Blair J.A.

The appellants advanced $600,000 to the respondents during negotiations to purchase a 25 per cent interest in the respondents' business.

When the transaction failed, the appellants sued to recover the funds, arguing they were a refundable deposit or loan, while the respondents claimed they were a non-refundable down payment.

The trial judge dismissed the action in very brief reasons.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge mischaracterized the central issue and failed to provide sufficient reasons to permit meaningful appellate review.

In a CCAA restructuring proceeding, stakeholders sought disclosure of a settlement agreement between U.S. Steel, its Canadian subsidiary, and the Attorney General of Canada regarding undertakings under the Investment Canada Act.

The CCAA judge held that the agreement was entirely privileged under s. 36 of the ICA.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while s. 36(5) protects the Crown from being compelled to disclose the agreement, this protection does not extend to the private corporations.

The appeal was allowed, and the issue of whether common law settlement privilege barred disclosure was remitted to the CCAA judge.

The appellants appealed a judgment declaring them vexatious litigants.

They failed to appear at the hearing.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the application judge's reasons and the appellants' written arguments, finding no merit to the appeal and agreeing that the appellants' conduct met the definition of vexatious litigants.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant judgment creditor sought to enforce its judgment by having the sheriff sell the respondents' mortgaged property.

The sheriff required a mortgage discharge statement, which the mortgagee bank refused to provide without the respondents' consent, citing PIPEDA.

The respondents failed to attend examinations in aid of execution.

The appellant brought a motion to compel the mortgagee to produce the statement, which was dismissed based on binding precedent.

On appeal, a five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The majority held that the mortgage discharge statement was sensitive personal information under PIPEDA, and the respondents could not be deemed to have impliedly consented to its disclosure to a judgment creditor.

The majority affirmed that the proper procedure to obtain the statement without consent is to seek an order for the examination of the mortgagee under Rule 60.18(6)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which would satisfy the court order exemption in PIPEDA.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing its claim on the basis that it was barred by a broadly worded release from a 1996 action settlement.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the claim related to the lands referred to in the release.

Furthermore, the court found that the appellant was an affiliate or associate of the releasing party due to the common control of both entities by the same individual.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.