Antonin I. Pribetic

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding it $203,000 in damages for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty arising from mortgage advances.

The appellant sought the full amount of the mortgage advances ($2.7 million).

The respondents cross-appealed, arguing the action should be dismissed due to novation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied a common sense view of causation in determining that the substitution of a new debtor broke the chain of causation, and that the novation argument failed because the appellant's claim was based on the Mortgage Administration Agreement, not the loan itself.

The appellants appealed a Motions Court Judge's decision refusing to vacate a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL).

The respondents had claimed a remedial constructive trust based on alleged unconscionable conduct following the termination of a contract.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and vacated the CPL, finding no evidence of unconscionable conduct by the appellants and noting that the respondents' claim was essentially for breach of contract rather than an equitable cause of action.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision calculating his pre-accident earnings based on his actual hourly wage of $20.00 rather than the $25.20 rate mandated by his union's collective agreement.

The Divisional Court applied a patent unreasonableness standard of review, given the Tribunal's specialized expertise and the strong privative clause.

The Court held that the Tribunal's task under the pre-1997 Workers' Compensation Act was to determine actual earnings, not what ought to have been paid, and that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to enforce the collective agreement.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment granting the respondents partial relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the forfeiture clause was penal and that retaining the full amount of the instalments would be unconscionable given the disparity with the value of the work performed.

Costs of the appeal were awarded to the respondents in the amount of $10,000.

The landlord applied to the Tribunal for an order requiring four co-tenants to pay rent arrears.

Three of the co-tenants had permanently vacated the apartment before the application was brought.

The Tribunal held it could only make an order against the tenant still in possession.

The Divisional Court reversed, holding that possession by one co-tenant constituted possession by all.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, restoring the Tribunal's decision.

The Court held that a 'tenant in possession' under s. 86 of the Tenant Protection Act requires some form of control over the unit, and a tenant who has completely and permanently vacated is not in possession, meaning the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to make an order against them.

The Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario (ACTO) brought a motion to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal concerning the liability of former co-tenants for rent arrears under the Tenant Protection Act.

The respondent landlord opposed the motion, arguing that the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding intervention do not apply to such appeals and that the intervention would unnecessarily complicate the private litigation.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding that Rule 13.03(2) explicitly permits intervention and that ACTO's expertise would assist the court in understanding the broader legal issues regarding co-tenant relationships.

The motion to intervene was granted subject to conditions.

The plaintiffs, police officers, brought an action against two Assistant Crown Attorneys and the Crown for negligence, malicious prosecution, and other claims arising from assault charges laid against them.

The defendants moved to strike the negligence claims and the vicarious liability claims against the Crown.

The motions judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that Crown Attorneys are absolutely immune from suits for negligence, and the Crown is immune from liability for the actions of Crown Attorneys under s. 5(6) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The negligence claims and the action against the Crown (except for Charter claims) were struck out.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for statutory accident benefits from Allstate, the insurer of the vehicle that struck her.

Allstate argued that the applicant was the spouse of her roommate, who was insured by Belair, and therefore Belair should pay the benefits.

The arbitrator applied the Molodowich factors and found that the applicant and her roommate were merely friends sharing accommodation, not spouses living in a conjugal relationship.

Allstate was found responsible for paying the applicant's statutory accident benefits.

The applicant was injured in a rear-end motor vehicle accident and received statutory accident benefits, including caregiver and housekeeping benefits, which were subsequently terminated by the insurer.

The applicant sought ongoing caregiver benefits, housekeeping expenses, and the cost of medical reports.

The arbitrator found the applicant's testimony regarding her pre-accident and post-accident activity levels to be vague and contradictory, and noted inconsistencies with surveillance evidence.

Consequently, the arbitrator concluded that the applicant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that she suffered a substantial inability to engage in caregiving activities or a partial inability to carry on a normal life.

The medical opinions were also deemed unreliable as they were based on the applicant's unreliable self-reporting.

The application for ongoing benefits was dismissed.