John J. Longo

The applicant sought rectification and enforcement of an agreement for the purchase of internment rights in a cemetery development.

The respondent argued that the signed document was merely a memorandum of understanding and that a formal agreement subject to legal review had not yet been concluded, requiring the matter to proceed to trial.

The court examined the parties’ post‑execution conduct, including payment and acceptance of a deposit, commencement of due diligence, engagement of consultants, marketing of burial plots, and planning applications.

These actions demonstrated that both parties treated the May 13, 2014 document as the binding formal agreement.

The court held that references within the document to a future “formal agreement” were the result of mutual mistake and ordered rectification.

Following the dismissal of the moving parties' motion for a rehearing of an appeal, the responding party sought costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $13,094.

The moving parties argued no costs should be awarded as the motion raised a novel issue that clarified the law.

The Court of Appeal held that costs should follow the event and awarded the responding party costs fixed at $4,000 all inclusive.

The defendant moved to stay an Ontario negligence and contract action arising from alleged defects in industrial thermostats supplied under an international commercial relationship.

The moving party relied on a contractual clause submitting to the jurisdiction of the English courts and argued that Ontario lacked jurisdiction or, alternatively, that England was the clearly more appropriate forum.

Applying the presumptive connecting factors framework, the court held that the alleged torts were committed in Ontario and that Ontario therefore had jurisdiction.

The court further held that the moving party failed to establish forum non conveniens or to show that the English courts should displace the plaintiff's chosen forum.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision granting certificates of pending litigation against their properties.

The respondent, who held an unpaid judgment of over $5 million, alleged the properties were fraudulently conveyed to avoid creditors.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the motion judge applied the correct legal test for granting a certificate of pending litigation in a fraudulent conveyance action and made no error in weighing the equities.

The moving parties brought a motion for a re-hearing of an appeal, arguing that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., released shortly before the appeal decision, altered the applicable standard of review for contractual interpretation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the result of the appeal was not driven by the standard of review and would not have been different under the Sattva test, as the application judge's errors were extricable questions of law.

Following a trial concerning ownership of a residential property, the successful plaintiff sought costs after obtaining a declaration of a one-half interest in the property.

The court considered a Rule 49 offer to settle under the Rules of Civil Procedure in which the plaintiff had offered to sell her interest for $250,000, which the estate declined.

Evidence of comparable sales indicated the property value exceeded $500,000, meaning the plaintiff achieved a better result at trial.

The court held that Rule 49 consequences applied, awarding partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

Costs were ordered against the estate but not against the co-defendant who had assigned his interest before trial.

The appeal concerned interpretation of a land development agreement containing a purchase price adjustment clause tied to non-developable acreage and secured by a vendor take-back mortgage.

The application judge treated the fifth anniversary in the clause as a hard deadline, with time of the essence, and held the purchaser lost any right to a price reduction by failing to trigger the process by that date.

The Court of Appeal held that interpretation was commercially unreasonable and inconsistent with the agreement’s structure, the consultant-based determination mechanism, and the surrounding development context.

The fifth anniversary operated as an 'as of' valuation date for measuring non-developable land, not as a limitation-like deadline.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment below set aside, and the purchaser was declared entitled to a price reduction to be determined under the agreement.

The plaintiff sought a declaration that she held a beneficial one-half interest in a Toronto property formerly owned by her deceased husband as tenant-in-common with his brother.

The defendants argued the property was held in trust for the brothers’ mother and that the plaintiff only held title as trustee rather than beneficial owner.

After reviewing the family’s financial contributions, tax filings, and historical dealings with the property, the court found no evidence of an express, resulting, or constructive trust in favour of the mother.

The evidence showed the brothers were the true beneficial owners who funded and maintained the property and consistently declared rental income on their tax returns.

The plaintiff therefore succeeded to her late husband’s beneficial half-interest, and the court ordered partition and sale of the property with proceeds divided equally.

The applicant mining company brought an application concerning mining royalty interests subject to contractual rights of first refusal.

After the respondent corporation dissolved and distributed its royalty interests to its principal shareholder, the applicant alleged that the transfer triggered the contractual rights of first refusal contained in two agreements governing mining royalties.

The court held that the dissolution and distribution of assets constituted a “transfer,” “grant,” or other disposition within the meaning of the agreements.

The respondent’s argument that the rights were only triggered by receipt of a bona fide third‑party purchase offer was rejected.

The court declared that the rights of first refusal were breached and granted declaratory and injunctive relief preventing enforcement of the royalty obligations.

During a trial concerning ownership of residential property and whether a resulting or constructive trust existed in favour of an estate, the plaintiff brought a mid‑trial motion seeking production of the deceased’s wills.

The court considered the principles of relevance and admissibility under the Rules of Civil Procedure and common law evidence authorities.

The wills were found to be potentially relevant to the intent of the deceased regarding the property at issue.

The court rejected arguments that family conflict created undue prejudice and held any risk could be controlled in a judge‑alone trial through appropriate weight.

Production of the wills was ordered subject to a confidentiality order sealing them from the public record.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the plaintiffs’ action against a contractor defendant, the court addressed costs.

The plaintiffs argued that no costs should be awarded due to their financial hardship, the cautious inclusion of the contractor as a defendant, their continued belief in the claim’s merit, and alleged prejudice from former counsel’s pleading deficiencies.

The court rejected these arguments, holding that impecuniosity and subjective belief in a claim do not justify avoiding costs, particularly where plaintiffs chose to continue litigation despite insufficient evidence.

Considering duplication arising from the defendant retaining two law firms and applying the factors in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court reduced the amounts claimed.

Costs of the motion and the action were fixed at reduced amounts payable by the plaintiffs.

The moving defendant sought summary judgment dismissing negligence claims arising from alleged flooding of the plaintiffs’ property during a highway construction project.

The plaintiffs alleged that the grading contractor failed to keep the construction site free of obstructions, causing culvert blockages and diversion of water onto their property.

The court refused a late informal request to amend the statement of claim to add additional flooding dates, holding the amendments introduced new causes of action barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

On the merits, the evidentiary record showed no proof that the contractor caused any blockage and no expert evidence establishing the applicable standard of care or its breach.

Finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, the court granted summary judgment dismissing the claim and all cross‑claims against the moving defendant.

The applicant purchaser sought a declaration that a vendor take-back mortgage was paid in full, arguing that a price adjustment for non-developable land reduced the balance to zero.

The agreement of purchase and sale required the calculation of non-developable land to occur at the five-year anniversary of the mortgage, but the applicant missed this deadline, claiming it was impossible to determine due to ongoing environmental studies regarding an endangered minnow species.

The court dismissed the application, holding that time was of the essence and the unpredictable nature of the development approval process did not excuse the failure to adhere to the contractually stipulated timeline.

The respondent vendors' cross-application for payment of the outstanding mortgage balance was granted.

The applicant sought a declaration that a vendor take-back mortgage was paid in full, arguing that a price adjustment clause in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale reduced the outstanding balance to zero.

The agreement stipulated that the price adjustment, based on the ratio of non-developable land, was to be calculated at the end of the fifth year of the mortgage term.

The applicant missed this deadline, arguing it was impossible to determine the non-developable land due to ongoing environmental consultations regarding an endangered minnow species.

The court dismissed the application, holding that time was of the essence and the failure to invoke the price adjustment mechanism at the stipulated time precluded any adjustment.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an order requiring it to pay $310,500 into court pursuant to Rule 45.02.

The defendant argued there was good reason to doubt the motion judge's finding that a specific fund existed and had not been commingled.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding the motion judge reasonably concluded that $310,500 remained directly traceable to the original fund and had not been commingled.

The court found no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the order.

The appellant appealed an order regarding compensation in a class action.

The appeal was resolved on consent, with the appellant abandoning his claim for compensation in excess of $95,000.

Class counsel consented to a payment of $95,000 to the appellant on a quantum meruit basis, to be paid from funds set aside for class counsel and appellant compensation.

The appellant brought a class action seeking restitution for unjust enrichment arising from late payment penalties (LPPs) levied by the respondent gas utility in excess of the interest limit prescribed by s. 347 of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant made out a claim for unjust enrichment.

The Court established a two-part test for the juristic reason analysis and found that the OEB orders did not constitute a juristic reason because they were inoperative to the extent they conflicted with the Criminal Code.

The respondent was ordered to repay LPPs collected in excess of the legal limit after the action was commenced in 1994.

The appellant appealed an order made under the Canada Business Corporations Act to the Divisional Court.

The court held that under s. 249 of the Act, an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, not the Divisional Court.

The appeal was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.

The appellant commenced a class action against the respondent gas utility, alleging that its five percent late payment penalty constituted interest at a criminal rate under s. 347 of the Criminal Code.

The motions judge granted summary judgment to the respondent, finding that the penalty was not an interest charge and that its payment was a voluntary act by the customer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the late payment penalty is a charge payable for the advancing of credit under an agreement or arrangement, and therefore constitutes 'interest' under s. 347.

The Court also held that the payment of the penalty is not a voluntary act that would preclude the application of the criminal interest rate provision.

Additionally, the Court set aside a personal costs award against the appellant, as he had received financial support from the Class Proceedings Fund.