Daniel Mayer

The moving parties, including the Crown and two police officers, sought summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' actions for negligent investigation, intentional infliction of mental harm, and civil conspiracy.

The plaintiffs' claims arose from a police investigation into alleged sexual assaults by two minor plaintiffs, which resulted in criminal charges that were later stayed after the minors completed counselling.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, concluding that the criminal proceedings were not terminated in favour of the plaintiffs, the police had reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charges, and there was no evidence supporting the other tort claims.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the claims against the moving parties were dismissed.

Le demandeur a intenté une action en jugement déclaratoire contre le procureur général et le lieutenant-gouverneur en conseil, alléguant que le Tribunal des droits de la personne de l'Ontario (TDPO) ne comptait aucun membre capable d'entendre sa cause en français.

Les défendeurs ont présenté une motion en radiation de la déclaration.

La Cour supérieure a accueilli la motion, concluant d'une part qu'elle n'avait pas compétence puisque le litige concernait l'exercice d'une compétence légale relevant de la compétence exclusive de la Cour divisionnaire en matière de révision judiciaire.

D'autre part, la Cour a conclu que la déclaration ne révélait aucune cause d'action raisonnable, car la demande était prématurée et théorique, le demandeur n'ayant pris aucune démarche auprès du TDPO pour faire avancer son dossier ou demander une audience en français.

The plaintiff professional corporation brought an action against the Law Society of Ontario, several individuals, and a Superior Court judge, seeking damages and declarations related to a previous unsuccessful application.

The defendants requested the action be dismissed under Rule 2.1.01.

The court dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, finding that the judge had absolute immunity, the plaintiff corporation had no cause of action, the issues had already been decided in the previous proceeding, and the pleadings contained inflammatory and bellicose language.

The plaintiff brought an action for malicious prosecution and Charter breaches against the Crown and the Toronto Police Services Board, arising from a 2013 police shooting during the execution of a search warrant and his subsequent criminal prosecution, which ended in acquittals in 2014.

The plaintiff sought leave under the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act to continue his claim against the Crown.

The Board moved for summary judgment based on the expiry of the limitation period, and the Crown moved to strike the Charter claims.

The court denied leave, finding no reasonable possibility of success for the malicious prosecution claim.

The court granted summary judgment to the Board, as the action was commenced more than six years after the acquittals and the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of discoverability.

The Charter claims against the Crown were also struck for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings before a member of the Law Society Appeal Panel, with the decision reserved.

In this case management teleconference, the application against the Attorney General of Ontario was dismissed on consent.

The application against the Law Society was stayed on consent pending the release of the Appeal Panel member's decision on the stay motion.

The plaintiff, a former student at York University, brought an action against the Attorney General of Ontario alleging that the government failed to protect him from mistreatment by the university and its professors.

The Crown brought a motion to strike the Statement of Claim without leave to amend.

The court granted the motion, finding that the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action as the Crown owes no duty of care to university students and universities are autonomous entities.

The court also found the action to be an abuse of process, as similar claims by the plaintiff against the university had already been dismissed by the Divisional Court.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion to extend the time for setting the action down for trial and the subsequent dismissal of the action for delay, the court determined the costs payable to the defendants.

The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that no costs should be awarded, emphasizing the principle of indemnity and the significant defence costs incurred.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a partial indemnity scale, with the primary private sector defendant receiving the largest share due to its robust defence of its licensed operations.

The applicants sought declarations regarding the governance and operations of the Mount Pleasant Group of Cemeteries (MPGC), a statutory trust established in 1826.

The court granted the applicants public interest standing and found that MPGC's directors had not been validly appointed since 1987, as they failed to comply with the mandatory election procedures in the 1849 Act.

The court declared that MPGC holds its assets as a charitable trust and that its operation of visitation centres and funeral homes exceeded its statutory objects.

The court declined to order a formal investigation under the Charities Accounting Act but appointed the seven most senior directors as trustees, subject to confirmation at a public meeting.

The Crown brought an application to declare the defendant a vexatious litigant under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendant had launched a prodigious number of meritless proceedings across various tribunals and courts.

The application was granted, and the affected existing proceedings were stayed pending an ex parte application to dismiss them.

The plaintiff, a former Crown employee, brought an action for conspiracy, misfeasance, abuse of process, and defamation against the Crown and several individuals arising from a workplace investigation and his subsequent termination.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action under Rule 21.01(3), arguing the court lacked jurisdiction because the dispute fell under a collective agreement.

Applying the test from Weber v. Ontario Hydro, the court found that the essential character of the dispute was workplace-related and fell squarely within the ambit of the collective agreement's arbitration provisions.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.