Joseph W.L. Griffiths

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion to extend the time for setting the action down for trial and the subsequent dismissal of the action for delay, the court determined the costs payable to the defendants.

The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that no costs should be awarded, emphasizing the principle of indemnity and the significant defence costs incurred.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a partial indemnity scale, with the primary private sector defendant receiving the largest share due to its robust defence of its licensed operations.

The plaintiff brought an undefended action against his separated spouse for fraud, alleging she forged his signature on credit cards, mortgages, and insurance documents.

The court held a default hearing and accepted the plaintiff's uncontradicted evidence regarding debts incurred in his name and the unauthorized cashing out of life insurance policies.

The court awarded the plaintiff $180,455.79 in damages, including $5,000 in general damages for mental anguish and damage to his credit rating, plus substantial indemnity costs due to the defendant's deceitful conduct.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering rescission of an asset purchase agreement.

The trial judge found that the appellant made fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations regarding defects in the building that were known at the time of closing.

The Court of Appeal rejected the appellant's submissions that the trial judge made extricable legal errors in contract interpretation or that the interpretation was commercially unreasonable.

The court found no palpable and overriding errors or inadequacy of reasons.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

An appeal from a motion judge's decision to dismiss third-party claims against all persons except Barton Thomas Burron in a fraud matter involving Saint Luke Lutheran Church, an unincorporated association.

The motion judge had dismissed the third-party claims on the basis that only Burron had a distinct fiduciary duty and independent standard of care.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that complex issues regarding the status of the plaintiff, the application of law to unincorporated associations, the Negligence Act, and the Rules of Civil Procedure required a full evidentiary record and should proceed to trial rather than be dismissed on a motion.

The plaintiff brought a motion to extend the time under Rule 48.14 to prevent the automatic dismissal of his action for delay.

The action, commenced in 2013, alleged that the defendants caused artificial flooding on his property.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay in advancing the litigation, noting that the outstanding summary judgment motion did not prevent the plaintiff from setting the matter down for trial.

The motion for an extension of time was dismissed, and the action was dismissed for delay.

The plaintiffs sued multiple defendants over a property dispute involving a cottage, a right of way, and claims for damages due to negligence and adverse possession.

The court found Robert Moore negligent for a mudslide damaging the plaintiffs' outhouse and Howard Moore liable for exacerbating damage and spoliation of evidence.

However, the plaintiffs failed to establish adverse possession over the disputed land, as they could not prove intent to exclude the true owner or effective exclusion.

The court awarded modest damages against Robert Moore and Howard Moore, but dismissed the adverse possession claim.

During jury deliberations in a motor vehicle personal injury trial, the jury foreman conducted internet research and found the Fault Determination Rules under the Insurance Act.

The jury asked a question about the regulation, prompting the trial judge to give a correcting charge instructing them to disregard it.

The jury subsequently returned a verdict finding the plaintiff 73% contributorily negligent.

The plaintiffs moved for a mistrial, arguing the jury was contaminated and failed to follow the correcting charge.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the correcting charge was sufficient, the jury's prompt disclosure of the research indicated a willingness to follow instructions, and the verdict was supported by the evidence.

The client abandoned her application for an assessment of her former solicitor's accounts the day before the scheduled hearing.

The assessment officer endorsed the discontinuance without making a costs order.

The solicitor brought a motion for costs of the abandoned application.

The court found it had jurisdiction to award costs under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 38.08(3), treating the motion akin to a motion to vary an order made without notice.

The court awarded the solicitor partial indemnity costs fixed at $1,000, discounting the amount claimed due to proportionality and avoidable preparation time.

Costs decision following a neighbour dispute over laneway access.

The successful party sought $43,750 in costs, relying on a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The court found the offer was not beaten and noted the successful party's provocative pre-litigation conduct in blocking the laneway unnecessarily escalated the dispute.

Applying the principle of proportionality and considering the conduct, the court fixed costs at $15,000.

The applicants, John Charles Brown and Joanne Muggette Brown, sought a declaration of adverse possession or a prescriptive easement over a laneway on Karen Savage's property.

Karen Savage, in a cross-application, sought a closing order for the laneway.

The court dismissed the Browns' claims for adverse possession and prescriptive easement, finding they failed to establish exclusive use or use "as of right." The court found that Savage did not require a closing order under the Road Access Act because the Browns had viable alternative access to their property from a public road, albeit at a cost.

Savage was granted the right to exclude the Browns from using the laneway, with a one-year suspension of enforcement to allow the Browns to implement alternative access.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for court approval of a settlement reached on behalf of two infant plaintiffs, who were claimants under the Family Law Act following their father's car accident.

The court identified several deficiencies in the evidence, including the lack of a breakdown between damages and pre-judgment interest, unclear plans for the settlement funds, conflicting information regarding the family's living situation, and an apparent undervaluation of the infant plaintiffs' claims for loss of care, guidance, and companionship.

The court also noted the absence of recommended neuropsychological and in-home assessment reports.

Consequently, the court was unable to approve the settlement and ordered counsel to appear in court for further directions.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of contract regarding the sale of a used digital printer.

The defendant stopped making instalment payments, alleging the printer was defective and unfit for its purpose.

The court found the agreement was a sale, not a lease, and that there was insufficient evidence of a fundamental breach by the plaintiff.

However, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claim because it was statute-barred, as the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of the defendant's default more than two years before issuing the statement of claim.

The appellant, aged 45 at trial, appealed a judgment dismissing her claim against her parents for alleged physical and emotional abuse during childhood.

The trial judge, after a 10-day trial with extensive evidence from multiple witnesses and experts, found the appellant's allegations not credible and dismissed the claim.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: that the trial judge failed to address the core issue of abuse, failed to provide adequate reasons, and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding the trial judge properly assessed credibility, provided sufficient reasons for appellate review, and identified no palpable and overriding errors.

The court rendered a decision on costs following a six-week jury trial.

The plaintiff, Frank D’Addario, was wholly unsuccessful in his claim for malicious prosecution against Betty Smith and Chris Napior.

Betty Smith's counterclaim for sexual assault was dismissed, while Chris Napior was awarded $25,000 in damages for defamation against Frank and Ferne D’Addario.

The court considered the results obtained at trial, abandoned claims, and Rule 49 offers to settle.

It awarded Betty Smith and Chris Napior $75,000 plus HST for defending abandoned claims, $5,000 plus HST for a pre-trial motion, and Chris Napior an additional $55,000 plus HST and $4,000 in disbursements for his successful defamation claim, after finding elements of over-lawyering and excessive billing in the initial costs submission.

The third parties moved for an order requiring the defendant to post security for costs of the action.

The court considered Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, noting that the third parties met the initial onus.

The central issue was whether the defendant had a good chance of success on his third-party claim, which would make a security for costs order unjust.

The court found that the defendant had a good chance of success in establishing that one of the third parties was the controlling mind of the defendant's company, and that the third parties' actions may have contributed to the defendant's financial distress.

Consequently, the motion for security for costs was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision granting judgment to the respondent for an unpaid loan of $15,000.

The trial judge found the corporate appellants liable for breach of contract and the individual appellants liable for unjust enrichment.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in finding personal liability, drawing an adverse inference from a failure to testify, and using pleadings to assess credibility.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error, noting that the trial judge's credibility assessments and use of pleadings were reasonable and legally correct.

The defendants brought a motion for non-suit to dismiss the plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim and to withdraw the defence of qualified privilege from the jury regarding a defamation counterclaim.

The court granted the motion for non-suit, finding no evidence that the defendants initiated the criminal proceedings, as the police exercised independent discretion in laying sexual assault charges.

The court also withdrew the defence of qualified privilege, ruling that statements made by the plaintiffs by counterclaim to a priest did not occur on a recognized occasion of qualified privilege, as there was no reciprocal duty or interest.

The defendants brought a motion for non-suit to dismiss the plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim and to withdraw the defence of qualified privilege from the jury regarding the plaintiff's defamation counterclaim.

The court granted the non-suit, finding no evidence that the defendants initiated the criminal proceedings, as the police exercised independent discretion.

The court also withdrew the defence of qualified privilege, ruling that statements made by the plaintiffs to a priest were not made on an occasion of qualified privilege.

The defendant moved to remove the plaintiff’s law firm on the basis of a conflict of interest, arguing the firm previously acted as its corporate counsel and therefore owed duties of loyalty.

The court found the defendant was technically a current client at the time the action was commenced, but the prior retainers were limited, sporadic, and of minor scope.

Applying the bright line rule from Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court held it was unreasonable in the circumstances for the defendant to expect the firm would not act against it in unrelated matters.

There was no risk of misuse of confidential information and no substantial risk that the representation would be materially affected.

The court concluded disqualification was not necessary to maintain the integrity of the administration of justice.

The appellant insurer appealed the dismissal of its motion for summary judgment.

The insurer argued that the respondent's claim for income replacement benefits was barred by the two-year limitation period under s. 281.1 of the Insurance Act.

The motion judge had found a genuine issue for trial based on an error in a subsequent denial form and a fresh medical finding.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the initial clear and unequivocal denial triggered the limitation period, and a fresh medical finding could not reactivate it.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the claim.