Jelena Vlacic

A.V. was convicted of sexual interference for conduct in Dubai.

Prior to sentencing, he applied to challenge the court's territorial jurisdiction, arguing that s. 7(4.1) of the Criminal Code is unconstitutional.

The application raised two constitutional arguments under the Charter: a breach of the right to make full answer and defence (s. 7 and 11(b)) due to difficulties in gathering foreign evidence, and overbreadth (s. 7) due to the section potentially capturing consensual conduct legal in other jurisdictions.

The court dismissed the first argument, finding that existing legal mechanisms and case-specific remedies address the concerns.

However, the court found arguable merit in the overbreadth argument, particularly concerning differing ages of consent, and adjourned sentencing to allow this aspect of the defence application to proceed.

This ruling addresses the continuation of an ongoing jury trial for second-degree murder amidst the rapid spread of the Omicron variant of COVID-19.

Despite a joint submission from the Crown and defence to continue the trial, the court exercised its discretion to adjourn the proceedings.

The judge balanced the accused's right to an expeditious and fair trial against the paramount health and safety concerns for all courtroom participants, including jurors, counsel, staff, and the accused's family.

The court took judicial notice of the Omicron variant's significantly increased transmissibility and its impact on vaccine effectiveness, noting the high likelihood of trial disruptions due to exposures or infections.

The trial was adjourned until February 7, 2022, with a reassessment meeting scheduled for January 31, 2022.

The accused, charged with murder, brought a pre-trial application to adduce evidence of the deceased victim's propensity for violence when intoxicated to support claims of self-defence and provocation.

The Crown conceded the evidence was admissible but sought to lead reply evidence of the accused's dated criminal record for violent offences.

The court held that the accused could lead the evidence.

If the accused limited the evidence to the period of May to August 2019, the Crown could not lead reply evidence of the accused's criminal record.

However, if the accused led evidence of the victim's propensity predating May 2019, the Crown would be permitted to lead reply evidence of the accused's record, provided the underlying facts of the convictions were also adduced to prevent undue prejudice.

The accused, charged with murder, brought a pre-trial application under the O'Connor framework for the production of a key Crown witness's third-party psychiatric records.

The witness, who had a history of schizophrenia, had given a statement to police about a conversation with the accused shortly after the murder.

The court dismissed the application at the first stage, finding the records were not 'likely relevant'.

The court held that the request was overbroad and rested on impermissible stereotypes about mental illness, as there was no case-specific evidence that the witness's condition impaired her ability to observe, retain, or recount the events at the material times.

The applicant, charged with attempted murder and witness intimidation, sought a bail review under section 520 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant argued that the complainant's unreliable testimony at the preliminary hearing constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the complainant's poor testimony was a predictable result of fear and intimidation, and that the Crown still had effective evidentiary tools to present a strong case.

The court held that releasing the applicant would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The applicant, Brandon Rego, sought a bail review under Section 520 of the Criminal Code, arguing a material change of circumstances due to the weakening of the Crown's intimidation case and a significant COVID-19 outbreak at his correctional facility.

The court found that both developments constituted a material change, opening the door for a full review of the bail decision.

However, despite these changes and the health risks posed by the pandemic, the court ultimately dismissed the application, ordering continued detention on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The judge emphasized the egregious nature of the alleged witness tampering and the applicant's extensive criminal history, concluding that his release would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The applicant was charged with assault, assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and mischief on September 1, 2018.

His trial was scheduled for September 25-26, 2019, but was adjourned when he was charged with new offences on the first day of trial.

Those charges were withdrawn approximately six weeks later.

The rescheduled trial was set for December 23-24, 2020, resulting in total delay of 27 months and 23 days.

The applicant applied for a stay of proceedings on the grounds of unreasonable delay in violation of s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the net delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan and that the Crown failed to justify the excess delay by taking reasonable steps to mitigate it.

The Crown applied under section 521 of the Criminal Code to reverse a bail review decision that released the accused on a surety bail with conditions.

The accused was charged with attempted murder and later with witness intimidation and kidnapping after the complainant was found chained to a bed.

The original bail judge detained the accused on secondary and tertiary grounds, finding him un-releasable regardless of the bail plan.

The reviewing judge subsequently released the accused, finding a material change in circumstances based on a new supervision plan.

The Superior Court held that the reviewing judge erred in law because the original detention was not based on an inadequate plan, but on the accused's ungovernability.

The release order was set aside and the detention order was reinstated.

The accused was charged with multiple firearms and threat-related offences after confronting tenants in his home with what appeared to be a handgun.

The central issue at trial was whether the Crown could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the unrecovered item was a real firearm rather than an imitation, relying on video evidence and witness testimony.

The court found that the circumstantial evidence, particularly witness descriptions of the bullets, proved the item was a real firearm.

The accused was found guilty of possessing a weapon for a dangerous purpose, pointing a firearm at one tenant, uttering a death threat to that tenant, possessing a firearm while prohibited, and possessing a loaded firearm without a licence, but acquitted of the remaining charges.

Elias Gibb was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder.

The Crown sought a 15-year parole ineligibility period, while the defence sought 12-14 years.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the senseless nature of the killing, the number of shots, the offender's criminal record, prior display of the gun, rejection of provocation defence, and increased gun violence in the region.

Mitigating factors included remorse, difficult childhood, family support, youth, and rehabilitation prospects.

The court also considered the jury's recommendation (majority 10 years) and the impact of Covid-19 on incarceration conditions, but affirmed proportionality.

The court imposed a life sentence with a 13-year period of parole ineligibility, rejecting the jury's majority recommendation due to the aggravating factors.

R.K. was charged with sexual assault and sexual exploitation involving two complainants (B and T) from different time periods (1997 and 2017).

R.K. applied for severance of the counts, and the Crown brought a cross-application for similar fact evidence.

The court dismissed the Crown's similar fact application, finding insufficient probative value and significant prejudice due to the generic nature of alleged similarities, the 20-year time gap, and differing allegations.

The court granted R.K.'s severance application, concluding that the interests of justice required separate trials.

This decision was based on the lack of admissible similar fact evidence, the accused's reasonable desire to testify on some counts but not others, and the absence of a strong factual or legal nexus between the remote allegations.

The applicant sought to establish standing to challenge the admissibility of a loaded handgun, ammunition, and drugs seized from a wooden fence during execution of a search warrant at his residence.

The applicant argued he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the fence and its contents.

The Crown contended there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in a shared fence accessible from the neighbor's property.

The court found that the applicant established standing by demonstrating a reasonable expectation of privacy in the fence, albeit at the lower end of the spectrum, as the fence was part of the curtilage of the residence and the items were not abandoned.

The applicant brought a motion to stay proceedings for violation of section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to delay.

The total delay from the laying of the information on August 28, 2018 to the scheduled end of trial on May 15, 2020 was 20 months and 17 days, exceeding the presumptive ceiling of 18 months under the Jordan framework.

The Crown argued that a 93-day delay between two judicial pre-trial dates should be characterized as a discrete event beyond its control due to technological issues from a Microsoft Office 365 software update.

The court rejected this argument, finding that the assigned Crown Attorney's failure to attend was due to forgetfulness rather than an exceptional circumstance.

The court also found significant delays in disclosure, particularly the 7.5-month delay in providing the Information to Obtain the search warrant and missing officers' notes.

The court concluded that no exceptional circumstances justified the delay and granted the stay of proceedings.

The appellant, Fiago Heron Sr., appealed convictions for two counts of weapons dangerous to the public peace and one count of assault with a weapon.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred by failing to critically assess the credibility of a key Crown witness, Paula Heron (the appellant's wife), despite significant inconsistencies in her testimony and a potential motive to fabricate.

The trial judge's reliance on the consistency of Crown witnesses without proper credibility analysis of Paula Heron was deemed an insufficient ground for conviction.

The appeal was allowed, convictions vacated, and a new trial ordered.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and human trafficking offences, sought disclosure of police occurrence reports and statements related to four prior incidents the Crown intended to introduce as similar-fact evidence.

The Crown argued the materials were 'records' under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code, requiring the accused to bring a production application under s. 278.3.

The court held that because the Crown intended to use the evidence as part of its case, it was constitutionally obligated under Stinchcombe to disclose the materials without requiring a production application.

The defendant pleaded guilty to communicating via computer system with a person he believed to be under 16 years of age for the purpose of facilitating sexual touching, contrary to s. 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant engaged in extensive online grooming of an undercover officer posing as a 13-year-old girl, including explicit sexual conversations and arranging to meet the purported child.

A forensic psychological assessment diagnosed the defendant with pedophilia, non-exclusive, sexually attracted to girls, though he denied such attraction.

The court imposed a 15-month custodial sentence followed by three years probation, a 20-year SOIRA order, and a 10-year s. 161 order prohibiting computer and internet use to communicate with minors.

Sentencing decision following convictions for repeated sexual offences against two foster children committed by the offender while standing in loco parentis and in a position of trust.

The court emphasized denunciation, deterrence, and separation from society in cases of child sexual abuse involving grooming, prolonged abuse, intercourse, and serious psychological harm.

Applying the sentencing framework and the totality principle, the court fixed a 12-year global penitentiary sentence, stayed one overlapping sexual assault count under Kienapple, and imposed multiple ancillary orders including DNA, SOIRA, prohibition, and non-communication orders.

The defendant was charged with assault and assault with a weapon (knife) against her husband.

The trial involved conflicting testimony from the complainant and defendant regarding an incident that arose from a dispute over bedroom furniture.

The court found the complainant's evidence not compelling and harbored reasonable doubts about what actually occurred.

The court was unable to determine who assaulted whom during the upstairs incident and could not rule out self-defence.

Regarding the alleged knife assault, the court rejected the complainant's evidence as implausible, noting his unconcerned behavior after the alleged threat and the fact that no knife was ever recovered by police.

The defendant was acquitted of both counts.

This decision addresses the voluntariness of statements made by two accused, J.D. and D.B., to police in a human trafficking case.

The Crown sought to admit statements from both.

J.D. argued his statement was involuntary due to fear from a forceful arrest, while D.B. argued hers was involuntary due to the absence of a primary caution.

The court found J.D.'s statement voluntary, concluding that the force used during his arrest was not excessive, he was properly cautioned, and he maintained an operating mind.

However, D.B.'s statement was deemed involuntary because she was never given a primary caution, was not fully informed of all charges when she spoke to counsel, and her understanding of the recording's purpose was flawed, raising reasonable doubt about her awareness of the stakes.

The Crown sought leave to introduce evidence of prior discreditable conduct against the accused, J.D. and D.B., in a criminal trial involving charges of procuring, exercising control, receiving financial benefit from sexual services, and advertising sexual services.

The court applied the probative value versus prejudicial effect test, considering issues of credibility, state of mind, and narrative.

The court granted leave for most of the requested evidence, including assaults, threats, and drug supply as means of control, and the involvement of other escorts, but dismissed the admission of evidence regarding a belief in a firearm and details of a romantic relationship due to excessive prejudice.

The court also found no air of reality to the defence's collusion argument.