J. George

The appellants appealed a trial judgment declaring the corporate respondent the sole owner of two boats and awarding damages for breach of fiduciary duty, defamation, and punitive damages.

The appellants also appealed the dismissal of their counterclaim and the costs awards.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge reasonably concluded there was a contract for the sale of the boats but no joint venture agreement.

The court found no errors in the trial judge's findings on fiduciary duty, defamation, damages, or costs.

The appeal was dismissed with costs of $17,000 awarded to the respondents.

The appellant railway company appealed a partial summary judgment dismissing its claims for ongoing coal tar contamination as an abuse of process.

The appellant had previously commenced an action in 1989 for historical and continuing coal tar migration, which was dismissed for inordinate delay and failure to preserve evidence.

The appellant commenced a new action in 2014 claiming damages for continuing migration since 2012.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the continuing tort claims were exhausted by the dismissal of the 1989 action, and allowing the 2014 action to proceed would undermine finality and bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The moving parties sought a panel review to set aside a motion judge's order requiring them to pay security for costs within 30 days, failing which their appeal would be dismissed.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error or misapprehension of material evidence in the motion judge's discretionary decision, agreeing that the appeal lacked merit and the justice of the case supported the order.

The motion to set aside the order, and an alternative request for an extension of time to post security, were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of two counts of sexual assault, one count of invitation to sexual touching, and one count of indecent exposure to a person under 16.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in the collusion instruction by failing to direct the jury that the instruction did not apply to him, and by failing to caution the jury that rejection of his family members' evidence on the basis of collusion could not be used to infer that the appellant was less credible or guilty.

The Court of Appeal found that there was no evidentiary basis to include the appellant in the collusion instruction, as he had not been cross-examined about participating in any family discussions of the allegations.

The failure to provide limiting instructions left the jury inadequately instructed on fundamental credibility issues.

The curative proviso was not applied because credibility was the central issue in the trial and the errors were not harmless or trivial.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault against a resident of a group home who had Down syndrome.

At trial, the Crown successfully applied to admit the complainant's hearsay statements to personal support workers without calling the complainant to testify, and without expert evidence that testifying would cause trauma.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in concluding the hearsay evidence was necessary without first hearing directly from the complainant or receiving expert evidence regarding potential trauma.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment holding them jointly and severally liable for $3.76 million after the respondent investors were defrauded in a second mortgage scheme.

The investment funds were misappropriated by employees of a law firm acting as agents for the appellants' gas station development project.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the summary judgment framework, his conclusion that an agency relationship existed, or his imposition of joint and several liability based on findings that the defendants worked together to deprive the investors of their funds.

Leave to appeal the substantial indemnity costs award was also denied.

The appellant was convicted of historical sexual offences against two sisters.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting cross-count similar fact evidence and prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded the similar fact evidence had significant probative value that outweighed its prejudicial effect, and properly admitted the prior consistent statements under the narrative exception to explain the delay in reporting.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and manslaughter after shooting two men outside a nightclub.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred by admitting evidence obtained in breach of his s. 8 Charter rights, misapprehending eyewitness testimony, improperly assessing the provocation defence, and refusing to grant a mistrial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's rulings or assessment of the evidence.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the 18-year parole ineligibility period as proportionate.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The action arose from a social media post by the respondent about Halal mortgages, which the appellant claimed referred to him and his former company.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the post related to a matter of public interest and that the appellant failed to show the defamation claim had substantial merit, as the impugned words did not identify him.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellants, FedEx, appealed an order certifying a class proceeding brought by the respondent, who alleged FedEx charged undisclosed and unsolicited customs brokerage fees in breach of the Consumer Protection Act.

FedEx argued the claim disclosed no cause of action, lacked common issues, and had an overly broad class definition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the pleadings disclosed a reasonable cause of action, the systemic nature of the billing practices raised common issues, and the class definition appropriately included claims that might face limitation or jurisdictional defences, which are better addressed at trial.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his semen found on a towel worn by the complainant.

The appellant claimed the semen was present because he was having an affair with the complainant's mother, who used the towel to clean him.

The trial judge rejected this evidence, finding no affair existed and the explanation implausible.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence, concluding the trial judge's findings were open to her and the inconsistencies regarding the towel's location did not undermine the DNA evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an inmate, pleaded guilty to intimidating a justice system participant and uttering threats.

On appeal, he sought to strike his guilty pleas due to procedural irregularities, including a failure to properly arraign him on one count, the failure to apply the Kienapple principle to stay the threatening count, and an insufficient plea inquiry.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence indicating the appellant was unmedicated and influenced by correctional officers to plead guilty to secure a federal transfer.

The Court allowed the appeal, struck the guilty pleas, and ordered a new trial, finding that maintaining the pleas risked a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his jury convictions for sexual assault and assault against his spouse.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding evidence of his controlling behaviour and by failing to caution against cross-count reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the contextual evidence was relevant to the issue of consent and that a cross-count reasoning caution was unnecessary because the physical and sexual assaults were inextricably linked.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a home invasion at a university residence and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in jury selection, misdirected the jury on reasonable doubt, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended an expert opinion on his likelihood of re-offending.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's jury screening or instructions, and upheld the sentence as eminently fit given the gravity of the offence and the appellant's extensive criminal record.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment after shooting an intruder outside his home.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in leaving manslaughter with the jury, and challenged the jury instructions on self-defence and out-of-court statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding an air of reality to manslaughter based on the appellant's testimony and upholding the jury instructions.

On the sentence appeal, fresh evidence revealed the trial judge misspoke and intended to impose a six-year sentence.

The Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in failing to correct his mistake immediately, and sentenced the appellant afresh to six years' imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference following a jury trial.

At trial, the Crown argued in closing that the self-represented appellant's lack of romantic relationships provided a motive for the offences, characterizing him as a 'sexual opportunist'.

The trial judge included this theory of motive in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal held that this evidence was irrelevant, prejudicial, and unfair, as it invited impermissible reasoning and the appellant was never cross-examined on it.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The trial judge had accepted the seven-year-old complainant's evidence despite inconsistencies, relying on the child's description of the assault and his subsequent protective behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapplication of the law and holding that the trial judge's credibility findings were entitled to deference.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his application to adduce evidence of prior sexual activity under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code, assessing his credibility, finding the requisite mens rea, and handling a post-trial application to re-open the trial involving solicitor-client privilege.

The Crown requested an in camera hearing for the appeal, which the Court of Appeal denied, finding alternative measures sufficient to protect the complainant's privacy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, credibility assessments, or application of the subjective mens rea standard.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay in a historical sexual assault case.

The application judge had calculated a net delay of 33 months, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the application judge made palpable and overriding errors by failing to attribute three distinct periods of delay to the defence: delay in setting a preliminary inquiry, delay due to defence unavailability for a judicial pre-trial, and delay caused by the defence being unprepared for the first judicial pre-trial.

Deducting these periods reduced the net delay to 29.4 months, below the ceiling.

The appeal was allowed, the stay set aside, and the matter remitted for trial.

The appellants, a police services board and a chief of police, appealed a Divisional Court decision allowing a negligence action against them to proceed.

The respondent alleged he was assaulted by police officers during an arrest and claimed the chief was negligent in supervision and training, and the board was directly and vicariously liable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the chief's appeal, finding the pleadings advanced a tenable claim with sufficient material facts.

The board's appeal was granted in part to strike the direct negligence claims, though the board remains a defendant based on vicarious liability.