluded it from being named as a party.

After the limitation period expired, the union moved to dismiss the action on this ground.

The motion was dismissed.

The respondent then successfully moved for a representation order allowing individual defendants to defend on behalf of union members.

The appeal addressed whether an action improperly naming a union could be amended after the limitation period expired by obtaining a representation order.

The majority held that the action was not a nullity and that the representation order could be granted as a correction of the party's name under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The dissent argued that section 3(2) created an absolute statutory requirement for a representation order and that the majority's approach created unacceptable uncertainty in the law.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment based on disability.

On the last business day before the scheduled hearing, the applicant filed a Request to Withdraw the Application, citing financial reasons.

The respondent objected, arguing the late withdrawal was an abuse of process, especially since the applicant had recently filed a civil action based on the same facts.

The Tribunal found the applicant's conduct amounted to an abuse of process and granted the request to withdraw, but ordered that the withdrawal be with prejudice to the applicant's ability to file a new application regarding the same issues.

The applicant filed a human rights application against the organizational respondent and five personal respondents.

The organizational respondent requested to defer the application pending the completion of a related union grievance and to remove the personal respondents.

The Tribunal granted the deferral, finding substantial overlap between the grievance and the application.

The Tribunal also removed the personal respondents, applying the Persaud criteria, as the organizational respondent accepted vicarious liability and there were no allegations of individual harassment.

The applicant requested the production of an unredacted version of a third e-mail exchanged between the respondent and Great West Life regarding her short-term disability application.

The Tribunal granted the request, noting that the e-mail formed part of a chain with two other e-mails previously ordered produced in an earlier interim decision.

The applicant filed a Request for Order During Proceedings seeking the production of unredacted emails exchanged between the respondent and Great-West Life regarding her short-term disability claim.

The respondent and Great-West Life opposed the request, arguing the redacted portions contained confidential commercial information about the claims adjudication process under PIPEDA.

The Tribunal found the unredacted emails were arguably relevant to the applicant's claims of reprisal and failure to accommodate.

The Tribunal ordered their production, concluding that the privacy interests were outweighed by the potential probative value of the information.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision that dismissed her claims for wrongful dismissal and age discrimination, but awarded her 23 weeks' notice under a 1998 employment contract.

The appellant argued that a 2011 contract, though void for lack of consideration, successfully rescinded the 1998 contract, or alternatively, that the 1998 termination clause was ambiguous.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's findings that the 1998 contract remained valid and its termination clause was unambiguous.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the motion judge's $15,000 costs award to the respondent, varying it to no costs due to the mixed success of the parties.

The respondent in a human rights application brought a motion for the production of various documents, including the applicant's medical records relating to conflicts with previous employers, previous settlement documents, and clinical notes from her treating practitioners.

The Tribunal applied the 'arguable relevance' test and balanced it against the applicant's privacy interests.

The Tribunal denied the requests for medical records regarding previous employer conflicts and previous settlement documents, finding them not arguably relevant and overly intrusive.

The Tribunal ordered the production of specific clinical notes from the relevant time period and the curriculum vitae of a practitioner expected to provide opinion evidence.

The applicant in a human rights proceeding brought a Request for Order During Proceedings seeking to amend the monetary remedy sought in her Application, schedule specific times for her witnesses to testify, and compel the production of a missing e-mail.

The Tribunal granted the amendment on consent.

The Tribunal deferred the witness scheduling request, noting that the applicant's testimony and cross-examination must be completed before her health care providers testify.

Finally, the Tribunal ordered the respondent to conduct another search for the arguably relevant e-mail and produce it or detail its search efforts.

The respondent requested early production of audio-recordings surreptitiously made by the applicant during meetings with the respondent's representatives.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding that the respondent failed to establish exceptional circumstances to justify early production before the normal disclosure process under Rule 16.