Jelena Vlacic

The applicant sought to establish standing to challenge the admissibility of a loaded handgun, ammunition, and drugs seized from a wooden fence during execution of a search warrant at his residence.

The applicant argued he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the fence and its contents.

The Crown contended there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in a shared fence accessible from the neighbor's property.

The court found that the applicant established standing by demonstrating a reasonable expectation of privacy in the fence, albeit at the lower end of the spectrum, as the fence was part of the curtilage of the residence and the items were not abandoned.

The applicant brought a motion to stay proceedings for violation of section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to delay.

The total delay from the laying of the information on August 28, 2018 to the scheduled end of trial on May 15, 2020 was 20 months and 17 days, exceeding the presumptive ceiling of 18 months under the Jordan framework.

The Crown argued that a 93-day delay between two judicial pre-trial dates should be characterized as a discrete event beyond its control due to technological issues from a Microsoft Office 365 software update.

The court rejected this argument, finding that the assigned Crown Attorney's failure to attend was due to forgetfulness rather than an exceptional circumstance.

The court also found significant delays in disclosure, particularly the 7.5-month delay in providing the Information to Obtain the search warrant and missing officers' notes.

The court concluded that no exceptional circumstances justified the delay and granted the stay of proceedings.

The appellant, Fiago Heron Sr., appealed convictions for two counts of weapons dangerous to the public peace and one count of assault with a weapon.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred by failing to critically assess the credibility of a key Crown witness, Paula Heron (the appellant's wife), despite significant inconsistencies in her testimony and a potential motive to fabricate.

The trial judge's reliance on the consistency of Crown witnesses without proper credibility analysis of Paula Heron was deemed an insufficient ground for conviction.

The appeal was allowed, convictions vacated, and a new trial ordered.

The defendant pleaded guilty to communicating via computer system with a person he believed to be under 16 years of age for the purpose of facilitating sexual touching, contrary to s. 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant engaged in extensive online grooming of an undercover officer posing as a 13-year-old girl, including explicit sexual conversations and arranging to meet the purported child.

A forensic psychological assessment diagnosed the defendant with pedophilia, non-exclusive, sexually attracted to girls, though he denied such attraction.

The court imposed a 15-month custodial sentence followed by three years probation, a 20-year SOIRA order, and a 10-year s. 161 order prohibiting computer and internet use to communicate with minors.

The defendant was charged with assault and assault with a weapon (knife) against her husband.

The trial involved conflicting testimony from the complainant and defendant regarding an incident that arose from a dispute over bedroom furniture.

The court found the complainant's evidence not compelling and harbored reasonable doubts about what actually occurred.

The court was unable to determine who assaulted whom during the upstairs incident and could not rule out self-defence.

Regarding the alleged knife assault, the court rejected the complainant's evidence as implausible, noting his unconcerned behavior after the alleged threat and the fact that no knife was ever recovered by police.

The defendant was acquitted of both counts.

This decision addresses the voluntariness of statements made by two accused, J.D. and D.B., to police in a human trafficking case.

The Crown sought to admit statements from both.

J.D. argued his statement was involuntary due to fear from a forceful arrest, while D.B. argued hers was involuntary due to the absence of a primary caution.

The court found J.D.'s statement voluntary, concluding that the force used during his arrest was not excessive, he was properly cautioned, and he maintained an operating mind.

However, D.B.'s statement was deemed involuntary because she was never given a primary caution, was not fully informed of all charges when she spoke to counsel, and her understanding of the recording's purpose was flawed, raising reasonable doubt about her awareness of the stakes.

The Crown sought leave to introduce evidence of prior discreditable conduct against the accused, J.D. and D.B., in a criminal trial involving charges of procuring, exercising control, receiving financial benefit from sexual services, and advertising sexual services.

The court applied the probative value versus prejudicial effect test, considering issues of credibility, state of mind, and narrative.

The court granted leave for most of the requested evidence, including assaults, threats, and drug supply as means of control, and the involvement of other escorts, but dismissed the admission of evidence regarding a belief in a firearm and details of a romantic relationship due to excessive prejudice.

The court also found no air of reality to the defence's collusion argument.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual exploitation involving a young person with whom he lived.

The court assessed the credibility of the complainant and the accused, noting significant inconsistencies in the complainant's statements to police and during testimony, as well as a potential motive to fabricate.

While DNA evidence of the accused's semen was found on the complainant's underwear, expert testimony could not rule out transference from other clothing in a communal laundry basket.

The court found the accused's testimony to be tailored to minimize his authority and contact with the complainant, but ultimately concluded that the evidence, when considered holistically, left a reasonable doubt on both charges.

The accused was found not guilty.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for refusing to comply with an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding reasonable suspicion, finding an intentional refusal, and improperly using his roadside silence to reject his trial testimony regarding medical excuses.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found no error in the reasonable suspicion or intentional refusal findings.

However, the court held the trial judge committed a reversible error by using the appellant's pre-arrest roadside silence to reject his trial evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and with refusing to comply with a demand to provide breath samples contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown called three witnesses: a civilian tow truck driver who observed the erratic driving and followed the vehicle; the arresting officer; and the breath technician.

The defence called the accused.

The court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was driving the vehicle observed by the tow truck driver and that his ability to operate the motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

The court also found that the Crown proved the mens rea and actus reus of the refusal charge.

The accused was convicted on both charges.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving, flight from police, and driving with excess alcohol (Over 80).

The trial involved both Charter and merits challenges.

The defendant alleged breaches of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Charter regarding the breath demand and right to counsel.

On the merits, the defendant argued the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable and that the dangerous driving and flight from police charges were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the defendant guilty of Over 80 but acquitted him of dangerous driving and flight from police due to insufficient evidence and reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with uttering threats to cause death, assault with a weapon (hammer), and simple assault against his spouse.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the testimony of the complainant, while the defence called the accused and a police officer.

The trial involved a credibility assessment of conflicting accounts regarding three alleged incidents: a threat to kill and bury the complainant, an attack with a hammer at a trailer, and a kitchen assault.

The court found significant inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, particularly regarding a statement made on the eve of trial that appeared to conflate separate incidents.

Despite finding the complainant largely credible, the court determined that reasonable doubt existed on all charges due to unexplained inconsistencies, the erratic nature of the complainant's testimony, and ambiguities in the medical evidence.

The accused brought a Mills application seeking production of third-party records held by medical providers, telecommunications companies, police services, and probation officers.

The application involved a sexual assault and assault causing bodily harm charge arising from an intimate relationship that had ended.

The court conducted a two-stage analysis under sections 278.3 to 278.9 of the Criminal Code, balancing the accused's right to make full answer and defence against the complainant's privacy interests.

The court granted production of certain hospital records, telephone records, police records relating to prior investigations, and police occurrence reports involving dishonesty allegations, while denying production of the complainant's telephone records, family physician records, and probation records.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging that the actions of PC Cooper were excessive and would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The incident occurred in the cell area of a police station when the officer was removing the defendant's handcuffs.

The defendant tensed and pulled his arm, which the officer interpreted as a precursor to aggressive movement.

The officer then took the defendant to the ground using a choke hold.

The court found that the defendant's section 7 Charter rights were infringed, as the officer's use of force was excessive in the circumstances.

Evidence obtained as a result was excluded.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol in his blood (Over 80) following a traffic stop in the early morning hours.

The Crown's case rested on an approved screening device (ASD) test that registered a "fail." The defence raised a Charter challenge arguing that residual mouth alcohol could have affected the reliability of the ASD result, claiming the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest.

The court found that the officer reasonably relied on the ASD result and that the accused's statement regarding the timing of his last drink (two hours prior) did not constitute credible evidence of recent alcohol consumption that would have required the officer to delay the test.

The conviction was entered.

The accused was charged with driving with over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood, drive disqualified, possession of a prohibited weapon, and breach of a weapons prohibition.

At trial, the Crown sought to rely on the presumption of identity regarding breath test readings to establish the accused's blood alcohol level at the time of driving.

The defence challenged whether the breath tests were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found that the police failed to meet this statutory requirement due to unnecessary delays, including an unaccounted period after the demand, a vehicle search, a leisurely personal search, and note-taking at the scene.

The Crown could not rely on the presumption of identity without evidence of compliance with the "as soon as practicable" requirement.

The charge was dismissed.