Laskin

The appellant architect appealed a summary judgment dismissing its third party claims for contribution and indemnity against two sub-trades in a complex construction delay dispute.

The motion judge had dismissed the claims on the basis that there was no firm evidentiary foundation for the sub-trades' liability.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge committed an error in principle by failing to assess the advisability of summary judgment in the context of the litigation as a whole.

Because the sub-trades' responsibility for project delays remained a live issue in the main actions, granting partial summary judgment created an unacceptable risk of duplicative proceedings and inconsistent findings of fact.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder after his three children tried to kill their mother.

At trial, the Crown theorized that the appellant used his religious beliefs to influence the children, and made inflammatory remarks during closing submissions comparing the appellant to notorious cult leaders and calling him a 'Jesus nut'.

The trial judge did not correct these remarks or instruct the jury on how to use the evidence of the appellant's religious beliefs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the Crown's improper comments and the trial judge's failure to intervene rendered the trial unfair and caused a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant orthopedic surgeon appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for medical malpractice after the respondent developed compartment syndrome following the application of a full circumferential cast.

The trial judge had strongly criticized the appellant's counsel for reviewing and discussing draft reports with their expert witnesses, ruling that such practices were improper under the 2010 amendments to Rule 53.03.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law, confirming that consultation between counsel and expert witnesses is essential and protected by litigation privilege absent a factual foundation of improper influence.

The Court also found the trial judge erred by using expert reports not in evidence to contradict viva voce testimony.

However, the Court concluded these errors did not cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, as the respondent's expert evidence was overwhelmingly stronger.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued for non-pecuniary damages.

The trial judge found the respondent met the statutory impairment threshold but dismissed the action because the respondent did not provide corroborating evidence of his change in function from a witness other than himself, as required by s. 4.3(5) of O. Reg. 461/96.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the regulation does not preclude the injured person from providing the corroborative evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the regulation requires corroboration of the physician's evidence, which can be provided by the injured person's own testimony.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge failed to make a finding of causation regarding whether the complainant's wounds were caused during a swarming in a parking lot or by flying glass.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the inescapable inference from the trial judge's reasons was that the wounds were caused during the parking lot assault, consistent with the Crown's theory and the complainant's accepted testimony.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting the sentencing judge did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Summers.

The appellant was granted 1.5 to 1 credit for all pre-sentence custody, resulting in a further 5 months of credit.

The plaintiffs were injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued the at-fault driver.

When the defendant's insurer took an off-coverage position, the plaintiffs' counsel attempted to add the plaintiffs' own insurer to the action for underinsured coverage.

After a motion judge directed counsel to bring the motion on notice due to a potential limitation period issue, counsel instead commenced a new action against the insurer.

The motion judge in the new action struck the claim as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while ignoring the direction was a minor abuse of process, striking the claim and potentially depriving the plaintiffs of underinsured coverage was a disproportionate penalty.

The court instead penalized the plaintiffs by denying them the costs of the motion and the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a stabbing at a nightclub.

At trial, he claimed he acted in self-defence.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by reversing a ruling that excluded prejudicial portions of his police statements, and by improperly instructing the jury on post-offence conduct and exculpatory statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly reweighed the probative value of the police statements after the defence put the officer's conduct in issue, and that the jury instructions on post-offence conduct and reasonable doubt were sufficient.

The appellant, a deaf individual with limited communication skills, was involuntarily committed under the Mental Health Act and detained in a maximum security psychiatric facility for 19 years.

He challenged the constitutionality of the involuntary committal provisions under s. 7 of the Charter and alleged a violation of his s. 15(1) equality rights due to inadequate sign language interpretation.

The Court of Appeal held that the Mental Health Act violates s. 7 when applied to long-term detainees because the Consent and Capacity Board lacks the authority to ensure that liberty is restricted no more than necessary.

The Court also found a violation of s. 15(1) due to the systemic failure to provide adequate interpretation services.

The Court severed the words 'or subsequent' from s. 20(4)(b)(iii) of the Act, suspending the declaration of invalidity for 12 months, and granted a declaration of the appellant's equality rights.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 15 years after shooting a bystander outside a tavern.

He appealed his conviction, arguing improper Crown cross-examination and errors in the trial judge's instructions on intent and provocation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's charge or the Crown's conduct.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and the period of parole ineligibility was reduced to 12 years, as the trial judge failed to give adequate weight to the appellant's lack of criminal record and potential for rehabilitation.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for assault and attempted kidnapping, was detained at a mental health facility.

His treating physician found him incapable of consenting to antipsychotic medication for his delusional disorder, a finding confirmed by the Consent and Capacity Board and upheld by the Superior Court.

On appeal, the appellant argued the physician's evidence was uncorroborated and the incapacity finding was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the physician's evidence was corroborated by the appellant's own testimony and documentary evidence, and the board's conclusion that the appellant could not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing medication was reasonable.

The plaintiffs brought a medical negligence action against the defendant doctor regarding care during pregnancy and delivery.

The defendant successfully moved to strike the statement of claim on the basis that it lacked sufficient particulars of the alleged negligence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiffs' appeal, holding that a plaintiff in a medical negligence action is not required to obtain an expert opinion before pleading, and that the material facts pleaded were sufficient to enable the defendant to deliver a statement of defence.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's discretionary decision regarding the appointment of an umpire for an insurance appraisal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to interfere with the motion judge's discretion.

The court was satisfied that the appointed umpire was appropriately qualified and found no evidence of bad faith.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge granting summary judgment and awarding costs to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's reasons for summary judgment or the costs award, noting the costs award was not unreasonable or erroneous in principle.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant was convicted of historical sexual abuse against his step-daughter and biological daughter.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility by relying on improper cross-examination about motive to fabricate, failing to address inconsistencies, and improperly relying on the appellant's courtroom demeanour outside the witness box.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the cross-examination was proper, the inconsistencies were minor, and the trial judge's modest reliance on courtroom demeanour did not cause a miscarriage of justice given the other cogent reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in calculating pre-trial custody credit.

The Court of Appeal held that because the appellant was detained under section 524(4) of the Criminal Code, the statute restricted credit to a 1:1 basis rather than 1.5:1.

The appeal was allowed to reflect a corrected effective sentence of 169 days, which had already been served.

The appellant, a commercial truck driver, was convicted of importing cocaine after 53 kilograms of cocaine were found hidden in his trailer.

At trial, the Crown introduced an expert police report on the use of commercial vehicles for transporting contraband.

The report contained both general opinions and case-specific opinions regarding the appellant's credibility and knowledge of the drugs.

The Court of Appeal held that the case-specific opinions were inadmissible as they usurped the role of the trier of fact.

Finding that the trial judge improperly relied on this inadmissible evidence to conclude the appellant knew about the cocaine, the majority allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, challenging the scope of a no-contact provision that included the Toronto Star.

The Court of Appeal found sufficient evidence to justify the continued inclusion of the Toronto Star in the condition, noting the appellant's history of threatening and harassing behaviour targeting media agencies.

The appeal was dismissed, subject to minor modifications proposed by the respondents.

The appellant settled and abandoned its appeal on liability and damages, proceeding only on the issues of costs and pre-judgment interest against two respondents.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal the trial judge's costs decisions, finding no error in principle in declining to award costs of the first trial or substantial indemnity costs of the second trial.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding pre-judgment interest, which had been inadvertently omitted below, awarding interest at 4 percent from the date of conversion.

The respondents built an addition to their home that encroached on a private right-of-way shared with the appellants.

The right-of-way was granted for vehicular ingress and egress.

The application judge found that the encroachment did not substantially interfere with the appellants' ability to use the laneway for its granted purpose and dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that an encroachment on a private right-of-way, even by a permanent structure, is only actionable if it substantially interferes with the dominant owner's reasonable use of the right-of-way.