D.R. O’Connor

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a boy left in his care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal regarding credibility assessments but applied the Kienapple principle to enter a conditional stay on the sexual assault conviction, as both charges shared the same factual and legal nexus.

The sentence appeal was dismissed, with the court finding that the fresh evidence of the appellant's spouse's health issues did not justify a conditional sentence for such a serious breach of trust.

The appellant appealed his conviction for simple assault, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and that the verdict was unreasonable because medical evidence was inconsistent with the violent assault described by the principal Crown witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was entitled to rely on substantial circumstantial evidence, including blood spatters and injuries, to find the appellant committed a simple assault.

The appellant appealed from a conviction and a 12-month custodial sentence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to give a Vetrovec warning regarding a witness's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no need for the warning as the trial judge was aware of the witness's problems.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed as the sentence was entirely fit.

The Crown appealed a 12-month conditional sentence imposed on a young first offender who suffered from a mental illness.

Although the law now requires a custodial sentence for the offence in question, the Court of Appeal declined to interfere because the respondent had successfully served the conditional sentence and addressed his mental health issues through prescribed medication.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision restraining them from objecting to an application to extract aggregate from a property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the individual appellant used the appellant corporation as his agent to breach his personal covenant not to object to the extraction.

The substantive appeal was dismissed.

However, the court allowed the appeal on costs, reducing the lower court's costs award from substantial indemnity to partial indemnity, as the relative merits of the case did not justify the higher scale.

The appellant appealed an order granting summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the record raised legitimate issues for trial regarding coercion and legitimacy, specifically concerning the appellant's state of mind when signing a guarantee, the nature of the demand, and the options available to him.

Because the facts relevant to these issues were in dispute, a trial was warranted.

The appeal was allowed with costs awarded to the appellant.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action against the respondent surgeon.

The trial judge found the surgeon negligent for failing to obtain informed consent by not disclosing alternatives to surgery, but dismissed the action on causation, finding a reasonable person in the patient's circumstances would have proceeded with the surgery anyway.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's causation analysis, noting the surgeon had no legal obligation to make a specific recommendation for or against elective surgery, and the evidence supported the finding that the patient was 'surgery ready' and would have accepted the procedure.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding family property.

The Court of Appeal found that there was a misunderstanding before the lower court and the family property issue had not been finally disposed of.

The appeal was dismissed, but the appellant was granted leave to seek to set aside a previously granted stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that work performed by the respondent was referable to an oral agreement to transfer properties to him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding was supported by uncontradicted evidence and there was no basis to interfere.

The appellant was involved in a minor rear-end collision and subsequently claimed disabling chronic pain.

At trial, the jury initially awarded zero for general damages, explaining they believed an insurance settlement had already compensated the appellant.

The trial judge instructed them to reconsider only general damages, which they reassessed at $50,000.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge should have instructed the jury to reconsider all heads of damage and that the overall assessment was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury's verdict was reasonable given the conflicting evidence on the cause and extent of the injuries.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding it breached a Master Area Franchise Agreement by wrongfully terminating it.

The trial judge found the termination was based on a misconception of the respondent's payment obligations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the liability finding but corrected mathematical errors in the damages calculation, adjusting the award to $1,141,400.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for trespass to land and chattels, and aggravated damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the $35,000 award for trespass to chattels and the $5,000 award for trespass to land, finding sufficient evidence of actual damage.

However, the court set aside the $10,000 aggravated damages award to the individual plaintiff, as the trespass was committed against the corporate plaintiff.

The appeal was allowed in part, reducing total damages to $40,000.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant failed to plead damages directly resulting from the respondent's actions and did not suffer any damages as a consequence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed an order fixing the trustee's remuneration and declining to appoint a substitute trustee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that s. 39(5) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act provided the motion judge with the authority to fix the remuneration.

The court also agreed that there was no basis to appoint a substitute trustee, as the appellant was permitted and capable of carrying a claim against the bankrupt.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a judgment, arguing the motion judge erred by assessing the respondent's mitigation efforts without cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's reasons and concluding that mitigation efforts could be fairly assessed on the record.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $6,000.

The husband appealed an order striking his Answer to the wife's claims for support and equalization.

The motion judge struck the Answer because the husband breached an order for disclosure of financial information relating to his business.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that striking a pleading is a serious remedy and the husband's conduct was not sufficiently serious to warrant it.

The husband was ordered to pay the wife's costs of the motion to strike and the costs of compelling production from his former business partner.

The applicant sought bail pending his appeal against conviction for selling cocaine.

The applicant argued that the trial verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge made errors in analyzing the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding no merit in the appeal given the overwhelming identification evidence from undercover and surveillance officers, the recovery of marked money, and the seizure of the cell phone used to arrange the drug buys.

The Canadian Civil Liberties Association brought a motion to intervene in an appeal concerning the retention and disclosure of police records by the Peel Regional Police Service.

The proposed intervener sought to raise new Charter issues regarding the police service's policies and practices.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the proposed intervener had relevant expertise, permitting the intervention would unfairly change the focus and scope of the proceedings, require a new evidentiary record, and prejudice the respondent given the proximity to the hearing date.

The appellants, who acted as real estate agents in the sale of a property for a dental office, appealed a trial judgment finding them liable in negligence after the purchaser discovered the property lacked the required parking spaces.

The trial judge apportioned 20% liability to each agent, 10% to the vendor, and 50% to the purchaser's lawyer.

On appeal, the appellants argued the vendor should bear more fault due to receiving the financial benefit of the sale, claimed unjust enrichment against the vendor, and argued the limitation period had expired based on the purchaser's lawyer's imputed knowledge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that benefit received is not a freestanding consideration for apportionment under the Negligence Act, the agents suffered no deprivation to support unjust enrichment, and the trial judge did not err in his discoverability analysis.

The young person appealed findings of guilt for three offences related to the sexual touching of a young child while babysitting.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to properly scrutinize the complainant's evidence, improperly shifted the burden of proof by referencing the appellant's failure to testify, and failed to properly consider defence expert evidence regarding the appellant's psychological profile.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of the burden of proof.