Alexandra Campbell

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and uttering threats against two former employees at his restaurant.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to properly consider evidence of collusion and animus among the complainants, and misapprehended evidence regarding the duration of one of the assaults.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the convictions related to the first complainant due to the trial judge's failure to critically analyze the evidence of collusion and animus.

The conviction related to the second complainant was upheld, as the trial judge's misapprehension of the assault's duration did not affect the ultimate finding of lack of consent.

The appellant was convicted of driving 'over 80' and appealed, arguing the trial judge erred by using his breathalyzer readings to assess the credibility of his 'evidence to the contrary' (the Carter defence).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, clarifying that the Supreme Court's prohibition in Boucher against using breathalyzer results to assess credibility applies only when the Crown relies on the presumption of accuracy.

Because the Crown called the breath technician and relied only on the presumption of identity, the trial judge was entitled to consider the breathalyzer readings in assessing the evidence as a whole.

The appellant appealed their sentence, arguing that the global sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence entirely fit given the appellant's substantial criminal record, the seriousness of the fraud offences, and the multiplicity of breach of probation offences.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision that quashed the respondent's conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The summary conviction appeal court judge had upheld the trial judge's reliance on the presumption of identity but found error in the alternative reliance on a toxicologist's report.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that while the Crown's narrow ground of appeal had merit, the issue lacked significance to the general administration of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault by maiming and his sentence of six years' imprisonment.

He argued there was no evidence of maiming.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the complainant's nearly severed toe, which left him permanently without feeling, was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the brutal, premeditated, and prolonged torture justified a sentence near the top end of the range.

The applicant, awaiting a retrial for first-degree murder, had his bail revoked after failing to report to police on Christmas Eve.

He applied for a review of the revocation order under s. 680 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence showing the applicant had been acquitted of the failure to comply charge because he simply forgot to report.

Finding the failure was not deliberate, the Court set aside the revocation order and reinstated the applicant's bail on the original conditions.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention at a minimum secure unit, arguing it was too restrictive and seeking an unconditional discharge.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible for assault, attempted sexual assault, and unlawfully being in a dwelling house, offences committed while experiencing command hallucinations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's disposition reasonable given the appellant's ongoing symptoms of schizoaffective disorder and the associated risk of disinhibited and aggressive behaviour.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board finding him unfit to stand trial due to an untreated mental disorder and delusions.

The appellant argued that the Board's reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's reasons were sufficient for appellate review and its conclusion was not unreasonable based on the evidence.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on two counts of sexual assault.

The trial judge had found that sexual intercourse occurred but was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that it was without consent, basing this conclusion largely on isolated passages from a poem written by the complainant.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider the poem as a whole and in the context of the complainant's sworn testimony denying consent.

The Crown met its burden of showing the verdict would not necessarily have been the same but for the error.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal decision that upheld a peace bond.

The Court of Appeal declined to admit fresh evidence, finding it added nothing of substance.

The Court agreed with the summary conviction appeal judge that there was a sufficient basis to grant the peace bond, though noting it would have been prudent for the trial judge to hear a summary of the circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of a defence witness.

The Court of Appeal held that it was open to the trial judge to conclude the witness failed to explain an important inconsistency in the evidence, and it was for the trial judge to determine the impact on credibility.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a seven-year-old child.

He argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence and erred by taking judicial notice of DNA properties when concluding that the absence of his DNA on the complainant did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments.

While the trial judge did err by taking judicial notice of DNA persistence without expert evidence, the Court applied the curative proviso, finding the error harmless given the overwhelming credibility findings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly considered the neighbour relationship as a low-end breach of trust.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissing his appeal from conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding no error of law.

The court agreed that the only rational conclusion on the evidence was that the applicant occupied the driver's seat, thereby triggering the presumption of care and control under s. 258(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant was sentenced to a 90-day intermittent sentence for assault causing bodily harm, and two concurrent 18-month conditional sentences for uttering a death threat and pointing a firearm.

The Court of Appeal held the intermittent sentence was legal but had to be served on consecutive days.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that a conditional sentence is not a 'sentence of imprisonment' within the meaning of s. 732(1) of the Criminal Code, and therefore does not render an intermittent sentence illegal or require it to be served on consecutive days.

The appellant appealed his custodial sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to properly consider a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the sentencing judge incorrectly concluded that only incarceration could satisfy the objectives of general deterrence and denunciation.

The Court noted that a properly fashioned conditional sentence can meet these objectives, and highlighted that the equally culpable co-accused received an 18-month conditional sentence despite having a prior record.

The appeal was allowed, and an 18-month conditional sentence was substituted for the youthful first-time offender.

The Crown appealed a sentence of six months' imprisonment and three years' probation imposed on the respondent for failing to provide the necessaries of life, which contributed to the death of her 22-month-old son.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence manifestly unfit given the enormity of the crime, noting that an 18-month sentence would have been appropriate under the previous regime.

However, because the respondent had already served her sentence, was out of custody, and had presented fresh evidence of rehabilitation and counselling, the Court declined to return her to custody and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the summary conviction appeal court, which had dismissed his appeal from conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that despite the appeal judge's comments, she had applied the proper test under Morrissey.

The appellant appealed his sentence.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred by failing to give the usual 2-to-1 enhanced credit for pre-trial custody, which the trial Crown had not opposed.

The Court of Appeal agreed, allowed the appeal in part, and reduced the sentence to time served.

The court also clarified that the restitution order did not provide for restitution to the James Estate and found no other errors.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break and enter, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

He challenged the trial judge's reliance on shoe evidence, a CAA card found in the possession of a woman seen in a video, and video identification by police officers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly limited the use of the shoe evidence, appropriately weighed the CAA card evidence, and reasonably accepted the police officers' identification based on their familiarity with the appellant's distinctive features.