Judith Parker

The appellants, owners of private cottages on leased land in a provincial park, appealed a decision declaring them obligated to pay a portion of the grant in lieu of taxes paid by the Crown to the municipality under the Municipal Tax Assistance Act.

The appellants argued that prior lease agreements and correspondence constituted an agreement exempting them from this obligation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that no such agreement existed and affirming the Crown's right to enforce its statutory rights following a change in taxation policy.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister's decision to exercise a five percent road reservation on his property pursuant to the Public Lands Act.

The applicant argued that the Minister miscalculated the land available, acted for an improper purpose, and denied him procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Minister had broad discretion under the Act, the decision to ensure public access was reasonable, and the applicant was afforded adequate consultation and reasons.

The applicant sought to be relieved from paying costs under the public interest principle after its application was dismissed.

The Divisional Court declined to deprive the respondents of costs, noting that while the applicant had no pecuniary interest, the application was without legal basis given clear and recent precedent.

The applicant was ordered to pay partial indemnity costs of $10,000 to each of the respondents.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board confirming the revocation of its licence to operate a long-term care home.

The appellant argued that the revocation order was issued without notice, breaching procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the hearing before the Board was a hearing de novo, which cured any prior procedural defects regarding notice.

The court also noted that any prejudice suffered by the appellant stemmed from the appointment of an interim manager, an order the appellant chose not to appeal.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry's alleged decision to exempt a wind farm project from compliance with the Endangered Species Act regarding the Redside Dace.

The Ministry had communicated via email that there were no Redside Dace issues in the project area, and thus the proponent did not need to apply for a permit.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Ministry's emails did not constitute an exercise of a statutory power of decision subject to judicial review, applying the precedent from Sierra Club.

Applicants who held private cottage interests on Crown land in a provincial park sought a determination that they were not obliged to reimburse the Crown for payments in lieu of municipal taxes.

The court held that s. 4(3) of the Municipal Tax Assistance Act created a statutory debt owed by tenants unless the parties had agreed otherwise, and no such agreement existed on the evidence.

The lease documents preserved the tenants' liability for taxes, rates, duties and assessments, and no implied variation could arise contrary to the written agreements.

The court also rejected waiver, promissory estoppel, and laches, finding no clear abandonment of rights, no representation altering legal relations, and no detrimental reliance.

The appellant appealed an order striking out his claim without leave to amend and dismissing his action for malicious prosecution and other claims.

He also sought an adjournment and to admit fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the adjournment and fresh evidence application, finding the evidence irrelevant.

The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that the claim was fatally flawed, raised allegations beyond the limitation period, and sought damages for non-existent causes of action.

The plaintiff, a lawyer, brought a defamation action against a conservation officer and the Crown after the officer left a voicemail for the plaintiff's client stating that the plaintiff was 'pretty much incompetent' and had 'mishandled grossly' the client's case.

The defendants conceded the statement was defamatory but argued the defence of qualified privilege.

The court found that the officer did not have a moral duty to make the call, and thus the occasion was not protected by qualified privilege.

Furthermore, even if privilege applied, the officer exceeded its scope by making gratuitous comments about the plaintiff's competence.

The court awarded the plaintiff $10,000 in general damages.

The applicants, commercial motor vehicle operators, sought a mandatory injunction or stay of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles' decision to downgrade their safety ratings from 'Satisfactory' to 'Conditional'.

The applicants argued the Registrar erred by using a kilometric measure and by attributing the same rating to an associated company.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no serious issue to be tried as the Registrar acted within his statutory authority and did not breach procedural fairness.

The court also held that the balance of convenience favoured the public interest in highway safety over the applicants' pecuniary interests.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's Second Amended Statement of Claim, which alleged malicious prosecution, conspiracy, and various other torts against numerous police officers and Crown attorneys.

The plaintiff, a self-represented litigant, also sought to rely on a Draft Fresh as Amended Claim.

The court granted the motion to strike, finding that the claims failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action, were statute-barred by the Limitations Act, and constituted an improper collateral attack on the plaintiff's prior criminal convictions.

Leave to amend the claim was denied.

The applicants, owners of designated physiotherapy clinics, sought judicial review to quash Regulation 138/13, which delisted their clinics and changed the funding model for physiotherapy services.

They argued the regulation was enacted in violation of a government policy requiring a 45-day consultation period, thereby breaching their legitimate expectations of procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the policy did not create a clear, unambiguous, and unqualified representation, as it expressly allowed for exceptions.

Furthermore, the court noted that quashing the regulation would be futile, as the government could simply re-enact it after a formal consultation period, having already heard and rejected the applicants' views.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination with respect to services because of a hearing disability.

He claimed that the Small Claims Court's requirement that he pay for written transcripts before being allowed to listen to the audio recordings was discriminatory.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing and found that the requirement to pay for written transcripts did not adversely impact the applicant, as his hearing impediment did not interfere with his ability to read.

The application was dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination with respect to services by the respondent police services board and officers.

In this interim decision, the Tribunal addressed the conduct of the upcoming hearing and outstanding production issues.

The Tribunal ordered the respondents to produce specific documents related to the applicant's arrests and seized computer, subject to a strict confidentiality order.

The appellant, a non-party to the proposed action, appealed an order directing it to produce certain documents to the respondent.

However, the documents were produced before the appeal was launched, rendering the appeal moot.

The Court of Appeal declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal, noting that the issue was not one that would evade appellate review in the normal course and that the order under appeal was discretionary based on specific facts.

The appeal was dismissed as moot.

The applicant requested an adjournment of a scheduled human rights hearing on the basis that he would be out of the country and needed time to seek legal assistance.

The respondent opposed the request.

The Tribunal denied the adjournment, finding that the applicant had ample time to obtain legal representation and prepare for the hearing, and failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances as required by the Tribunal's Practice Direction.

The Tribunal also directed the parties to be prepared to address preliminary issues at the hearing, including whether the application should be dismissed under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code or for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Director of the Ministry of the Environment's decision to issue a Renewable Energy Approval for a wind facility.

The applicant argued the Director failed to comply with regulatory requirements and denied procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant lacked both personal and public interest standing.

In the alternative, the court held that the Director's decision to dispense with strict compliance with notice requirements was reasonable, and the consultation process met the common law requirements of procedural fairness.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Director of the Family Responsibility Office's refusal to enforce a child support order.

In 2001, the applicant had repeatedly advised the Director that the arrears were paid directly to her, leading the Director to clear the arrears.

Six years later, the applicant claimed she had been duped by the payor and asked the Director to reinstate and enforce the arrears.

The Director refused, citing a dispute over the arrears and advising the applicant to seek redress from the court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Director's decision reasonable as there was a real and substantial dispute over the arrears, and the Director is not mandated to investigate or resolve such disputes.

The respondent in a human rights application alleging sexual harassment sought production of undisclosed documents from a Crown Brief detailing the applicant's prior interactions with police.

The respondent argued the documents were relevant as similar fact evidence and necessary for full answer and defence.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding that the undisclosed documents, which primarily concerned domestic incidents and were not of a sexual nature or related to a workplace, were not arguably relevant to the allegations in the application.

The defendants brought a motion to quash the applicant's application for judicial review.

The applicant sought review of 61 decisions made by various police oversight bodies regarding his complaints, but failed to provide specific grounds for any particular decision.

The applicant conceded he actually sought a general audit and review of policing in his community under section 25 of the Police Services Act.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding the application too broad, lacking specific grounds, and seeking relief for a non-justiciable issue, while granting the applicant liberty to bring a new, properly specified application.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the General Manager of OHIP imposing an administrative charge of $81,450 for 543 unauthorized payments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the General Manager had no duty to refer the administrative charge issue to the Health Services Appeal and Review Board, as the Board's jurisdiction is limited to reviewing unauthorized payments.

The Court confirmed the General Manager's authority to impose a $150 administrative charge for each unauthorized payment under the Commitment to the Future of Medicare Act, 2004.

Furthermore, the Court noted it would have declined to grant the discretionary remedy of judicial review due to the applicant's delay in bringing the application.