Child protection

The Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a motion seeking a temporary order placing two children (ages 7 and 12) in the mother's care subject to society supervision, due to substantial school absenteeism over three years.

The motion proceeded on consent after the mother ensured consistent school attendance.

The court granted the order with conditions for both parents and the society, emphasizing that educational neglect is a serious child protection concern that societies must address promptly.

This endorsement addresses costs following a child protection trial where the primary dispute was between paternal (A.H. and B.H.) and maternal (D.T. and A.T.) grandparents for custody of a child, M. The paternal grandparents, who were ultimately granted deemed custody, sought costs against the maternal grandparents.

The court found that while the maternal grandparents had a legitimate case, their conduct, including obstructing access and breaching court orders, was unreasonable and unduly prolonged the proceedings.

Applying principles that allow for costs against parents/parties in child protection cases for unreasonable conduct, the court awarded $3,000 in costs to the paternal grandparents to sanction the maternal grandparents' behaviour and partially indemnify the successful litigants.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought two protection applications concerning children Iz (6 years old) and J (5 months old), both in the society's temporary care.

The applications alleged the mother's substance misuse, neglect, inadequate supervision, unstable housing, and inability to meet the children's needs, including special needs, alongside concerns related to the disappearance and death of another child, Nv.

The mother sought dismissal of the application for J or, alternatively, a 6-month supervision order for both children in her care, with access.

The court found J to be in need of protection, citing overwhelming evidence of risk of harm due to the mother's serious lack of judgment, dishonesty, and chaotic lifestyle, particularly concerning Nv's death.

The court dismissed the mother's request for a supervision order and access, finding her unreliable and her plan inadequate.

Both children were placed in the extended society care of the Children's Aid Society, with an order for sibling access between Iz and J, and with their other siblings R and A in Peel CAS care.

The offender, Christopher Watts, pleaded guilty to breaching a Long-Term Supervision Order (LTSO) by being in the presence of female children under 18 without supervision.

This was his fourth breach of the LTSO.

The court considered sentencing principles, including denunciation, deterrence, and separation, giving primary consideration to the protection of children.

The offender's lack of insight and resistance to rehabilitation were aggravating factors.

The court imposed a sentence of three years' incarceration, less pre-sentence custody on a 1:1 basis, rejecting enhanced credit due to the need for public protection and the offender's high risk of recidivism.

The Society sought extended care for H.M., who was found in need of protection.

The mother, B.T., sought H.M.'s return.

The court found that while H.M. continued to need protection, the risk was low and B.T.'s parenting was adequate.

The court critically examined the Society's restrictive access policies and communication, which contributed to the strained relationship.

The final order placed H.M. in the mother's care under Society supervision for six months, with specific terms for communication and support, and no access for the father.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a summary judgment motion in a child protection application concerning two children, MA (4) and MH (3), who had a history of being in and out of society care due to parental instability, substance abuse, and criminal involvement.

The mother, C. B.-H., was the only participating respondent, seeking placement of the children in her care or increased access.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, concluding that the mother's chaotic lifestyle, incarceration, and failure to address protection concerns rendered her unable to provide a safe and stable home.

The court granted the society's request for extended society care for both children, with discretionary access for the mother (minimum three times annually) and paternal aunt (minimum two times annually if requested), and no access for the father and paternal uncle.

Sibling access was ordered a minimum of twice monthly.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that the child K. was in need of protection and an order for extended society care with no access for the mother, K.C. K.C. opposed, seeking dismissal or a supervision order and continued access.

The court found K. to be in need of protection and ordered extended society care, citing K.C.'s long-standing behavioral and thought process challenges, and her inability to provide a safe, stable, and predictable environment.

However, the court found insufficient evidence to summarily determine the access issue post-extended society care, ordering a mini-trial on that specific matter.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a summary judgment motion seeking a final order to place two children (J.W. Jr. and A.D.) in the permanent care and custody of a kin caregiver (C.R.) under section 102 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The Society also sought orders regarding access for the mother (S.D.) and fathers, and the kin caregiver's ability to secure documentation and travel with the children.

The mother opposed the motion, seeking the return of the children, but did not file affidavit evidence.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, concluding that the mother's untreated and recurring mental health issues posed a high and unmitigated risk to the children, and her plan of care was not in the children's best interests.

The court granted the Society's requested orders, emphasizing the children's need for permanency, their special needs, and their Métis cultural connection with the kin caregiver.

The Applicant, Valoris for Children and Adults of Prescott-Russell, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a final order for extended society care for the child B.J.M.O., who had previously been found in need of protection.

The respondent parents opposed, arguing for a trial on disposition and access, proposing custody to kin or interim supervision.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial.

It ordered extended society care for the child, with access to parents at the Society's discretion (due to criminal no-contact conditions and a broken relationship) and sibling access as determined by the Society.

The decision emphasized the child's best interests, stability, and the unsuitability of other options.

The Family and Children’s Services of Guelph and Wellington County brought a motion for temporary care and custody of a child, R., seeking placement with her aunt and uncle.

The father opposed, requesting the child's return to his care or expanded access, while the mother and aunt/uncle supported the Society's plan.

The court applied the two-part test under subsection 94(10) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, requiring the Society to demonstrate reasonable grounds of a real possibility of harm if the child were returned to parental care, and that an interim supervision order would be insufficient.

The court found a long history of neglect, including unhygienic living conditions, missed medical appointments, school absences, and concerns arising from the tragic death of another child in the parents' care.

The parents' responses were deemed insufficient to refute the established risks.

The court concluded that the child was at risk of harm and could not be adequately protected by a supervision order with either parent.

Consequently, the motion for temporary care and custody with the aunt and uncle was granted, with supervised access for the parents, and the Society was directed to monitor the child's hygiene and school attendance.

The Children's Aid Society initiated child protection proceedings concerning S.D. The paternal great-grandmother, A.D., moved to be added as a party to the proceedings.

The maternal grandmother, L.P., opposed the motion, arguing it would cause delay and that A.D. was not a primary caregiver.

The Society did not oppose A.D.'s motion.

The court found it was in the child's best interests to add A.D. as a party, noting her significant and consistent caregiving role, and that the existing order for L.P. to make "reasonable access arrangements with A.D." constituted a right of access, making A.D. a "parent" under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

Even if not a statutory parent, the court would exercise its discretion to add A.D. as a party.

The motion was granted.

The parents (P.N.R. and K.R.) appealed a summary judgment finding that their children were in need of protection due to physical harm, as determined by a motions judge.

The appeal raised issues regarding fresh evidence, the legal test for physical harm, the application of summary judgment rules, and procedural fairness.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the original finding that the children had suffered physical harm.

It found no error in the motions judge's application of the law, including the standard for physical harm and the use of summary judgment powers to weigh evidence and assess credibility.

The court also rejected claims of procedural unfairness and ineffective counsel.

This case concerns a temporary care and custody motion for an Indigenous child, L.L.C., who had been residing with a maternal aunt under a Customary Care Agreement (CCA).

Following the CCA's termination, the child was placed with the father.

Kina Gbezhgomi Child and Family Services initiated a protection application seeking a protection finding and a supervision order with the father.

The court determined that the federal An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families (Federal Act) applies and has paramountcy over provincial legislation (CYFSA), altering the method of analysis for Indigenous children's placements.

Applying the Federal Act's national standards, the court found it was in the child's best interests to be placed with the father, without the need for society supervision, as there were no protection concerns.

The court also ordered continued contact with the maternal aunt and suggested the matter be transitioned to a Children's Law Reform Act application.

The Children's Aid Society of Waterloo Region brought a summary judgment motion seeking an order for their Openness Application to proceed under s. 197 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (CYFSA).

The children are Métis and were adopted by the adoptive parents.

The motion addressed whether the Openness Application could proceed despite alleged failures by the Society to properly serve the Métis Nation of Ontario and an unidentified First Nation band, as required by the CYFSA.

The court found that formal service and notice to the Métis community were not required for the Openness Application to proceed, as the Métis Nation of Ontario is not a "listed community" under the Act, and the determination of a child's community for statutory notice purposes is a ministerial, not judicial, function.

The court ordered the Openness Application to proceed under s. 197 and expedited the trial management conference and openness hearing.

The father (P.W.) appealed a trial judge's decision finding his children in need of protection under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, and placing them in the mother's custody with supervised access for the father.

The father argued the trial judge erred in applying the Act, misapprehended evidence, and erred in judicial notice and risk assessment.

The Children's Aid Society and the Office of the Children's Lawyer supported the trial judge's flexible approach to evidence and findings.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding of need for protection and the disposition, upholding the flexible approach to evidence in child protection cases and deferring to the trial judge's factual findings and assessment of the children's best interests.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a child protection application and a motion for temporary care and custody of three children, seeking a supervision order for the mother (K.M.).

The father (D.L.) did not appear.

The court addressed procedural fairness, noting the Society's failure to provide adequate notice for both the application (30 days required) and the motion (6 days required), as materials were filed and the first court date set only four days later.

The judge declined to abridge time, finding the Society's procedure unfair and tantamount to ex parte proceedings.

Despite the Society's request for a supervision order under s.94(2)(b) of the CYFSA, the court ordered temporary care and custody to the mother without supervision under s.94(2)(a), emphasizing fairness and the lack of pressing concerns for the children.

This ruling addresses a status review proceeding by summary judgment motion under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The court assessed whether the child, "G", remained in need of protection due to emotional harm stemming from past domestic violence involving the parents and the father's ongoing actions.

While the mother had made significant progress in her ability to protect the child, "G" continued to exhibit aggressive behaviors and fear related to the father.

The court denied the Society's request for a deemed custody order, opting instead for a protection order.

This order placed the child in the mother's care subject to nine months of Society supervision, with no access for the incarcerated father until he brings a new application and demonstrates reduced risk.

This case concerns a temporary care hearing under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, for two children, JS1 and DA.

The applicant, Dilico Anishinabek Family Care, sought to place the children in its temporary care due to concerns of physical harm and neglect by the parents, including inappropriate discipline, failure to meet children's needs, and substance abuse.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children were at risk, citing consistent allegations from the children, the parents' uncooperative behaviour, lack of insight, and failure to complete rehabilitative programs.

The court ordered the children into the temporary care of the agency with supervised access for the parents.

The Children's Aid Society of Brant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking extended society care for two children, J.G.P.G. and J.B.G., following the termination of an interim care order.

The respondent mother, M.G., did not file responding materials, and the respondent father, F.B., though noted in default, was permitted to make submissions.

The court granted the Society's motion, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding the children's permanent placement, and ordered extended society care with specified access for both parents and the children's older sister, D.G.

This decision addresses a request for costs brought by the father (K.D.) against the mother (P.D.) following a child protection trial.

The trial found the child in need of protection due to emotional harm caused by the mother, and custody was granted to the father.

The court applied Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, noting that the presumption of costs for a successful party does not apply in child protection cases.

While the mother's litigation conduct was deemed unreasonable and prolonged the trial, the court found it did not constitute "bad faith" under Rule 24(8) because her actions stemmed from a fixed belief related to a personality disorder, rather than an intent to inflict financial or emotional harm.

Consequently, the father was awarded partial indemnity costs, significantly less than the full recovery sought, reflecting the mother's unreasonable behaviour but not bad faith.