J. George

The appellant was charged with several human trafficking and sexual services counts and with one count of assault and one count of assault causing bodily harm.

He was convicted on the two assault counts but acquitted of the remaining charges.

He appealed his convictions and his total sentence of 14.5 months.

He argued the trial judge improperly siloed credibility findings, having acquitted him of the related charges, and provided insufficient reasons.

He also appealed the imposition of consecutive sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge was entitled to accept some of the complainant's evidence while rejecting other parts, particularly given corroborating photographic and video evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge reasonably found the assaults were separate incidents and the total sentence was proportionate.

In supplementary reasons, the Court of Appeal addressed an error in the application judge's formal judgments regarding the continuation of a right of survivorship after a joint tenancy was severed into a tenancy in common.

The court granted the respondent leave to cross-appeal without a formal notice, varied the judgments to extinguish the right of survivorship, and issued a vesting order transferring 100% of the beneficial interest in the property to the respondent as the beneficiary of a resulting trust.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to call rebuttal evidence, failing to apply the W.(D.) framework to defence evidence, and admitting unauthenticated Snapchat screenshots.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised her discretion to admit the rebuttal evidence as it responded to a new issue raised by the defence.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's application of the burden of proof or the admission of the electronic evidence, which met the low threshold for authentication.

The appellant municipality was charged with contraventions under the Endangered Species Act for road maintenance activities that allegedly harmed an endangered butterfly species.

The municipality sought declaratory relief stating that its road maintenance obligations under the Municipal Act superseded the Endangered Species Act, exempting it from compliance.

The application judge dismissed the application as premature and not ripe for adjudication, noting the municipality had not attempted to obtain a permit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the finding that the issues were not justiciable and should be addressed either through the permit process or in the ongoing quasi-criminal prosecution.

The appellant commenced an action against opposing counsel from a previous proceeding, seeking punitive damages and a direction for Law Society disciplinary proceedings.

The motion judge struck the claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The appellant appealed.

The respondent requested the appeal be dismissed under Rule 2.1.01.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, noting the absence of a duty of care, absolute privilege, and the doctrine of collateral attack.

The appellant appealed his sentence of seven years and seven months for firearms and drug offences, arguing the trial judge erred by treating him as a recidivist based on his youth record and by failing to grant a further sentence reduction for harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly weighed the appellant's continuous criminal record, including a youth conviction for first-degree murder using a firearm, to assess moral culpability.

The Court also held that the trial judge appropriately factored the harsh pre-trial conditions into the global sentence without requiring a mathematical deduction.

The appellants were convicted of procuring, receiving a material benefit from sexual services, and advertising sexual services.

At trial, the judge applied section 276 of the Criminal Code to restrict the appellants from cross-examining the complainant about her prior work in the sex trade.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that section 276 does not apply categorically to sexual services and human trafficking offences, and that the trial judge erred in applying it to restrict relevant cross-examination.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso, allowed the appeals in respect of the sexual services offences, and ordered a new trial.

An appeal against a conviction for trafficking MDMA was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possessing proceeds of crime and his 26-month sentence.

He argued the verdict was inconsistent with his acquittal for possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and that the trial judge erred in her circumstantial evidence analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence of knowledge and control over the cash was compelling, unlike the evidence regarding the cocaine.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge properly considered the collateral immigration consequences but correctly concluded that a sentence under six months would not adequately address the gravity of the offence.

The appellant, a 19-year-old first-time offender, was convicted of child luring and communicating to obtain sexual services after responding to an undercover police advertisement.

He appealed his convictions, alleging errors in the jury charge regarding mens rea and arguing he was entrapped by police inducement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions or the entrapment ruling.

On the sentence appeal, the Court admitted fresh evidence of the appellant's recent medical hardships and found the trial judge erred in principle by not considering a conditional sentence, which became legally available due to an intervening change in the law.

The Court struck down the six-month mandatory minimum sentence under s. 286.1(2)(a) of the Criminal Code as grossly disproportionate and substituted a nine-month conditional sentence.

The offender pleaded guilty to trafficking fentanyl and criminal negligence causing death after selling cocaine laced with fentanyl to the victim, who subsequently died of an overdose.

The offender admitted to wilful blindness, having told the victim the drugs were a 'real head-spinner'.

The court rejected a suspended sentence, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for fentanyl trafficking, and sentenced the offender to three years' imprisonment.

The applicant brought a Motion to Change seeking to vary a 2005 order regarding spousal support and pension division.

The respondent brought a motion to dismiss the applicant's Motion to Change under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules, arguing that the applicant had failed to obey a 2007 order requiring her to reimburse him for support overpayments.

The court found that the applicant's non-compliance was willful and that her underlying claims lacked merit, as the pension administrator correctly applied the Pension Benefits Act in determining she was not a spouse entitled to survivor benefits.

The court granted the respondent's motion and dismissed the applicant's Motion to Change.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's motor vehicle accident claim.

The collision occurred when the plaintiff attempted an improper left turn from a through lane, striking the defendant's vehicle which was proceeding lawfully in the designated left-turn lane.

Applying the enhanced fact-finding powers under Rule 20.04, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, concluding that the defendant could not have reasonably avoided the collision.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.