Abuse of process

The Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) appealed a trial judge's decision holding it jointly and severally liable for 20% of the costs awarded against the mother in a custody and access dispute.

The trial judge had criticized the OCL for failing to seek court orders to compel the father and child to cooperate with its investigation.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by applying the wrong threshold for awarding costs against a non-party.

The Court held that costs against the OCL should only be awarded in exceptional circumstances involving bad faith or patently unreasonable, unfair, or indefensible conduct, which was not present in this case.

The landlords brought a motion to dismiss or quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board consent order that terminated his tenancy.

The tenant had remained in the rental unit without paying rent and failed to perfect his appeal or order transcripts.

The Divisional Court found that the tenant had engaged in a pattern of delay, made misrepresentations to the court, and filed the appeal solely to obtain an automatic stay of eviction.

The appeal was dismissed for delay, failure to obtain leave, and as an abuse of process.

The landlords were granted immediate vacant possession and awarded substantial indemnity costs.

The Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal brought a motion to strike and dismiss an application for judicial review as an abuse of process.

The applicant had previously sought judicial review of a Tribunal decision regarding her non-economic loss benefit, which was dismissed by the Divisional Court.

She then brought a new application seeking judicial review of the Tribunal's reconsideration decision on the same issue.

The court found the new application to be an abuse of process and an improper collateral attack on the earlier Divisional Court decision, as the grounds were substantially the same and the issues had already been determined.

The motion was granted and the application was dismissed with costs.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board consent order terminating the tenancy and ordering payment of rent arrears.

The tenant had appealed the order, which automatically stayed the eviction, arguing she was coerced into the agreement.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that the tenant failed to obtain leave to appeal a consent order, raised no question of law, and brought the appeal solely for the purpose of delay to remain in the premises without paying rent.

The plaintiff brought two motions for leave to appeal orders made by the motion judge regarding the settling of a formal order and the extension of time for the defendant to file a statement of defence.

The court directed the Registrar to give notice under Rule 2.1.01 that it was considering dismissing the motions as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

After reviewing the plaintiff's written submissions, the court found no merit to the complaints, noting that no appeal lies from the settling of a formal order and that the extension of time was a necessary exercise of discretion.

Both motions for leave to appeal were dismissed as frivolous and an abuse of process.

The respondents brought a request under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the self-represented applicant's application for judicial review as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The respondents argued the application was an attempt to relitigate prior adjudicative decisions of the Social Benefits Tribunal and the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

The court dismissed the request, noting that determining whether the applicant was relitigating issues would require reviewing over a dozen prior decisions.

Following established precedent, the court held that if a judge must work through multiple cases to discern relitigation, the pleadings are not frivolous or vexatious on their face.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal from an order that had dismissed a previous motion for leave to appeal.

The Divisional Court held that there is generally no right of appeal from an order refusing leave to appeal, subject to a narrow exception where a judge mistakenly declines jurisdiction.

Finding that jurisdiction was not declined but rather the original motion was decided on its merits, the court concluded it had no jurisdiction to entertain the further motion.

The motion was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal of two Landlord and Tenant Board orders terminating the tenancy and evicting the tenant for non-payment of rent.

The Divisional Court found that the tenant's appeal raised no questions of law and was manifestly devoid of merit.

The court also noted that the appeal appeared to be a delaying tactic, as the tenant had not paid rent for several months.

The motion to quash was granted, the stay of enforcement was lifted, and the landlord was awarded costs.

The applicant brought a motion under Rule 37.14 to set aside an earlier order of the Divisional Court that dismissed her appeal as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01.

The applicant claimed she failed to respond to the earlier notice due to insufficient notice.

The court accepted the lack of notice for the purpose of the motion but found the applicant failed to demonstrate any basis to set aside the order or show that the result would be different if reheard.

The motion was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The tenant appealed a consent order from the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating his tenancy and evicting him for non-payment of rent.

The tenant failed to set the appeal down for a hearing, evaded service, and did not appear at the scheduled hearing despite being notified.

The tenant claimed the landlord obtained the consent order by misrepresentation regarding municipal by-law violations and a desire to renovate.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no merit to the tenant's arguments, noting he had not paid rent since April 2015, and ordered immediate vacant possession to the landlord.

The applicant filed a motion in writing seeking a reconsideration of a 2014 Divisional Court decision that dismissed her appeal from a Law Society of Upper Canada appeal panel.

She relied on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Jordan.

The court dismissed the motion under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, finding no jurisdiction for a panel to reconsider its earlier decision in these circumstances.

The landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision ordering him to pay $25,000 in compensation for disposing of the tenant's property after an eviction.

The tenant had been incarcerated, and his parents attempted to pay rent, but the landlord refused payment and ignored their communications.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that the landlord's conduct constituted an abuse of process was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The respondent employee was wrongfully dismissed and awarded damages in Small Claims Court.

The appellant employer engaged in years of frivolous and vexatious litigation to avoid paying the judgment, including multiple failed appeals and motions.

The respondent successfully garnished the funds after correcting a misnomer in the appellant's name.

The appellant appealed the misnomer correction and the refusal to return the garnished funds.

The Divisional Court dismissed the misnomer appeal on the merits, declined to lift the stay of garnishment due to lack of financial hardship evidence, but ultimately dismissed the appellant's second appeal as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.02, thereby lifting the stay and prohibiting the appellant from bringing further motions without leave.

The appellants commenced a medical negligence action in 2015 against the respondents, which was dismissed on summary judgment as res judicata because it duplicated a 2011 action that had been struck as statute-barred.

The appellants appealed the summary judgment dismissal.

The Divisional Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 considering dismissal of the appeal as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

Receiving no submissions from the appellants, the court dismissed the appeal, finding it was a clear attempt to relitigate claims, including fraudulent concealment, that were finally disposed of in the prior proceeding.

The landlords brought a motion to quash the tenants' appeal from a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order.

The tenants had failed to pay rent for over a year and did not comply with the Board's interim orders.

The tenants appealed the eviction order, which automatically stayed the eviction, allowing them to remain in the premises rent-free.

The Divisional Court found the appeal was manifestly devoid of merit, raised no valid questions of law, and was brought solely for the purpose of delay.

The appeal was quashed as an abuse of process and costs were awarded to the landlords.

The appellant lawyer was found by the Law Society Hearing Division to have knowingly assisted in mortgage fraud and his licence was revoked.

The Appeal Division upheld the misconduct finding and the dismissal of a stay motion based on delay, but substituted a two-year suspension for the revocation due to the Law Society's inordinate delay.

The appellant appealed the misconduct and stay decisions, and the Law Society cross-appealed the penalty decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding that the Appeal Division correctly interpreted the law on delay and reasonably concluded that a two-year suspension was appropriate.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that dismissed her request to add the University of Windsor as a party to her complaint against the Law Society, dismissed her complaint against the Law Society, and declared her a vexatious litigant regarding her attempts to pursue allegations against the University over her official transcript.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was reasonableness and found that the HRTO had ample authority to control its processes and prevent abuse.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board dismissing its Requests for Hearing regarding the removal of vascular ultrasound services from its licences.

The Board had dismissed the requests due to an inordinate 15-year delay causing prejudice, and found the requests moot because the appellant failed to comply with Minutes of Settlement that provided a mechanism to restore the services.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable and its application of the test for administrative delay correct.

The applicant brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside orders of single judges that quashed his application for mandamus and allowed interveners to participate.

The applicant sought to compel three police forces to investigate alleged criminal conduct by the CN Police Service.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, affirming that mandamus does not lie to compel police to investigate specific crimes, as police discretion in such matters is not subject to judicial dictation.

The court also upheld the costs awards and strongly criticized counsel for filing voluminous, uncoordinated materials, citing the culture shift required by Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Registrar General's decision to cancel his birth registration under the Vital Statistics Act, following a criminal conviction where it was found he had assumed a false identity.

The applicant argued that delegating the decision to a Ministry lawyer created a reasonable apprehension of bias and that denying his request for a teleconference hearing breached procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias given the distinct roles within the Ministry, and concluding that a written hearing satisfied the duty of fairness as the applicant failed to provide new evidence conclusively impeaching the prior judicial finding of his identity.