Julie I. Bourgeois

The accused brought a constitutional challenge under s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms against a conviction under s. 244.2(3)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code for intentionally discharging a firearm while reckless as to the life or safety of another person.

The accused was the driver of a vehicle from which his co-accused fired a shot at another vehicle.

The accused argued the mandatory minimum sentence of five years constituted cruel and unusual punishment, relying on the principle of parity with his co-accused who received a lesser sentence.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenge, finding it was bound by precedent and that the mandatory minimum was not grossly disproportionate given the gravity of the offence and the accused's instrumental role in its commission.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application challenging delay in prosecution following his conviction on multiple counts related to a drive-by shooting.

The total delay from arrest to trial was 28 months, exceeding the presumptive ceiling of 18 months established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown relied on exceptional circumstances, including the discrete event of defence counsel's appointment to the bench and the case's inherent complexity.

The court found the delay reasonable based on the discrete event exception, case complexity, and transitional considerations reflecting the parties' reliance on the previous Morin framework.

The accused was charged with possession of cannabis marijuana contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, resisting arrest contrary to the Criminal Code, and possession of counterfeit currency contrary to the Criminal Code.

The trial proceeded by way of a blended voir-dire regarding Charter breaches.

The court found that the initial traffic stop lacked proper grounds, the arrest was unlawful and arbitrary, the warrantless search was unreasonable, the right to counsel was not properly implemented, and excessive force was used during the arrest.

All evidence was excluded pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, and the accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused was charged with sexual assault.

The Crown alleged the complainant did not consent to sexual activity due to intoxication.

The complainant had no memory of the events due to alcohol consumption.

The accused testified he obtained consent before engaging in sexual activity.

The court applied the WD analysis and considered whether the Crown proved the absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the accused's evidence credible and reliable, and that it raised a reasonable doubt regarding consent.

The court acquitted the accused.

The accused was jointly charged with another individual on a 32-count Information including attempted murder, firearm-related offences, and drug possession charges.

The Crown withdrew charges of attempted murder and several firearm and drug possession counts.

At trial, the central issues were whether the accused had knowledge of firearms in the vehicle he was driving, whether he was a party to the firearm discharge offence, and whether he possessed drugs found upon arrest.

The court found the accused guilty of 21 counts based on circumstantial evidence establishing his knowledge and control of the firearms, his participation in the shooting incident through his driving conduct, and his possession of drugs found in the vehicle where he was arrested.

The accused was charged with sexual offences against two complainants, with allegations spanning 1980-1981.

The Crown proceeded with a joint trial on all counts.

The accused applied for severance of the counts by complainant.

The court granted the severance application, finding that the benefits to the administration of justice in trying the counts together were minimal and that the cumulative effect of relevant factors, particularly the possibility of the accused testifying on one set of counts but not the other, and the uncertain merit of a similar fact evidence application, favoured separate trials.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than the legal limit of alcohol in his body and breaching a release condition prohibiting alcohol consumption.

The central issue was whether the accused's Charter right to counsel under section 10(b) was breached.

The officer detained the accused following a traffic stop for excessive speeding and, upon discovering the smell of alcohol on his breath, requested an Alcohol Screening Device.

The officer did not inform the accused of his right to counsel during the approximately 8-9 minute wait for the device to arrive, despite the accused having a cell phone with his lawyer's contact information.

The court found that a realistic opportunity existed for the accused to consult counsel before providing a breath sample, and that the officer failed to comply with his implementational obligation under section 10(b).

Consequently, the breath sample results were excluded as evidence obtained in violation of the Charter, and the accused was acquitted on both counts.

The applicant sought to terminate a Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order made pursuant to s. 490.012(2) following his conviction for indecent act contrary to s. 173(1)(a).

The order was made on May 13, 2010, and the applicant applied for termination after more than six years had elapsed.

The court applied the test under s. 490.016(1), requiring the applicant to establish on a balance of probabilities that the impact of continuing the order, including on privacy or liberty, would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest in protecting society through the effective prevention or investigation of crimes of a sexual nature.

The court granted the application and terminated the order.

The accused was charged with aggravated sexual assault contrary to section 273(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the accused had non-consensual intercourse with the complainant without informing her of his HIV-positive status.

The central issues were whether the complainant slept in the couple's bed and whether sexual intercourse occurred.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and reliable, rejected the accused's denials, and found him guilty of the charge.

The court applied the W.(D.) test to assess credibility and found that the complainant and the accused's wife provided consistent corroborating evidence regarding key details, while the accused's account was evasive and contradicted by both witnesses.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, arising from a collision on May 18, 2015, in Ottawa.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing 168 mg% and 165 mg% at the time of testing, expert toxicological evidence regarding scientific impairment at 50 mg%, and police observations of alleged signs of impairment.

The defence raised the "last drink" doctrine, arguing the accused consumed alcohol approximately 13 minutes before driving, and challenged the applicability of general scientific impairment evidence to the specific accused.

The court found the accused not guilty on both counts.

The accused brought an application under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging unreasonable delay in bringing the matter to trial.

The accused was charged with attempted murder and numerous firearms-related offences arising from a drive-by shooting on July 23, 2014.

The trial was scheduled for July 11-22, 2016, representing a delay of approximately 23.5 months from the laying of charges.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the Crown was responsible for approximately one month of delay in disclosing a sealed Information to Obtain a search warrant, the overall delay was reasonable when considering the complexity of the case, the inherent time requirements, the accused's implicit waiver through his actions and tactical choices, and the significant societal interest in trying serious offences on the merits.

The accused brought an application under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging unreasonable delay in bringing the matter to trial.

The accused was charged with numerous counts related to firearms use and two counts of attempted murder arising from a drive-by shooting incident on July 23, 2014.

The delay from charge to trial was approximately 23.5 months.

The court rejected the application, finding that while the Crown was responsible for approximately one month of delay in disclosing a sealed Information to Obtain a search warrant, the majority of the delay was attributable to inherent time requirements of the complex case, actions of the accused (including multiple changes of counsel), and institutional scheduling constraints.

The court found the accused had implicitly waived his right to a speedy trial through his conduct and tactical choices.