Andrew Raven

The appellant unions challenged the constitutionality of the federal Expenditure Restraint Act (ERA) and the Government's conduct in collective bargaining, arguing they infringed their members' freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The ERA imposed wage increase caps and rolled back previously negotiated increases in response to the 2008 global economic crisis.

The Court of Appeal held that the ERA and the Government's conduct did not substantially interfere with the collective bargaining process.

In the alternative, any limits on s. 2(d) rights were demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter given the pressing and substantial objective of managing the economic crisis.

The court also upheld the application judge's decision to admit and prefer the evidence of the Government's participant expert over the unions' expert.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an interest arbitration award that established a new job classification system and wage grid for the bargaining unit.

The union argued the panel's adoption of the employer's proposed wage grid violated s. 11(6) of the Canadian Human Rights Act by reducing male wages to achieve pay equity, and failed to apply the replication principle.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the panel's decision was reasonable.

The panel was tasked with creating a completely new classification system, not correcting an existing one, and reasonably concluded that s. 11(6) did not apply or was not breached.

The panel also reasonably applied the replication principle by considering objective market forces and economic realities.

The applicant unions brought an application seeking a declaration that the Expenditure Restraint Act is unconstitutional and of no force and effect, arguing it violated their members' freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter by rolling back and capping wage increases.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the legislation did not substantially interfere with the freedom of association, as it applied broadly across the federal public sector and did not target associational activities.

The court further held that even if there was a breach of s. 2(d), it would be saved under s. 1 of the Charter as a demonstrably justified response to the 2008 global economic crisis.

The applicant, a branch of the United States Department of Defense, sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision certifying a union to represent its civilian employees in Ontario.

The Board had found that the applicant was a separate agency of the foreign state, had waived sovereign immunity, and was engaged in commercial activity.

The Divisional Court quashed the certification, holding that the applicant was an integral part of the U.S. government, had not waived its immunity, and was engaged in sovereign military support activities rather than commercial activities.

This appeal considered whether actuarial surpluses recorded in federal public-sector superannuation accounts were assets in which plan members held legal or equitable interests.

The Court held the accounts were statutory accounting records tracking Consolidated Revenue Fund transactions, not segregated asset pools.

It rejected claims based on proprietary entitlement, fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and alleged expropriation.

The Court further held the statutory amendments authorized debiting surplus amounts and did not require compensation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This administrative law appeal concerned judicial review of a staffing tribunal decision rejecting an abuse-of-authority complaint under federal public service staffing legislation.

The Court held that the tribunal reasonably concluded there was no legal requirement to use a particular appointment process based on whether a position was new or reclassified.

It further held the reviewing court improperly assessed a different theory than the one advanced in the complaint and impermissibly reweighed the record on judicial review.

The appeal was allowed, with the tribunal decision restored.

Public sector unions and individual employees brought constitutional challenges to two federal statutes enacted through omnibus budget legislation: the Expenditure Restraint Act and the Public Sector Equitable Compensation Act.

The applicants moved to sever the combined challenges or, alternatively, amend their applications to retain only the Expenditure Restraint Act challenge and pursue the pay equity challenge later.

The respondent opposed severance, arguing the evidence and pleadings were already intertwined.

The court held that although the Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for severance of an application, leave to amend under Rule 26.01 was appropriate because no non-compensable prejudice would result.

Leave was granted to amend the notices of application to proceed only with the Expenditure Restraint Act challenge, without prejudice to commencing fresh applications challenging the Public Sector Equitable Compensation Act.

Applicants in two related constitutional applications sought procedural relief to separate challenges to two different federal statutes enacted within the same budget legislation: the Expenditure Restraint Act and the Public Sector Equitable Compensation Act.

They requested severance of the combined challenges or, alternatively, leave to amend the applications to pursue only the wage restraint challenge while preserving the right to challenge the pay equity legislation later.

The court held that although the Rules of Civil Procedure contain no explicit severance mechanism for applications, the requested relief could be granted through amendment principles under Rule 26.01 where no non-compensable prejudice arises.

The court granted leave to amend the notices of application to retain only the Expenditure Restraint Act challenge and permitted the applicants to commence a future application concerning the Public Sector Equitable Compensation Act.

No costs were awarded, and the parties were encouraged to seek case management.

The applicant, Anishinabek Police Service, sought judicial review of two arbitration awards that allowed grievances regarding an unpaid suspension and subsequent termination of a First Nations Constable to proceed to arbitration.

The applicant argued that the doctrines of issue estoppel and abuse of process barred the arbitration because the constable's dismissal had already been adjudicated under the employer's Code of Conduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding that the adjudicator under the Code of Conduct was not exercising a statutory function and did not make a judicial decision.

Therefore, the prior adjudication did not preclude the union from pursuing grievances under the collective agreement and the Canada Labour Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard appeals regarding a Canadian Human Rights Tribunal finding of pay inequity between a largely female group of employees and a largely male comparator group.

The Federal Court of Appeal had previously overturned the Tribunal's finding.

In an oral judgment, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals on the merits, finding no reviewable error by the Tribunal, and dismissed the appeal regarding the reduction of damages, adopting the dissenting reasons of Evans J.A. from the court below.

The appellant filed a human rights complaint alleging sexual harassment by the Canadian Forces.

The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal substantiated the complaint in part and awarded compensation, including $47,000 for legal costs under the statutory provision allowing compensation for 'any expenses incurred'.

The Federal Court of Appeal set aside the costs award.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Tribunal's decision should be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness, its interpretation of the statute to include legal costs was unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed, confirming the Tribunal does not have the authority to award legal costs.

The parties consented to an order fixing the costs of the appeal at $100,000, all inclusive, payable to the respondent Crown.

The appellants, representing federal public servants, RCMP, and Canadian Forces personnel, appealed the dismissal of their actions seeking the return of over $28 billion to their pension plans.

The Government had amortized and later withdrawn actuarial surpluses from the Superannuation Accounts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Superannuation Accounts were merely legislated ledgers containing no actual assets, as employee contributions were deposited into the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

The Court held that the Government did not owe a fiduciary duty to the plan members regarding the surplus, nor was it unjustly enriched.

Furthermore, the 2000 amendments to the governing statutes clearly authorized the Government to withdraw the actuarial surplus.

The Canadian Union of Public Employees filed a pay equity complaint alleging that the employer discriminated against flight attendants, a predominantly female group, by paying them less than mechanics and pilots, who are predominantly male.

The employer argued that the groups belonged to different establishments because they were in separate bargaining units with different collective agreements.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the three groups belong to the same establishment because they are subject to a common personnel and wage policy, regardless of differences in their collective agreements.

The appeal was dismissed and the matter remitted to the Canadian Human Rights Commission to continue its investigation.

The former chauffeur to the Speaker of the House of Commons filed discrimination and harassment complaints with the Canadian Human Rights Commission after his position was declared surplus.

The Speaker and the House of Commons challenged the Commission's jurisdiction, claiming parliamentary privilege over the management of employees.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellants failed to establish a broad parliamentary privilege immunizing all employee relations from external review.

However, the Court ruled that the employee was required to pursue his complaints through the grievance procedure established under the Parliamentary Employment and Staff Relations Act, which ousted the jurisdiction of the Canadian Human Rights Commission for this dispute.

Several trade unions brought actions challenging federal legislation that authorized the federal government to deal with surpluses in pension plans covering federal government and RCMP employees.

The Attorney General of Canada successfully moved to strike the unions as plaintiffs, arguing that s. 3(2) of the Rights of Labour Act prevented them from suing in their own names.

The Court of Appeal allowed the unions' appeal, holding that the unions have the legal status to sue in their own names derived from their governing labour legislation or corporate status, and that s. 3(2) does not bar them.

The Court also found the unions had standing due to their direct interest in their members' pension benefits.

The appellants, foreign nationals living in Canada, challenged s. 16(4)(c) of the Public Service Employment Act, which gives preference to Canadian citizens in open competitions for federal public service employment.

They argued this preference violated their equality rights under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that while the provision infringes s. 15(1) by discriminating on the analogous ground of citizenship, it is saved under s. 1 as a reasonable limit demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

The Court found the objectives of enhancing the meaning of citizenship and encouraging naturalization to be pressing and substantial, and the preference to be rationally connected and minimally impairing.