Stay of proceedings

The U.K. Pensions Regulator and Pension Protection Fund Trustee appealed an order finding that their service of a Warning Notice breached the stay provisions in the Initial Order under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the service of the Notice was a nullity.

The Court clarified that the order below does not preclude the appellants from seeking to assert a claim in the CCAA process for pension contribution shortfalls.

Gary McHale laid a private information alleging three individuals committed a crime.

A justice of the peace received the information.

Before the pre-enquete hearing under s. 507.1 of the Criminal Code could begin, a Crown Attorney intervened and withdrew the charges.

McHale successfully applied for mandamus in the Superior Court, which directed the pre-enquete to proceed.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Crown's common law authority to withdraw a private information does not crystallize until the justice determines to issue process at the conclusion of the pre-enquete.

The accused was denied a bail hearing for 24 days due to a lack of systemic resources in York Region.

The trial judge found a breach of the accused's section 11(e) Charter rights, stayed the proceedings, and awarded costs against the Crown.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the finding of systemic delay and the costs award for counsel's attendances in bail court.

However, the Court set aside the stay of proceedings, finding that the trial judge erred by failing to balance the interests served by granting a stay against society's interest in a trial on the merits.

The costs awarded for the Charter argument were also set aside.

The plaintiff brought a proposed class action against Dell for allegedly defective notebook computers.

Dell sought to stay the action based on a mandatory arbitration clause in its standard-form sales agreement.

The motion judge refused the stay and certified the class action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the Consumer Protection Act, 2002, which invalidates mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer agreements, applied to the claim because the computers failed after the Act came into force.

The Court also refused to grant a partial stay for non-consumer claims, as doing so would lead to inefficiency and a multiplicity of proceedings.

The respondent was charged with trafficking cocaine.

On the trial date, the assigned Crown counsel realized she had previously represented the respondent and eventually disclosed a potential conflict of interest.

The trial judge stayed the proceedings as an abuse of process and awarded costs against the Crown, finding the Crown's conduct placed the respondent in an untenable position.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error in concluding the Crown could not prove its case and failed to apply the proper legal principles for a stay of proceedings.

The stay and costs orders were set aside.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order staying Ontario family law proceedings in favour of Mexican proceedings.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by failing to implement a prior consent order that mandated binding mediation-arbitration.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that staying the proceedings without setting aside the prior order was an impermissible collateral attack.

The Court also held that the mediation-arbitration agreement was valid even though it was signed by counsel rather than the parties themselves, applying the principle from Geropoulos v. Geropoulos.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the accused on nine counts of historical indecent assault.

The trial judge had stayed the charges, including three to which the accused had just pled guilty, due to a 27-month delay between arrest and trial, finding a breach of s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the 16.5 months of institutional delay fell within the Morin guidelines and the accused suffered only slight prejudice, primarily related to winter travel difficulties rather than the delay itself.

The stay was set aside, and the matter was remanded for trial on the not-guilty pleas and sentencing on the guilty pleas.

The Crown appealed an order staying proceedings against the respondent for child pornography charges due to a 27.5-month delay between arrest and trial.

The trial judge found the delay unreasonable under s. 11(b) of the Charter, attributing it to the slow pace of Crown disclosure and institutional delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the case's complexity, the inherent time requirements, or the balancing of the respondent's prejudice against society's interest in a trial on the merits.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, uttering a death threat, and unlawful confinement.

The trial judge granted a stay of proceedings, finding that the 30-month delay from the date of the charge to the scheduled trial date violated the accused's right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, concluding that the delay was not unreasonable given the mutual agreement to convert the case to a superior court trial with a preliminary inquiry, and the lack of significant prejudice to the accused.

The stay was set aside and the matter was directed to proceed to trial.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder, robbery, and forcible confinement after a third trial, the first two having resulted in hung juries.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in failing to give a limiting instruction regarding the lead police investigator's testimony, which included hearsay and personal opinions on the appellant's guilt.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the failure to provide a limiting instruction was a fatal error that could have led the jury to believe the police possessed undisclosed inculpatory evidence.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso given the prior hung juries, and entered a stay of proceedings rather than ordering a fourth trial.

The appellants, an actuary and his employer, were sued by the successor administrator of a pension plan for allegedly preparing negligent actuarial reports that allowed the plan sponsor to underfund the plan before entering CCAA protection.

The appellants sought to bring third-party claims against the sponsor's former directors and officers, alleging they instructed the actuary to use improper methods.

The motion judge struck the third-party claims, finding they disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the successor administrator's claim did not depend on the sponsor's reasonable reliance on the reports, and that the CCAA orders protecting directors and officers did not bar the third-party claims because the individuals were acting as agents of the plan administrator, not merely as corporate directors.

The appellant brought an action in detinue in the Superior Court of Justice seeking the return of diamonds seized by Customs for failure to declare them.

The motion judge stayed the action, finding the Federal Court was the court of preferred jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge properly exercised his discretion under section 106 of the Courts of Justice Act, as the Federal Court has more experience with the Customs Act and related issues.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to grant a stay of Ontario proceedings on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The underlying action involved a fire at the respondent's plant in Alberta, and the respondent had commenced identical actions in both Alberta and Ontario.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge properly applied the factors from Amchem and Muscutt, concluding that Alberta was not a more convenient forum, particularly given a potential limitation period issue in Alberta.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision denying a stay of proceedings under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion.

The court agreed that the underlying application was a straightforward Charter-based constitutional challenge of a federal law regarding citizenship, rather than a matter involving the administrative handling of citizenship files.

The Crown appealed an order staying nine charges of fraud over $5,000 against the respondent due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The charges arose from alleged misrepresentations of a publicly traded company's financial affairs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's assessment of the inherent time requirements and his allocation of institutional delay.

The Court found no error in the application judge's conclusion that the Crown's accommodation of co-accused counsels' schedules contributed to the unreasonable delay, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant's criminal charges were stayed on the eve of trial due to delay and disclosure issues, and the trial judge awarded costs against the Crown under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The summary conviction appeal judge set aside the costs award.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the setting aside of the costs award, finding that while the 16-month delay triggered a s. 11(b) inquiry, the Crown's conduct did not amount to the marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable standards required to justify a costs award.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, using a firearm, and possession of a prohibited weapon following his fourth trial.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting an overheard utterance to his lawyer ('I had a gun, but I didn't point it') without context, and in instructing the jury that his failure to ask why he was being arrested could be used to assess his guilt.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the utterance's meaning was too speculative and its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

The court also found the trial judge impermissibly undermined the appellant's right to silence.

Given this would be the appellant's fifth trial, the court entered a stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding Option A of a contract unenforceable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that Option A lacked a mechanism to ensure the consummation of a contemplated maintenance agreement, rendering the option to purchase television sets for $1 unenforceable.

The court varied the damages award to include a fair rental charge of $4,696.50 per month for the period the appellant retained the television sets under a stay pending appeal.

The appellant sought a stay of proceedings on the basis of alleged unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, raising foundational questions about which criminal courts may grant remedies under s. 24(1).

The Supreme Court held, by majority, that a preliminary inquiry judge is not a court of competent jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies because that tribunal's authority is confined by the Criminal Code and does not include the remedial powers sought.

The Court further held that Charter remedies in criminal matters must generally fit within the existing procedural structure of the criminal process, with superior courts retaining jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances and appeals remaining governed by statutory routes.

The appeal was dismissed, although strong dissents would have found a s. 11(b) breach and stayed the proceedings.

The accused was charged with several sexual offences nearly three years after the alleged incidents, primarily due to the police's inability to locate the complainant.

A Provincial Court judge stayed the proceedings, finding the pre-charge delay violated the accused's right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, holding that the time frame for assessing a section 11(b) claim generally runs only from the moment a person is charged, and pre-charge delay is irrelevant to this analysis.