Joseph W.L. Griffiths

The plaintiffs sued multiple defendants over a property dispute involving a cottage, a right of way, and claims for damages due to negligence and adverse possession.

The court found Robert Moore negligent for a mudslide damaging the plaintiffs' outhouse and Howard Moore liable for exacerbating damage and spoliation of evidence.

However, the plaintiffs failed to establish adverse possession over the disputed land, as they could not prove intent to exclude the true owner or effective exclusion.

The court awarded modest damages against Robert Moore and Howard Moore, but dismissed the adverse possession claim.

During jury deliberations in a motor vehicle personal injury trial, the jury foreman conducted internet research and found the Fault Determination Rules under the Insurance Act.

The jury asked a question about the regulation, prompting the trial judge to give a correcting charge instructing them to disregard it.

The jury subsequently returned a verdict finding the plaintiff 73% contributorily negligent.

The plaintiffs moved for a mistrial, arguing the jury was contaminated and failed to follow the correcting charge.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the correcting charge was sufficient, the jury's prompt disclosure of the research indicated a willingness to follow instructions, and the verdict was supported by the evidence.

The client abandoned her application for an assessment of her former solicitor's accounts the day before the scheduled hearing.

The assessment officer endorsed the discontinuance without making a costs order.

The solicitor brought a motion for costs of the abandoned application.

The court found it had jurisdiction to award costs under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 38.08(3), treating the motion akin to a motion to vary an order made without notice.

The court awarded the solicitor partial indemnity costs fixed at $1,000, discounting the amount claimed due to proportionality and avoidable preparation time.

Costs decision following a neighbour dispute over laneway access.

The successful party sought $43,750 in costs, relying on a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The court found the offer was not beaten and noted the successful party's provocative pre-litigation conduct in blocking the laneway unnecessarily escalated the dispute.

Applying the principle of proportionality and considering the conduct, the court fixed costs at $15,000.

The applicants, John Charles Brown and Joanne Muggette Brown, sought a declaration of adverse possession or a prescriptive easement over a laneway on Karen Savage's property.

Karen Savage, in a cross-application, sought a closing order for the laneway.

The court dismissed the Browns' claims for adverse possession and prescriptive easement, finding they failed to establish exclusive use or use "as of right." The court found that Savage did not require a closing order under the Road Access Act because the Browns had viable alternative access to their property from a public road, albeit at a cost.

Savage was granted the right to exclude the Browns from using the laneway, with a one-year suspension of enforcement to allow the Browns to implement alternative access.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for court approval of a settlement reached on behalf of two infant plaintiffs, who were claimants under the Family Law Act following their father's car accident.

The court identified several deficiencies in the evidence, including the lack of a breakdown between damages and pre-judgment interest, unclear plans for the settlement funds, conflicting information regarding the family's living situation, and an apparent undervaluation of the infant plaintiffs' claims for loss of care, guidance, and companionship.

The court also noted the absence of recommended neuropsychological and in-home assessment reports.

Consequently, the court was unable to approve the settlement and ordered counsel to appear in court for further directions.

The appellant, aged 45 at trial, appealed a judgment dismissing her claim against her parents for alleged physical and emotional abuse during childhood.

The trial judge, after a 10-day trial with extensive evidence from multiple witnesses and experts, found the appellant's allegations not credible and dismissed the claim.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: that the trial judge failed to address the core issue of abuse, failed to provide adequate reasons, and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding the trial judge properly assessed credibility, provided sufficient reasons for appellate review, and identified no palpable and overriding errors.

The court rendered a decision on costs following a six-week jury trial.

The plaintiff, Frank D’Addario, was wholly unsuccessful in his claim for malicious prosecution against Betty Smith and Chris Napior.

Betty Smith's counterclaim for sexual assault was dismissed, while Chris Napior was awarded $25,000 in damages for defamation against Frank and Ferne D’Addario.

The court considered the results obtained at trial, abandoned claims, and Rule 49 offers to settle.

It awarded Betty Smith and Chris Napior $75,000 plus HST for defending abandoned claims, $5,000 plus HST for a pre-trial motion, and Chris Napior an additional $55,000 plus HST and $4,000 in disbursements for his successful defamation claim, after finding elements of over-lawyering and excessive billing in the initial costs submission.

The third parties moved for an order requiring the defendant to post security for costs of the action.

The court considered Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, noting that the third parties met the initial onus.

The central issue was whether the defendant had a good chance of success on his third-party claim, which would make a security for costs order unjust.

The court found that the defendant had a good chance of success in establishing that one of the third parties was the controlling mind of the defendant's company, and that the third parties' actions may have contributed to the defendant's financial distress.

Consequently, the motion for security for costs was dismissed.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision refusing summary judgment in an action for statutory accident benefits.

The underlying action had been commenced more than four years after the insurer’s initial denial of benefits, despite a statutory two‑year limitation period under the Insurance Act and the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The motion judge declined summary judgment due to concerns about a subsequent denial form containing an error and a later medical report suggesting fibromyalgia related to the accident.

The court held that the law is well settled that the two‑year limitation runs from the insurer’s refusal and is not subject to discoverability.

Leave to appeal was granted because the decision appeared inconsistent with other Ontario authorities and clarification of the limitation rule was important.

A beneficiary applied for costs following a successful application removing an executor and trustee of an estate.

The applicant sought full indemnity costs and requested that the respondent pay personally due to misconduct in administering the trust and breaching a mediated settlement agreement.

The court found the respondent’s conduct reprehensible, including withholding trust funds without justification, acting under conflicts of interest, and attempting unsuccessful procedural delays.

While the applicant could not recover costs from a previously settled proceeding, the respondent’s breach of the settlement agreement justified a higher scale of costs.

Full indemnity costs were awarded and ordered payable personally by the respondent, together with reimbursement to the trust for legal fees he had paid to his own counsel from trust funds.

An application sought removal of an estate trustee and appointment of a corporate trustee under s. 37 of the Trustee Act.

The applicant alleged the trustee refused to pay trust income to the life beneficiary, acted in conflict of interest as both trustee and capital beneficiary, and breached settlement terms governing joint management of trust investments.

The court reviewed the governing principles for removal of trustees, emphasizing that the primary consideration is the welfare of the beneficiaries and that removal requires evidence that the trust cannot be properly administered if the trustee remains.

Given ongoing hostility, breaches of the settlement agreement, unilateral investment decisions, and interruption of income payments to the life beneficiary, the court found the conflict impaired the trustee’s ability to exercise discretion impartially.

The trustee was removed and a corporate trustee appointed.