V. Jennifer Mackinnon

The children's aid society and the prospective adoptive parents sought judicial review of decisions by the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding the adoption placement of a child.

The Board had rescinded the society's decision to refuse another foster family's adoption application and confirmed the termination of the prospective adoptive parents' adoption placement.

The Divisional Court allowed the applications for judicial review, finding that the Board's conduct during the hearing, including uneven treatment of the foster families and inappropriate questioning of witnesses, gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court set aside the Board's decisions and ordered a new hearing before a newly constituted panel to determine the child's current best interests.

The defendant brought a motion seeking dissolution of an ex parte Mareva injunction that prohibited dealings with several real estate properties.

The plaintiff alleged the defendant participated in fraud and conspiracy relating to real estate transactions and argued that there was a real risk the defendant would dissipate assets to avoid judgment.

The court reviewed evidence of multiple property sales, inconsistencies in the defendant’s affidavit evidence, and delays in cooperating with discovery.

Applying the test for Mareva relief, the court found the plaintiff had established a strong prima facie case and a real risk of asset dissipation.

The court held that the criteria for maintaining the injunction were satisfied and dismissed the defendant’s motion.

During an ongoing family law trial, the court issued procedural directions governing the completion of evidence and the management of remaining witnesses.

The respondent was permitted to call several witnesses within strict time limits and was directed regarding the orderly presentation of those witnesses.

The court addressed potential testimony from a treating professional, limiting the evidence to factual observations rather than expert opinions.

Directions were also given concerning a late-produced psychiatric report, potential cross‑examination of the author, possible updated views and preferences evidence for the children through the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, and updated financial disclosure from both parties.

The applicant, an Advanced Care Paramedic, sought judicial review of a medical director's decision to decertify him following an investigation into a call where a patient later died.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness because the medical director did not follow the advisory recommendations of the Paramedic Practice Review Committee and acted as investigator, prosecutor, and decision-maker.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant was provided with adequate notice, disclosure, opportunities to respond, and reasons, and that the process did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The responding party brought a motion to set aside the registration in Ontario of a Pennsylvania child support order under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act.

The moving party argued he was not ordinarily resident in Ontario and that registration was contrary to public policy because the order was being enforced elsewhere and he was not in arrears.

The court reviewed the legal test for ordinary residence from leading authorities and considered the moving party’s routine of spending approximately three months each year in Ontario while maintaining property, licences, and other ties to the province.

The court held that a person may be ordinarily resident in more than one jurisdiction and found that the established pattern of returning annually to Ontario constituted ordinary residence.

None of the statutory grounds for setting aside the registration were established.

Following a Divisional Court order requiring reconsideration of a prior Crown wardship decision, the court conducted a full reconsideration of a child protection status review involving two young children.

The moving parties argued that the statutory definitions of “Indian” and “native person” in the Child and Family Services Act were unconstitutional and sought placement of the children with family members rather than Crown wardship.

The court rejected the constitutional challenge, finding insufficient evidentiary foundation to establish discrimination under s. 15 of the Charter and no breach of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

On the merits, the court found that proposed family placement plans lacked sufficient indicia of permanence and stability after the children had already spent an extended period in care.

Considering the statutory best‑interests factors and the importance of permanency, the court concluded that Crown wardship with access best served the children’s interests.

The appellant appealed a final order regarding spousal support, arguing the trial judge erred in imputing income to her, setting the commencement date for support, fixing the quantum within the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, and calculating the respondent's income.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law or significant misapprehension of evidence.

The court upheld the trial judge's discretionary decisions, including the imputation of income based on the appellant's capacity and the selection of a post-application commencement date due to the appellant's delay in pursuing the claim.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) of the College of Physiotherapists of Ontario, which issued a caution regarding their public communications but did not refer the matter to discipline.

The applicants argued the ICRC exceeded its jurisdiction, exhibited bias, denied procedural fairness, and infringed their Charter rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding the ICRC acted reasonably, did not make improper findings of fact or misconduct, and appropriately balanced Charter values.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel, which had set aside a Hearing Panel's dismissal of professional misconduct complaints related to mortgage transactions.

The Appeal Panel found the Hearing Panel erred in law by incorrectly defining fraud and by concluding a lawyer need not disclose material facts if they reasonably believe the lender already knows them.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing that a lawyer has a strict duty to disclose all material facts to a lender client, and that the Appeal Panel reasonably concluded the Hearing Panel's legal errors rendered its factual findings unsafe.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration award that determined two policy grievances regarding the employer's Nuclear Resourcing Policy.

The arbitrator had found that the employer's reassignment of employees to available work within their job classification did not violate the job posting provisions of the collective agreement.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and held that the arbitrator's interpretation fell within a range of reasonable outcomes, as it followed established arbitral jurisprudence and considered the collective agreement as a whole.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The tenant appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board dismissing his applications as vexatious and finding he had abandoned the rental unit before the landlord changed the locks.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that its jurisdiction is limited to questions of law under s. 210(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act, and the tenant failed to identify any error of law.

The Board had ample evidence to conclude the applications were vexatious and to reject the tenant's credibility regarding alleged rent payments.

The moving party sought to set aside an order quashing his appeal from the Landlord and Tenant Board.

He argued that the Board's consent order was invalid because his former counsel forced him to accept the settlement under duress.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the counsel's firm legal advice did not amount to duress at law and that there was no unfairness in the prior proceedings.

Following a trial on spousal support where the applicant was the more successful party, both parties sought costs.

The court found that the respondent failed to make reasonable offers to settle and maintained an unreasonably high demand for spousal support, which necessitated the trial.

The applicant was awarded costs fixed at $45,000 on a partial recovery basis.

Following a 24‑year marriage without children, the primary issue at trial was spousal support after separation and equalization of property.

The respondent sought significant retroactive and ongoing support based on disability and medical expenses, while the applicant argued he should not pay ongoing support after retirement and relied on the principle against double recovery from pension income.

The court awarded retroactive and interim support largely within the high end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines and imputed employment income to the applicant for one additional year due to a retirement decision made shortly before trial.

After June 2016, the court declined to order further support, holding that the respondent had not established an exception to the rule against “double dipping” articulated in Boston v. Boston.

The court also granted a divorce and required the applicant to maintain life insurance to secure the temporary support obligation.

Following a family law motion addressing parenting issues, school enrollment, and child support, the court determined costs arising from the motion.

The moving party had limited success, obtaining a slight reduction in child support and resolving summer access, but was unsuccessful on the central issue concerning enrollment of the child in junior kindergarten without both parents’ consent.

The responding party had been required to prepare materials for several issues that did not proceed due to the matter being better addressed at trial after a settlement conference.

Considering the divided success and the preparation required, the court awarded the responding party partial costs.

Costs were fixed at $3,500 inclusive, payable in monthly installments.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking to exercise access to his four daughters following allegations of sexual touching that had led to the suspension of access.

The children had been interviewed by child protection authorities and police, but no criminal charges were laid and the evidentiary record before the court was limited.

The court found the situation troubling due to the prolonged restriction of access and unresolved factual disputes, including potential concerns about alienating behaviour.

The court ordered therapeutic counselling for the children and directed that a social worker supervise a series of structured community visits between the father and the children, followed by continued supervised access.

The matter was scheduled for further case management and the involvement of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer was noted.

The applicant brought a family law motion addressing several interim parenting and support issues, including summer parenting time, child support recalculation following a change in employment income, and whether the child should be enrolled in junior kindergarten.

The court accepted that the applicant’s shift to a lower-paying full-time position was not voluntary underemployment but imputed modest additional income for potential summer employment and adjusted child support accordingly.

The court declined to order the child’s enrolment in junior kindergarten given disputed facts and the absence of a custody or decision-making order.

On the respondent’s request, the court directed the Office of the Children’s Lawyer to conduct an updated clinical investigation using a different investigator in preparation for trial.

Summer parenting time was resolved by consent.

The applicant brought an unopposed motion to change a 2009 family court order relating to child support, income determination, and section 7 expenses for two children.

The court accepted the applicant’s evidence regarding the respondent’s employment income where the respondent failed to provide financial disclosure but declined to impute additional income based on speculative evidence.

The court also rejected certain claimed extracurricular and counselling expenses as section 7 expenses due to insufficient evidentiary support.

The order was varied to adjust child support and to establish each parent’s proportionate contribution toward post-secondary education expenses after a deemed child contribution.

Ongoing disclosure obligations and payment mechanisms were also ordered.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a temporary disclosure order requiring production of bank and credit card statements dating back several years.

The disclosure had been ordered at a settlement conference in a family law proceeding involving a significant claim for retroactive child support and a dispute regarding the appropriate amount of support under s. 4(b) of the Child Support Guidelines.

The court held that the financial disclosure was relevant to issues including the moving party’s ability to pay retroactive support, alleged blameworthy spending conduct, and whether the table amount of support was inappropriate.

The court further held that the judge had authority under the Family Law Rules to make the disclosure order at the settlement conference.

Leave to appeal was denied and the motion dismissed.

This was a costs endorsement following a six-day trial in which the applicant obtained a $20,000 award on an unjust enrichment claim.

The court held the applicant was the successful party notwithstanding that he claimed $60,000 and recovered less.

The court also recognized that a self-represented litigant may receive reasonable compensation for work personally performed, but reduced the amount sought to reflect documentary issues that caused trial time to be lost.

Costs were fixed at $8,500 inclusive of fees, disbursements and HST, payable forthwith.