Abuse of process

The applicant sought judicial review of an administrative decision by a judge dismissing her misconduct complaints against two Deputy Judges and a Referee.

The Divisional Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering dismissing the application as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

After reviewing the applicant's submissions, the court dismissed the application, finding it lacked jurisdiction over the underlying orders, failed to plead claims against several respondents, and contained only bare allegations of Charter infringements and procedural unfairness without supporting facts.

The appellant filed two notices of appeal challenging a costs decision made by an Associate Justice.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, noting that leave to appeal is required for costs decisions under s. 133 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant failed to seek leave to appeal and instead made submissions challenging the costs order and a prior peremptory order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the proceeding under Rule 2.1.01 as an abuse of process because it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeals without leave, but granted the appellant two weeks to file a proper motion for leave to appeal.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review of two Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decisions that dismissed his discrimination application as an abuse of process and denied reconsideration.

The applicant also brought multiple procedural motions before the Divisional Court, including requests for adjournments, stays, and judicial recusals, alleging systemic bias and procedural unfairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed all motions, finding no denial of procedural fairness or reasonable apprehension of bias.

On the merits of the judicial review, the Court held that the HRTO's decisions were reasonable, noting the applicant's repeated failures to comply with tribunal directions and excessive filings.

The landlord brought a motion under Rule 2.1.01 to dismiss the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board consent eviction order as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The tenant had accumulated significant rent arrears and failed to make payments under a negotiated schedule.

The tenant appealed the consent order, claiming economic duress and good faith efforts to secure funds.

The Divisional Court found the appeal raised no questions of law, as required by the Residential Tenancies Act, and that the claim of duress lacked merit.

The court concluded the appeal was issued solely to allow the tenant to remain in the premises rent-free, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant veterinarian appealed three separate decisions of the Discipline Committee of the College of Veterinarians of Ontario finding him guilty of professional misconduct and imposing penalties including suspensions and costs.

The appellant argued that the proceedings should have been dismissed for abuse of process due to delay and procedural irregularities, that the College's expert evidence should not have been admitted, and that the penalties were clearly unfit.

The Divisional Court dismissed all three appeals, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the Committee's factual findings and no errors of law.

The Court held that the statutory referral process was properly followed, the delay was not inordinate and caused no prejudice, the expert evidence was properly admitted, and the penalties and costs were within the Committee's reasonable discretion.

The landlords brought a motion to lift the automatic stay of execution of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order pending the tenant's appeal.

The court had previously directed the tenant to pay ongoing rent and make monthly payments towards rental arrears as a condition of maintaining the stay.

The tenant failed to make any payments towards the arrears, arguing that conflicting orders prevented them from doing so.

The court rejected this argument, finding no contradiction, and held that it would be an abuse of process to allow the tenant to continue living in the unit without paying the outstanding rent.

The motion was granted and the stay of eviction was lifted.

The appellants, facing Canadian charges for a telemarketing fraud scheme targeting US residents, were ordered committed for extradition to the United States.

They appealed the committal order and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order, arguing the Canadian proceedings were a sham to hold them on bail pending extradition (abuse of process) and that their surrender violated their s. 6(1) Charter mobility rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and applications, finding no air of reality to the abuse of process claim and holding that the Minister properly applied the Cotroni factors in deciding to surrender the appellants.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to fully vacate notices of garnishment issued against their bank accounts.

The appellants argued the garnishments conflicted with prior freezing orders that permitted them to use funds for legal fees.

The Court of Appeal (majority) dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge properly exercised his broad discretion under Rule 60.08(16) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to uphold the garnishments while allowing limited access to funds for legal fees, preventing the frustration of the respondent's judgment.

The appellants appealed an order striking out their statement of claim against the federal government for discrimination, defamation, malice, and Charter breaches.

The motion judge found the action was an abuse of process, as it attempted to re-litigate complaints about a British Columbia legal proceeding and lacked any factual basis connecting the complaints to the federal government.

The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that the appellants could not make an indirect attack on the B.C. proceedings by suing the federal government in Ontario.

The appeal was dismissed with no costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to surrender him to the Czech Republic to face charges relating to the production and possession of methamphetamine.

The applicant argued that his surrender would be an abuse of process due to his status as a police informer, alleged police corruption, and the risk of an unfair trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's factual conclusions were well-founded and that he did not err in his analysis of whether the surrender would breach the principles of fundamental justice or section 44 of the Extradition Act.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her civil action against the Crown and the Attorney General of Ontario.

The Court of Appeal held that her claim for malicious prosecution was statute-barred under section 7 of the Public Authorities Protection Act, as it was commenced more than six months after the cause of action arose.

The court found no air of reality to her allegations of malice or her Charter claims, noting she failed to plead material facts.

The court also held that the civil action was an improper collateral attack on a final criminal court decision.

The appeal was dismissed without costs.

The appellant, Bank of Montreal, appealed an order granting the respondent, Royal Bank of Canada, priority over the proceeds of the sale of a property and collected rents.

The respondent's registered mortgage was void due to a violation of the Planning Act.

However, the Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision that the respondent was entitled to priority based on the equitable doctrine of subrogation, as it had advanced funds to pay off prior valid encumbrances and municipal taxes.

The Court also upheld the respondent's priority regarding the assignment of rents, which was validly registered under the Personal Property Security Act.

The respondent's cross-appeal seeking an equitable mortgage was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the extradition judge's dismissal of two preliminary stay applications and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order.

The stay applications alleged abuse of process due to political or religious motivation and challenged the certification of the Record of the Case.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the extradition judge correctly held that political motivation allegations are for the Minister to consider at the surrender stage, and that certification concerns related to reliability rather than admissibility.

The application for judicial review was also dismissed, as the Minister reasonably concluded there was no general policy of neglect for due process in the requesting state and no factual basis to suggest extradition was sought for an improper purpose.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her application for spousal support and declaring her a vexatious litigant under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent moved to quash the appeal on the basis that the appellant failed to obtain leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that leave is not required to appeal a vexatious litigant order itself.

On the merits, the Court set aside the vexatious litigant order because the appellant was not given a fair hearing on the issue.

However, the Court upheld the summary dismissal of the spousal support claim, finding no genuine issue for trial given the lack of evidence of economic disadvantage or need arising from the marriage.

The prosecution appealed the dismissal of its application for prohibition and certiorari to halt a securities prosecution.

The prosecution alleged the trial judge lost jurisdiction by interfering with its case presentation, failing to rule on evidence admissibility, and failing to restrain uncivil attacks by defence counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge has inherent trial management power to direct the order of evidence and defer evidentiary rulings.

While defence counsel's conduct was uncivil and improper, the trial judge's response did not deprive him of jurisdiction or prevent a fair trial.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident.

In a prior arbitration for accident benefits, the arbitrator found the appellant was uninsured at the time of the accident.

The appellant subsequently brought an action against the tortfeasor for negligence and against his insurer for breach of contract and negligence.

The motions judge dismissed both actions on the basis of abuse of process and issue estoppel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the tort action was separate from the contractual dispute, and the negligence claim against the insurer raised different issues than those decided in the arbitration.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action under Rule 24.01(1)(c).

The parties agreed the rule could not be invoked because the respondents had not served their affidavit of documents.

However, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal on the alternative ground that the action was an abuse of process, citing inordinate unexplained delay since 1996, conduct in prior related litigation, and failure to comply with a previous court order.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that his s. 7 Charter rights were breached due to missing initial disclosure statements from complainants and the late disclosure of the police file after the jury's guilty verdict.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the missing and late-disclosed materials were of marginal relevance and did not impact the right to a fair trial.

The appellant also argued that a delay in hearing his appeal, caused by issues obtaining transcripts, breached his Charter rights.

The Court dismissed this argument, finding no prejudice or abuse of process.

The appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The respondent, charged with arson, brought a pre-trial motion for a stay of proceedings alleging abuse of process due to an insurance company's involvement in the criminal investigation.

The trial judge refused the stay but excluded wiretap evidence and ordered the Crown to pay approximately $150,000 in costs forthwith.

The Crown appealed the costs order.

The Court of Appeal held that the Crown had the right to appeal the costs order immediately under s. 676.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Court allowed the appeal and quashed the costs order, finding that the trial judge should not have determined the issue of costs or the abuse of process application until the conclusion of the trial, as the actual benefit of the exclusionary remedy to the defence could only be assessed at that time.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to grant a stay of proceedings after police negligently lost a five-minute videotaped statement from an eyewitness.

The trial judge found the loss breached the respondents' s. 7 Charter rights and prejudiced their ability to make full answer and defence.

The Court of Appeal agreed there was a s. 7 breach but held that a stay was inappropriate, as the lost evidence did not cause irreparable harm to the integrity of the justice system or such prejudice that no other remedy would suffice.

The Court noted other remedies, such as excluding the identification evidence, were available.

The stay was set aside and a new trial ordered.