D.R. O’Connor

The appellant appealed an order referring a solicitor's account for assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's exercise of discretion, as the motion judge had identified sufficient reasons to establish special circumstances.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after striking his wife in the head multiple times with a heavy mortar.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on the definition of 'recklessness' under s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code and erred in admitting the deceased's ante-mortem statements regarding his prior abusive conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in the recharge on recklessness, the error was sandwiched between correct instructions and did not cause a miscarriage of justice.

The court also upheld the admission of the hearsay statements, finding they met the threshold reliability test and their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The Crown appealed an order requiring it to pay $18,000 in costs to nine respondents who were arrested during a major gang takedown.

The respondents had been detained for more than 24 hours without a bail hearing and were remanded for periods exceeding the statutory limit, prompting them to bring habeas corpus applications.

The application judge found systemic failures by the Crown to prepare for the mass arrests, resulting in breaches of the respondents' Charter rights, and awarded costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Crown's failure to ensure adequate court resources for the predictable influx of detainees constituted a marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable standards, justifying the exceptional remedy of costs.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possessing a loaded restricted firearm and being present in a motor vehicle with a firearm.

He was arrested during a fake drug deal where he and two others intended to rob an undercover officer.

The trial judge found him guilty as a party under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of common intention to rob but applied the Kienapple principle to stay the less serious firearms charge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

At trial, the central issue was whether the complainant consented.

The trial judge instructed the jury that even if the complainant consented, the appellant could be found guilty if she lacked the capacity to consent due to intoxication.

However, the trial judge refused to instruct the jury on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal held that once the trial judge introduced the issue of capacity, fairness required instructing the jury on mistaken belief in consent, especially given the substantial alcohol consumption by both parties.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual abuse of a child, arguing the trial judge erred in accepting the complainant's evidence due to inconsistencies, relying on a prior child pornography conviction, and inferring a prior denial was an attempt to protect the appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge appropriately evaluated the evidence, properly used the prior conviction to show sexual interest and opportunity, and reasonably inferred the complainant's prior denial was to protect the appellant given their close relationship.

The appellants brought an application for a stay, which was dismissed, and the appeal was stayed pending the appointment of a new trustee of the family trust.

The appointment process was subsequently resolved on consent and the appeal was abandoned.

The respondent sought costs for the stay motion.

The court awarded costs to the respondent, noting that the appellants could have achieved their desired result without bringing an unsuccessful stay application.

Costs were fixed at $15,000.

The appellants were convicted of multiple counts of fraud and laundering proceeds of crime arising from a large-scale advance fee scheme operated out of a condominium.

On appeal, they challenged the admission of evidence obtained from a search of the condominium, arguing breaches of section 8 of the Charter based on information provided to police by building management following a flood.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information and no state agency by the building staff.

The sentence appeals were also dismissed, upholding the penitentiary sentences as appropriate for large-scale fraud.

The appellant appealed his convictions for threatening, sexual assault, and assault, arguing the trial judge failed to adequately explain the rejection of his evidence and failed to apply the W.(D.) framework to the threatening charges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons, read as a whole, demonstrated she evaluated all evidence, properly applied the W.(D.) principles, and made credibility findings open to her on the evidence.

The young person appealed his convictions and sentence for assault and sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.D. analysis and did not engage in prohibited propensity reasoning.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

Because a concurrent one-day adult sentence resulted in the youth serving his eight-month sentence in an adult facility—contrary to the intention of all parties—the court reduced the sentence to time served (seven months and one week).

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decision finding that the respondents were employed under indefinite-term contracts and were entitled to reasonable notice of termination, as well as the award of Wallace damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings regarding the nature of the contracts, noting that the parties' conduct significantly varied from the written terms.

The court upheld the Wallace damages award for one respondent due to an unfounded and damaging pager message sent by the appellant, but set aside the award for the other respondent as there was no evidence of similar harm or mental distress.

The appeal was dismissed with respect to the first respondent and allowed in part for the second.

The respondents were acquitted of operating a commercial motor vehicle in a dangerous or unsafe condition under s. 84(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Crown appealed, arguing that a regulation defining 'critical defects' for the purpose of vehicle impoundment under s. 82.1 should also apply to the offence provision in s. 84(1.1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the regulation explicitly applies only to s. 82.1 and that the legislature intended a higher threshold of danger for a conviction under s. 84(1.1) than for an impoundment under s. 82.1.

The appellant appealed a decision refusing to release him from custody and dismissing his application to quash an information for failing to appear.

He argued the Superior Court lost jurisdiction over him under section 485(3) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Superior Court retained jurisdiction under section 470 and that the challenge to the information should be raised as a defence at trial.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissing his appeal from conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding no error of law.

The court agreed that the only rational conclusion on the evidence was that the applicant occupied the driver's seat, thereby triggering the presumption of care and control under s. 258(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against the respondent bank regarding the sale of four properties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the bank had authority to sell the properties, did not sell them imprudently, and properly applied the sale proceeds to the outstanding mortgages.

Furthermore, the court agreed with the trial judge that the appellant's action was barred by the Statute of Limitations.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing there was insufficient evidence that he attempted to penetrate the sleeping complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion based on the appellant's actions and the complainant's testimony of experiencing sharp pain.

The court noted the complainant was not cross-examined on this part of her evidence.

The appellant estate appealed an order directing it to deliver shares owned by the husband to the wife's counsel for preservation and safekeeping under s. 12(b) of the Family Law Act.

The shares were already subject to a prior preservation order, which the husband breached by delivering them to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the order did not stay execution of the appellant's money judgment against the husband, nor did it constitute a collateral attack or determine priorities between the appellant and the wife.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that a robotic weld cell it designed and produced for the respondent was not reasonably fit for its intended purpose.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to find an implied term in the contract requiring the respondent to provide pretacked assemblies within tolerances suitable for robotic welding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the contract documents and commercial realities placed the responsibility on the appellant, who had specialized expertise in robotic welding and knowledge of the respondent's facility.

The appellant brought a motion for directions to determine whether an appeal from the dismissal of a motion to amend a statement of defence in an oppression action lies to the Court of Appeal or the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal held that the dismissal of the motion to amend was a final order.

Furthermore, the Court determined that the order was 'made under' the Business Corporations Act within the meaning of s. 255, as the power exercised was sufficiently close to the legislative source of adjudicating oppression claims.

Consequently, the appeal lies to the Divisional Court, and the matter was transferred accordingly.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States on charges of conspiracy to traffic marijuana and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence of inconsistent witness statements, argued the Minister failed to consider prosecuting him in Canada under the Extradition Treaty, and challenged the Minister's refusal to seek return assurances or delay surrender pending Ontario civil forfeiture proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and judicial review, finding the fresh evidence would not have altered the committal and the Minister's discretionary decisions were reasonable.