Joseph W.L. Griffiths

The defendants brought a motion for non-suit to dismiss the plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim and to withdraw the defence of qualified privilege from the jury regarding a defamation counterclaim.

The court granted the motion for non-suit, finding no evidence that the defendants initiated the criminal proceedings, as the police exercised independent discretion in laying sexual assault charges.

The court also withdrew the defence of qualified privilege, ruling that statements made by the plaintiffs by counterclaim to a priest did not occur on a recognized occasion of qualified privilege, as there was no reciprocal duty or interest.

The defendants brought a motion for non-suit to dismiss the plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim and to withdraw the defence of qualified privilege from the jury regarding the plaintiff's defamation counterclaim.

The court granted the non-suit, finding no evidence that the defendants initiated the criminal proceedings, as the police exercised independent discretion.

The court also withdrew the defence of qualified privilege, ruling that statements made by the plaintiffs to a priest were not made on an occasion of qualified privilege.

The defendant moved to remove the plaintiff’s law firm on the basis of a conflict of interest, arguing the firm previously acted as its corporate counsel and therefore owed duties of loyalty.

The court found the defendant was technically a current client at the time the action was commenced, but the prior retainers were limited, sporadic, and of minor scope.

Applying the bright line rule from Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court held it was unreasonable in the circumstances for the defendant to expect the firm would not act against it in unrelated matters.

There was no risk of misuse of confidential information and no substantial risk that the representation would be materially affected.

The court concluded disqualification was not necessary to maintain the integrity of the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed an arbitrator's order precluding her from proceeding with claims for income replacement benefits (IRBs) due to missing the two-year limitation period and failing to comply with notification obligations.

The Director's Delegate dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant never met the eligibility criteria for IRBs because she continued working for more than five years after the accident and did not suffer a substantial inability to perform her essential tasks within 104 weeks.

Applying binding Court of Appeal precedent, the Delegate confirmed that an insured must establish eligibility within the first 104 weeks to qualify for benefits beyond that period.

The appellant insurer appealed the dismissal of its motion for summary judgment.

The insurer argued that the respondent's claim for income replacement benefits was barred by the two-year limitation period under s. 281.1 of the Insurance Act.

The motion judge had found a genuine issue for trial based on an error in a subsequent denial form and a fresh medical finding.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the initial clear and unequivocal denial triggered the limitation period, and a fresh medical finding could not reactivate it.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the claim.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision refusing summary judgment in an action for statutory accident benefits.

The underlying action had been commenced more than four years after the insurer’s initial denial of benefits, despite a statutory two‑year limitation period under the Insurance Act and the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The motion judge declined summary judgment due to concerns about a subsequent denial form containing an error and a later medical report suggesting fibromyalgia related to the accident.

The court held that the law is well settled that the two‑year limitation runs from the insurer’s refusal and is not subject to discoverability.

Leave to appeal was granted because the decision appeared inconsistent with other Ontario authorities and clarification of the limitation rule was important.

The applicant sought income replacement benefits (IRBs) after being terminated from her employment more than five years following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer raised a preliminary issue that the claim was statute-barred, having issued a clear denial of IRBs shortly after the accident when the applicant returned to work.

The arbitrator found that the insurer's initial denial was valid and triggered the two-year limitation period, which had long expired.

Furthermore, the arbitrator held that the applicant failed to comply with her statutory obligations to notify the insurer of her change in circumstances and to provide requested information, without a reasonable excuse.

The applicant was therefore precluded from proceeding to arbitration on her IRB claim.

A beneficiary applied for costs following a successful application removing an executor and trustee of an estate.

The applicant sought full indemnity costs and requested that the respondent pay personally due to misconduct in administering the trust and breaching a mediated settlement agreement.

The court found the respondent’s conduct reprehensible, including withholding trust funds without justification, acting under conflicts of interest, and attempting unsuccessful procedural delays.

While the applicant could not recover costs from a previously settled proceeding, the respondent’s breach of the settlement agreement justified a higher scale of costs.

Full indemnity costs were awarded and ordered payable personally by the respondent, together with reimbursement to the trust for legal fees he had paid to his own counsel from trust funds.

An application sought removal of an estate trustee and appointment of a corporate trustee under s. 37 of the Trustee Act.

The applicant alleged the trustee refused to pay trust income to the life beneficiary, acted in conflict of interest as both trustee and capital beneficiary, and breached settlement terms governing joint management of trust investments.

The court reviewed the governing principles for removal of trustees, emphasizing that the primary consideration is the welfare of the beneficiaries and that removal requires evidence that the trust cannot be properly administered if the trustee remains.

Given ongoing hostility, breaches of the settlement agreement, unilateral investment decisions, and interruption of income payments to the life beneficiary, the court found the conflict impaired the trustee’s ability to exercise discretion impartially.

The trustee was removed and a corporate trustee appointed.

The insurer brought a motion to require the insured to attend an in-home assessment, a psychological assessment, and an orthopaedic assessment pursuant to section 42 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, and to stay the arbitration pending her attendance.

The insured had previously failed to attend the insurer's scheduled assessments, claiming they conflicted with her own.

The arbitrator found that the insured had conceded the assessments were reasonable and necessary by agreeing to attend them at a pre-hearing, and that allowing her to reverse this position would be procedurally unfair.

The arbitrator ordered the insured to attend the assessments and stayed the arbitration pending her attendance.

The applicant, who lives in a condominium unit, sought an interim remedy to be relieved from the respondent's rule requiring him to transport his dog in a wagon or cart on common grounds, alleging it failed to accommodate his physical disability.

The Tribunal applied Rule 23 and found the application had merit, the balance of harm favoured the applicant, and it was just and appropriate to grant the request.

The interim remedy was granted subject to conditions regarding leashing, entry/exit routes, and elevator usage times.

The applicant, a condominium resident, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination based on disability because the respondent required him to cart his companion dog on common grounds.

The applicant requested an expedited proceeding, claiming that carting the dog exacerbated his catastrophic injuries.

The respondent opposed the request, arguing the applicant had known of the rule for years and submitted evidence suggesting he could perform physically demanding acts.

The Tribunal dismissed the request to expedite, finding the applicant's submissions too vague and lacking medical evidence to demonstrate truly urgent circumstances.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received income replacement benefits for 104 weeks.

The appellant insurer terminated the benefits, arguing the respondent did not meet the stricter test of suffering a complete inability to engage in any employment for which he was reasonably suited by education, training or experience.

The trial judge found the respondent met the test because he lacked the financial resources to train for long-haul trucking, which was identified as a suitable alternative.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a job requiring no substantial upgrading or retraining is a suitable alternative, even if the insured lacks formal qualifications at the time of trial.

Following the withdrawal of an arbitration application, the insurer requested an assessment of expenses.

The arbitrator had previously ordered the applicant's representative to personally pay the insurer's expenses because he caused the insurer to incur expenses without reasonable cause.

The arbitrator assessed the insurer's expenses at $3,063.68, finding the claimed hours and hourly rate to be reasonable.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for statutory accident benefits.

A dispute arose regarding the calculation of his pre-accident earning capacity (PEC) and residual earning capacity (REC) for the purpose of determining his loss of earning capacity benefit (LECB).

The arbitrator determined the PEC based on the insurer's accountant's calculation of the best 52 weeks of income in the 156 weeks prior to the accident.

The REC was determined based on two REC DAC assessments, finding the applicant capable of working as a mechanical assembler and later as a warehouseman.

The arbitrator ordered the insurer to pay the calculated LECB amounts and interest on any outstanding benefits, but denied the applicant's claim for a special award.

The Applicant sought to withdraw her arbitration application for statutory accident benefits.

The Insurer consented to the withdrawal but sought its expenses, arguing they were unreasonably incurred due to the conduct of the Applicant's representative.

The Arbitrator permitted the withdrawal and awarded expenses to the Insurer.

The Arbitrator found that the Applicant's representative, a paralegal, demonstrated a lack of knowledge of the law and arbitration process, commenced claims that were time-barred or unmediated, and prolonged the proceeding unnecessarily.

Finding his conduct amounted to inexcusable misconduct, the Arbitrator ordered the representative to personally pay the Insurer's expenses pursuant to section 282(11.2) of the Insurance Act.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court judgment regarding an insurance coverage dispute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower court and the arbitrator that the insurance endorsement in question included a causal element excluding coverage for loss or damage resulting from the ownership, use, or operation of specific machinery.

On the agreed facts, this causation requirement was not met.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for statutory accident benefits, which the insurer terminated.

The applicant sought arbitration.

During the proceedings, the applicant's representative was found to have a conflict of interest and withdrew.

After being given time to find new representation, the applicant and the insurer ultimately signed a consent to dismiss the arbitration without costs.

The arbitrator dismissed the issues in the arbitration hearing based on the consent of the parties.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received income replacement benefits (IRBs) from the insurer, as well as paid sick leave from his employer.

The insurer requested repayment of the IRBs, stating the applicant was not entitled to both.

The applicant applied for mediation more than two years after receiving the insurer's refusal to pay.

The arbitrator held that the insurer's refusal was clear, unequivocal, and met the notice requirements set out in Smith v. Co-operators.

Consequently, the applicant was precluded from proceeding to arbitration due to the expiry of the two-year limitation period.

The insurer appealed an arbitrator's decision awarding the insured expenses for two disputed treatment plans and housekeeping benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer argued the arbitrator erred in his treatment of the medical assessments and in awarding housekeeping benefits despite finding the insured's expense forms unreliable.

The Director's Delegate dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the arbitrator's weighing of the evidence, including his preference for the treating physiotherapist's plans over the insurer's assessments and his reliance on in-home assessments to determine housekeeping entitlement.