Abuse of process

The appellant appealed an order of committal for surrender pursuant to the Extradition Act and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order of surrender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the extradition judge's conclusions that the alleged conduct would constitute an offence in Canada, that the record was sufficient, and that he lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Charter application.

The Court also dismissed the application for judicial review, finding no error in the Minister's exercise of discretion.

The employee was convicted of sexually assaulting a young boy in the course of his employment as a recreation instructor.

The employer subsequently dismissed him.

The union grieved the dismissal.

At the arbitration, the arbitrator allowed the union to relitigate the employee's culpability, ultimately finding the employee innocent and ordering his reinstatement.

The Divisional Court quashed the arbitrator's decision.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's ruling, holding that the arbitrator erred in law.

The Court found that permitting the relitigation of a final criminal conviction in a grievance arbitration, where the facts and issues are identical, violates the finality principle and constitutes an abuse of process.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting the respondent.

The respondent subsequently brought a civil action for damages and successfully moved for summary judgment on liability based on the criminal conviction.

The appellant appealed the summary judgment and the dismissal of his cross-motion for production of the respondent's pre-assault medical records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the criminal conviction established prima facie proof of liability and the appellant raised no genuine issue for trial.

The Court also held that while the medical records were not privileged, the appellant had not established their relevance for production at this stage.

The accused was convicted of assault causing bodily harm.

At trial, the Crown did not call the victim of the assault to testify, relying instead on other witnesses and forensic evidence.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, holding that the Crown had a duty to call the victim.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, ruling that the Crown has broad discretion in deciding which witnesses to call, including the victim, and is not required to call all material witnesses absent an abuse of process.

Criminal appeal concerning destruction by a third-party sexual assault crisis centre of counselling notes made during the complainant’s initial disclosure before charges were laid.

The majority held that where destroyed material met the disclosure or production threshold, the accused’s right to make full answer and defence under s. 7 was breached without any additional requirement to prove actual prejudice at the breach stage.

Applying both the Stinchcombe and O’Connor frameworks, the Court found the notes were likely relevant to credibility and cross-examination and would have been producible.

A stay of proceedings was restored because the deliberate destruction of the only independent contemporaneous written account caused irremediable prejudice and continuing the prosecution would damage the integrity of the justice system.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Newfoundland Court of Appeal that had allowed the Crown's appeal from a stay of proceedings and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the prosecution was not an abuse of process because it was initiated after an independent investigation, rather than to advance a civil interest to recover a debt.

The Court also agreed that there was no violation of the appellant's right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The appellant challenged convictions arising from historical abuse allegations at an orphanage, arguing abuse of process and unreasonable verdicts.

The Court upheld the rejection of the abuse of process claim and maintained the conviction for assault causing bodily harm.

However, applying the unreasonable verdict standard under s. 686(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, the Court held that the indecent assault convictions could not reasonably be supported given blatant falsehoods, material inconsistencies, possible collusion between complainants, and unreliable photographic identification.

The indecent assault convictions were quashed.

The accused appealed after the Court of Appeal set aside a judicial stay entered because of repeated Crown non-disclosure in a sexual offence prosecution.

A majority held that non-disclosure violates s. 7 only where it prejudices the accused's ability to make full answer and defence, and that a stay is reserved for the clearest of cases where prejudice cannot be otherwise remedied.

The Court also established a landmark framework for obtaining production of private third-party records, requiring the accused to show likely relevance and requiring the court to balance trial fairness against privacy and equality interests.

The appeal was dismissed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant sought reconsideration of an order refusing leave to appeal after a provincial court of appeal set aside his conviction on fresh evidence but entered a stay of proceedings for abuse of process rather than an acquittal or new trial.

The majority held that, in exceptional circumstances, the Court may reconsider a leave refusal under Rule 7 despite Rule 51(12).

It further held that a stay order made under s. 686(8) of the Criminal Code is ancillary and divisible from the judgment setting aside the conviction, and is therefore appealable by leave under s. 40(1) of the Supreme Court Act notwithstanding s. 40(3).

Leave to appeal was granted.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which had allowed the Crown's appeal from a stay of proceedings and ordered a new trial.

The issue concerned whether the use of a police informant, who was to be paid in full only in the event of a successful investigation, constituted an abuse of process.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as of right, adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal that the informant's evidence was not inadmissible.

The appellant challenged a Court of Appeal order setting aside his acquittal on a charge of second degree murder and directing a new trial.

The Supreme Court held that the trial judge's slip in the recharge to the jury constituted a serious misdirection and that it could not be said with the requisite certainty that the verdict would inevitably have been the same absent the error.

On the disclosure issue, the court held that full disclosure had been made before the second trial and that an appellate court had no jurisdiction to grant a stay where no such application had been brought at trial.

The court further held that ordering a new trial in the circumstances did not amount to an abuse of process.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal that set aside a stay of proceedings and remitted the matter for trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a stay of proceedings for abuse of process should only be granted in the clearest of cases where fundamental principles of justice are violated.

The Court found this was not such a case and that compelling the accused to stand trial would not be oppressive or vexatious.

The appellant was charged with criminal negligence causing death.

After a series of pre-trial delays, the trial judge granted a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, finding a breach of the appellant's s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay, finding the delay was not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, raising issues of both pre-trial and appellate delay.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the pre-trial delay was not unreasonable and that s. 11(b) does not apply to appellate delay, which must instead be addressed under s. 7 of the Charter.

The Crown appealed from a decision upholding a stay of proceedings granted after the accused's dismissal from employment.

The central issue was whether the circumstances amounted to a violation of the accused's rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms or an abuse of process justifying a stay.

The Court held that the governing authority was Vermette and found no Charter breach and no abuse of process on the facts.

The appeal was allowed, the judgments below were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was charged with trafficking in a narcotic.

During his trial, defence counsel sought to cross-examine a police officer in a manner that would reveal the identity of a police informer.

The Crown objected and stayed the proceedings under s. 508 of the Criminal Code to protect the informer's identity, subsequently recommencing the proceedings.

The appellant argued this constituted an abuse of process and that the second trial judge's refusal to allow the cross-examination, issue a material witness warrant, or reopen the case to hear a witness on entrapment denied him the right to make full answer and defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Crown acted properly to protect the informer's identity and that the trial judge made no errors in her discretionary rulings.

The appellant was charged with murder and underwent two trials, the first resulting in a conviction that was overturned on appeal, and the second ending in a mistrial.

A third trial was scheduled five years after the initial charge.

The appellant sought a stay of proceedings, arguing that the Crown's refusal to accept a manslaughter plea and its objection to a judge-alone trial constituted an abuse of process, and that the five-year delay violated his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no prosecutorial misconduct to justify an abuse of process.

The Court also held that the s. 11(b) right was not infringed, as the overall delay was largely attributable to the appellant's own tactical decisions, particularly his delays in retaining counsel, and the inherent time requirements of appellate and retrial proceedings.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking after persistently refusing the approaches of a police informer over six months.

He eventually sold drugs to the informer due to persistent requests, threats, and a large monetary inducement.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and entered a stay of proceedings, holding that entrapment is not a substantive defence but an aspect of abuse of process to be decided by the trial judge.

The Court established an objective test for entrapment, finding that the police conduct in this case went beyond merely providing an opportunity and amounted to an abuse of process.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking after selling marijuana to an undercover police officer.

The meeting was arranged by a friend of the appellant who was acting as a police informant in exchange for consideration on his own pending charges.

The appellant argued he was entrapped into committing the offence due to persistent phone calls and pressure from his friend.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the police acted on reasonable suspicion and merely provided an opportunity to commit the offence, without employing tactics that would induce an average person to commit the crime.

The Republic of Argentina appealed a decision discharging the respondent from extradition proceedings due to a 17-month delay.

The extradition judge had found the delay violated the respondent's right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 11(b) does not apply to extradition hearings, which are not trials but proceedings to determine if there is sufficient evidence to surrender a fugitive.

The Court also found no abuse of process or violation of s. 7 of the Charter, noting the delay was largely due to the foreign authorities and not attributable to Canadian officials.

Furthermore, the Court held that an extradition judge is not a court of competent jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine after selling drugs to an undercover police officer.

The transactions were instigated by a police informer who repeatedly requested drugs from the appellant over several months.

The appellant argued the defence of entrapment.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.

The majority held that, assuming the defence of entrapment is available under Canadian law, it did not arise on the facts of this case, as the evidence amounted to no more than persistent solicitation.

A strong dissent would have recognized the defence of entrapment and stayed the proceedings, finding the police conduct to be a calculated scheme of ensnarement.