Antonin I. Pribetic

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's construction lien action for delay, return its security, and alternatively for security for costs.

The court declined to dismiss the action for delay, accepting the plaintiff's explanation and commitment to proceed, and therefore refused to discharge the lien.

However, the court ordered the plaintiff to post $190,000 in security for costs due to evidence of financial instability.

Notably, the court discovered the plaintiff's counsel had used artificial intelligence to generate a factum containing fake case citations and failing to comply with Rule 4.06.1, leading the court to disregard the factum and reserve the right to impose further sanctions in costs.

The court dismissed a proposed class action for delay under section 29.1 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The plaintiff failed to advance the proceeding for over six years after being ordered to deliver amended materials.

The court found that the plaintiff had not taken any steps to advance the case, failed to comply with court-ordered timetables, and did not provide evidence to justify an adjournment.

The dismissal does not prejudice putative class members, as they may commence a new proceeding on the same grounds.

The Crown brought a motion for default judgment seeking a declaration that the Aylmer Church's conveyance of real property to the Lethbridge Church was fraudulent and void.

The Aylmer Church had transferred the property for nominal consideration shortly after being ordered to pay substantial fines and costs for contempt of court related to COVID-19 public health orders.

The court found multiple badges of fraud, including a non-arm's length transfer, suspicious timing, grossly inadequate consideration, and retained beneficial use.

The motion was granted, the conveyance was declared void, and the lands were made subject to execution by the Crown.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of section 18.1 of the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, regarding court approval of settlements in forfeiture proceedings.

The Attorney General of Ontario sought approval for a settlement with an interested party (Rosa Norwood) for a payment from seized property proceeds, without a prior judicial determination that the property was tainted by unlawful activity.

The appellants (Michael Norwood's Estate and 947014 Ontario Inc.) argued this was an error.

The Court of Appeal held that a "settlement in relation to a proceeding under this Act" must relate to in rem property interests, which necessitates a prior finding that the property is proceeds or instruments of unlawful activity.

The court found the motion judge erred in approving the settlement without such a finding, as it purported to settle in rem interests of others without their rights being displaced.

The appeal was allowed, and the settlement approval order was set aside.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of complex, interrelated standard form agreements common in the road construction industry.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario affirmed the application judge's interpretation of these contractual provisions, finding no error in the lower court's reasoning.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The applicants, two student associations, sought judicial review to quash the Minister's 'Student Choice Initiative' directives, which required colleges and universities to allow students to opt out of student association fees.

The Divisional Court found the directives justiciable, rejecting the government's arguments that they were immune from review as core policy decisions or exercises of the Crown's prerogative spending power.

The Court held that the directives were unlawful because they conflicted with the statutory schemes governing colleges and universities, which protect the autonomy of universities and the normal activities of college student associations.

The application was granted and the directives were quashed.

Greenpeace Canada brought an application for judicial review seeking a declaration that the Ontario government unlawfully cancelled the cap and trade program without following the public consultation requirements of the Environmental Bill of Rights (EBR).

The Minister had claimed an exemption under the EBR, arguing that the recent general election was a substantially equivalent process of public participation.

The Divisional Court found that the election was not substantially equivalent and the government failed to comply with the EBR.

However, the application was dismissed because the government subsequently passed valid legislation repealing the cap and trade program and barring proceedings, rendering the requested declaratory relief of no practical effect.

The respondents brought a motion to quash an application for judicial review on the basis of mootness.

The underlying application challenged the Minister's decision to invoke an exception under the Environmental Bill of Rights, bypassing public consultation for revoking the cap and trade program by claiming the recent provincial election was a substantially equivalent process.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to quash, finding that the scope of the Minister's exception power remains a live controversy despite the subsequent repeal of the relevant legislation.

The court further held that even if the matter were moot, it would exercise its discretion to hear the application to provide clarity on the statutory exemption.

The Ontario government cancelled an electric car subsidy program but extended it for a two-month transition period.

The applicant, Tesla Motors Canada ULC, was explicitly excluded from this transition program by a condition limiting it to "franchised automobile dealerships." Tesla sought judicial review, arguing the exclusion was arbitrary, unlawful, and made for an improper purpose without procedural fairness.

The court found the decision to exclude Tesla was arbitrary, unrelated to the stated policy goal of protecting small to mid-sized dealers, and constituted an egregious exercise of discretion for an improper purpose.

The court quashed the minister's decision to implement the transitional program.

The defendants brought a motion to stay the plaintiff's action or remove the plaintiff's counsel, alleging improper use of inadvertently disclosed privileged documents.

The court found that the plaintiff's failure to destroy one electronic copy of a privileged document and its subsequent limited use were inadvertent and caused no prejudice to the defendants.

The court dismissed the request for a stay and removal of counsel but granted ancillary relief ordering the destruction of the privileged documents and prohibiting their further use.

The plaintiffs appealed an order staying their action for failure to pay previous costs awards.

Through this appeal, the self-represented plaintiff sought to set aside a $6,450 costs award made by another judge who had dismissed the plaintiffs' motion for leave to appeal a document production order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the previous costs order could not be collaterally attacked through an appeal of the stay order, and that the costs were appropriately awarded to the successful party on the leave motion.

The applicant condominium unit owner sought declarations and compliance orders regarding restrictive use covenants in a commercial condominium declaration.

The applicant operated an accounting office and relied on a declaration provision restricting multiple units from operating the same type of business.

Another unit owner provided tax preparation and financial planning services from its unit.

The court held that these services constituted operation of an “Accounting Office” within the meaning of the declaration, thereby contravening the restrictive covenant.

The court further held that a declaration clause purporting to relieve the condominium corporation from enforcing restrictive covenants conflicted with s. 17(3) of the Condominium Act, 1998, which obligates the corporation to take reasonable steps to ensure compliance.

The clause was declared unenforceable and deemed amended, and compliance orders were granted.

The applicant sought an anti-suit injunction restraining the respondents from continuing a patent and contract dispute before a United States federal court in Illinois.

The respondents alleged that the applicant, as successor to a corporation that had entered a settlement agreement containing an Illinois forum selection clause, was bound by the agreement and had engaged in conduct infringing U.S. patents.

Applying the test in Amchem Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board), the court held the applicant failed to show that the foreign court assumed jurisdiction inconsistently with forum non conveniens principles or that substantial injustice would result if the foreign proceeding continued.

The Illinois court had jurisdictional connections including U.S. patents, Illinois governing law, and attornment by other defendants.

The application for an anti-suit injunction was dismissed.

A secured creditor brought an application under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act seeking the appointment of an interim receiver over the assets of a debtor corporation.

The debtor opposed the application and brought a motion to stay the receivership proceeding or alternatively to consolidate it with a separate action challenging the validity of a general security agreement and alleging contractual breaches.

The court found on the evidence that the debtor was insolvent, unable to meet obligations as they became due, and operating at a deficit.

As the debtor had granted security that became enforceable upon insolvency, the secured creditor’s interest required protection through court supervision.

An interim receiver with limited powers was appointed and the debtor’s motion for a stay or consolidation was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that service of process on its receptionist was proper under the Hague Convention.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the propriety of service was a factual issue depending on whether the receptionist was in control of the business, and there was no evidence before the motion judge to suggest she was not.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against the respondent bank for breach of a settlement agreement.

The appellant argued the bank improperly reported his written-off debt as an R9 'bad debt' credit rating.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly applied the summary judgment test and that the settlement agreement explicitly stated the bank was not required to report to credit agencies in any particular way.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding it $203,000 in damages for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty arising from mortgage advances.

The appellant sought the full amount of the mortgage advances ($2.7 million).

The respondents cross-appealed, arguing the action should be dismissed due to novation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied a common sense view of causation in determining that the substitution of a new debtor broke the chain of causation, and that the novation argument failed because the appellant's claim was based on the Mortgage Administration Agreement, not the loan itself.

The appellants appealed a Motions Court Judge's decision refusing to vacate a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL).

The respondents had claimed a remedial constructive trust based on alleged unconscionable conduct following the termination of a contract.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and vacated the CPL, finding no evidence of unconscionable conduct by the appellants and noting that the respondents' claim was essentially for breach of contract rather than an equitable cause of action.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision calculating his pre-accident earnings based on his actual hourly wage of $20.00 rather than the $25.20 rate mandated by his union's collective agreement.

The Divisional Court applied a patent unreasonableness standard of review, given the Tribunal's specialized expertise and the strong privative clause.

The Court held that the Tribunal's task under the pre-1997 Workers' Compensation Act was to determine actual earnings, not what ought to have been paid, and that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to enforce the collective agreement.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment granting the respondents partial relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the forfeiture clause was penal and that retaining the full amount of the instalments would be unconscionable given the disparity with the value of the work performed.

Costs of the appeal were awarded to the respondents in the amount of $10,000.