Stay of proceedings

The appellant appealed an order requiring her to attend an examination in aid of execution, arguing the Master erred because she had filed for bankruptcy two days prior, triggering an automatic stay under s. 69.3(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The respondent argued the underlying default judgment declared the debt survived bankruptcy under s. 178(1).

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that s. 178(1) applies to discharge, not the automatic stay, and the Master erred in granting the order while the stay was in effect.

The municipality appealed a motion judge's decision to stay its civil action against the defendants pending the completion of related criminal fraud charges against one of the defendants.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in law by holding that section 7 of the Charter eclipsed the established test requiring extraordinary or exceptional circumstances for a stay.

The court reaffirmed that the burden remains on the moving party to prove exceptional circumstances, and set aside the stay.

The applicant, a Justice of the Peace facing a judicial misconduct complaint, brought a motion for a temporary stay of the Hearing Panel's proceedings pending his application for judicial review of the Complaints Committee's decision to refer the matter to a hearing.

The respondent brought a cross-motion to quash the judicial review application for prematurity.

The court held that the judicial review application was manifestly premature, as all of the applicant's arguments could be raised before the Hearing Panel.

The court also dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the applicant failed to meet the test for a stay of proceedings.

The applicant, a psychotherapist, brought a motion to stay the Registrar's decision revoking her certificate of registration pending her application for judicial review.

The Registrar had revoked the certificate without a hearing, finding the applicant failed to disclose prior complaints and relationships on her application.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and granted the stay, finding serious issues to be tried regarding procedural fairness, irreparable harm to the applicant's reputation and livelihood, and that the balance of convenience favoured the applicant.

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of an arbitrator's order which held that an arbitration arising from a 1990 motor vehicle accident could not proceed because the applicant had signed a full and final release.

The applicant sought the stay pending an application for judicial review.

The Divisional Court applied the RJR MacDonald test and found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The court noted that the delay was largely attributable to the applicant and that financial compensation would ultimately be available if successful.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court trial judgment dismissing her action against the respondent for trespass.

Prior to trial, a settlement had been reached and the respondent paid the appellant $18,000.

The settlement was later vacated by court order, which required the appellant to return the $18,000 before proceeding to trial.

The appellant proceeded to trial without repaying the funds and subsequently appealed the trial decision.

The Divisional Court stayed the appeal, ordering that the stay would become permanent if the appellant failed to repay the $18,000 within 30 days, citing the need to enforce compliance with court orders.

The applicant sought a stay of small claims court proceedings pending an application for judicial review of a deputy judge's interlocutory order granting an adjournment on terms, specifically an order for particulars.

The Divisional Court denied the motion for a stay and quashed the application for judicial review, holding that judicial review of interlocutory small claims court decisions is restricted to narrow jurisdictional issues.

The court found no jurisdictional error in the order for particulars and concluded the application was manifestly devoid of merit.

The applicant sought to stay academic disciplinary proceedings before the University Tribunal pending his application for judicial review of the Tribunal Chair's interim decisions refusing to recuse himself and refusing to disqualify the university's counsel.

The university brought a cross-motion to quash the judicial review application.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for a stay and granted the cross-motion to quash, finding that the application for judicial review was manifestly premature as the hearing on the merits had not yet proceeded and the applicant had an adequate alternative remedy through an internal appeal.

The appellant tenant appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating her tenancy so the purchaser could move in.

The appeal automatically stayed the eviction, allowing the appellant to live rent-free for 14 months.

The appellant failed to perfect the appeal, claiming she could not afford the transcripts, and moved for an extension of time.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion and quashed the appeal, noting the appellant had saved approximately $21,000 in rent and failed to provide proper proof that the transcripts had been ordered.

The self-represented plaintiffs sought leave to appeal an order staying their civil action pending the final disposition of related criminal proceedings against one of the plaintiffs.

The civil action alleged various torts and Charter breaches arising from wiretap authorizations that led to the criminal charges.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision.

The court noted that the fundamental issue in the civil claim—the lawfulness of the wiretap authorization—was identical to a key issue in the criminal case, making the circumstances exceptional enough to warrant a stay.

The appellant appealed a master's decision dismissing its motion to stay a wrongful dismissal action on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The appellant argued the master erred in considering juridical advantage and in failing to follow a similar Superior Court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the master correctly applied the Supreme Court's guidance in Van Breda regarding juridical advantage and properly exercised his discretion in weighing the factors.

The court held that the master was entitled to distinguish the prior Superior Court decision based on the unique circumstances of the case.

The self-represented plaintiffs, who are currently incarcerated, brought a motion to extend the time to deliver a motion for leave to appeal an order staying their civil action pending the disposition of criminal charges against one of the plaintiffs.

The court found that the plaintiffs had a bona fide intention to appeal, adequately explained the delay caused by their incarceration and administrative errors, and that the defendants suffered no prejudice.

The court also found that the proposed leave to appeal motion had merit, as the motion judge had not considered the high threshold required to stay a civil proceeding pending criminal charges.

The extension of time was granted, and costs were awarded to the moving party.

The applicant employer brought a motion to stay an arbitrator's interim award pending judicial review.

The employer had disciplined an employee, who grieved the discipline.

The employer subsequently withdrew the discipline and argued the arbitrator lost jurisdiction as the matter was resolved.

The arbitrator found there were remaining remedial issues and retained jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the stay motion, finding no serious question to be determined because the judicial review application was premature and would result in fragmentation of the administrative process.

The respondent employee was wrongfully dismissed and awarded damages in Small Claims Court.

The appellant employer engaged in years of frivolous and vexatious litigation to avoid paying the judgment, including multiple failed appeals and motions.

The respondent successfully garnished the funds after correcting a misnomer in the appellant's name.

The appellant appealed the misnomer correction and the refusal to return the garnished funds.

The Divisional Court dismissed the misnomer appeal on the merits, declined to lift the stay of garnishment due to lack of financial hardship evidence, but ultimately dismissed the appellant's second appeal as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.02, thereby lifting the stay and prohibiting the appellant from bringing further motions without leave.

The landlord brought a motion to dismiss the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating the tenancy for non-payment of rent.

The tenant had not paid any rent since moving in and failed to comply with a Board consent order requiring payment of rent into the Board.

The Divisional Court found the appeal was completely devoid of merit, raised no genuine questions of law, and constituted an abuse of process designed solely to prolong a rent-free existence.

The motion was granted, the appeal was dismissed, the stay was vacated, and the landlord was awarded substantial indemnity costs.

The applicants brought two motions in relation to their application for judicial review of a decision by the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario Discipline Committee.

The first motion sought to compel the Committee to include a full transcript of the oral evidence in the record of proceedings.

The second motion sought an interim stay of the discipline proceedings pending the judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions, finding that the relevant statutes do not oblige the Committee to order and pay for a transcript if one has not been prepared, and that the application for judicial review was premature as the administrative proceedings had not yet concluded.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granting the respondent monies due under a defaulted mortgage.

The appellants argued the judgment should not have been granted or should have been stayed because of an ongoing 2011 action alleging misappropriation of funds by a financial advisor who allegedly controlled the respondent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence linking the respondent to the defendants in the 2011 action and no triable issues regarding liability under the mortgage.

The court also denied leave to appeal the motion judge's costs award.

The applicant, a paralegal, sought judicial review of a Law Society appeal panel decision that set aside findings of professional misconduct against him but directed a new hearing rather than staying the proceedings.

The applicant argued the appeal panel breached procedural fairness and provided insufficient reasons for refusing the stay.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the appeal panel reasonably concluded that the stay request should be addressed by a new hearing panel with the benefit of a full evidentiary record.

The plaintiffs appealed an order staying their action for failure to pay previous costs awards.

Through this appeal, the self-represented plaintiff sought to set aside a $6,450 costs award made by another judge who had dismissed the plaintiffs' motion for leave to appeal a document production order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the previous costs order could not be collaterally attacked through an appeal of the stay order, and that the costs were appropriately awarded to the successful party on the leave motion.

The appellants brought motions to stay the construction of two wind turbine projects pending their appeals of the Environmental Review Tribunal's decisions upholding the Renewable Energy Approvals.

The court found it lacked jurisdiction under the Rules of Civil Procedure or the Environmental Protection Act to stay the Director's approvals directly, treating the motions as requests for interlocutory injunctions.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found a serious issue to be tried but concluded the appellants would not suffer irreparable harm prior to the appeal hearing, as the turbines would not be operational by then.

The motions were dismissed.