Jeffrey Wayne Galway

The appellant employer sought to partially wind up its defined benefit pension plan following a corporate reorganization and plant closure, without distributing the $3.1 million pro rata share of the actuarial surplus to the affected members.

The Superintendent of Financial Services refused to approve the report, but the Financial Services Tribunal ordered its approval, relying on the doctrine of legitimate expectations and its interpretation of the Pension Benefits Act.

The Divisional Court overturned the Tribunal's decision.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the Divisional Court, holding that section 70(6) of the Pension Benefits Act requires the distribution of surplus on a partial wind up, and that the doctrine of legitimate expectations cannot be used to create substantive rights or override statutory obligations.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment requiring it to pay $135.5 million in cash to fulfill its obligations under a letter agreement.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by restricting payment to cash rather than allowing payment in shares of certain corporations as provided in the agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the respondent was entitled to reject the offered shares as not being of equivalent value, and finding that allowing payment in shares years after the deadline would inappropriately rewrite the agreement.

The City of Toronto appealed a decision declaring parts of a municipal by-law unconstitutional.

The by-law prohibited anyone at a Collision Reporting Centre from recommending an auto repair shop to motor vehicle owners.

The application judge found this violated the insurers' freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and was not justified under s. 1.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the by-law's objectives of protecting vulnerable accident victims from business pressures and preserving the impartiality of the centres were pressing and substantial.

The Court found the limitation on commercial expression was minimally impairing and justified under s. 1.

The Superintendent of Financial Services appealed a decision of the Financial Services Tribunal regarding the partial wind-up of a pension plan by Monsanto Canada Inc. The Tribunal had ruled that Monsanto was not required to distribute pension surplus on a partial wind-up and that Monsanto had a legitimate expectation based on past regulatory practice.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of the Tribunal.

The Court held that section 70(6) of the Pension Benefits Act requires the distribution of surplus on a partial wind-up, and that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot justify disregarding the requirements of the law.

The Superintendent of Financial Services proposed a partial wind up of the employer's pension plan following a corporate reorganization in 1996 that resulted in the involuntary termination of 384 administrative employees.

The employer requested a hearing, arguing that the number of terminations was not significant.

The Financial Services Tribunal found that 384 terminations, representing approximately 12.8% to 14.9% of the active administrative plan members, constituted a significant number under section 69(1)(d) of the Pension Benefits Act.

The Tribunal directed the Superintendent to order the partial wind up for the period from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 1996.

The appellant airlines purchased liquor abroad and stored it in customs bonded warehouses in Ontario for use on domestic and international flights.

The provincial liquor authorities charged markups and gallonage fees on the liquor.

The airlines sought restitution of the fees and a declaration that the provincial liquor monopoly was constitutionally inapplicable to their federal aeronautical undertaking.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the liquor was subject to the federal Importation of Intoxicating Liquors Act and that the provincial monopoly applied, as providing liquor is not an integral part of an aeronautical undertaking.

However, the Court ordered the provincial authorities to make full restitution of the gallonage fees wrongfully collected under an inapplicable licensing regime.

The applicants brought jurisdictional dispute applications regarding the assignment of work for the fabrication and installation of a monorail at the Bruce Nuclear Generating Station.

The Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 1000 raised a preliminary constitutional challenge, arguing that labour relations at the nuclear facility fall under federal jurisdiction.

The Board applied the functional test and determined that while the production of nuclear energy and its attendant safety concerns are within federal jurisdiction, the fabrication and installation of the monorail is not integral to the federal undertaking.

Having found it had jurisdiction, the Board directed Ontario Hydro to assign the work to the applicants based on collective agreements and historical practice.

Appeals concerning whether labour relations at a provincially owned utility's nuclear generating stations were governed by provincial or federal labour legislation.

The majority held that Parliament's declaratory power under s. 92(10)(c) and s. 91(29) validly brought the nuclear facilities within exclusive federal jurisdiction, and that labour relations were integral to the operation and management of those declared works.

A majority also held that atomic energy is a matter of national concern under the peace, order and good government power, and that labour relations at the nuclear facilities formed part of that jurisdiction.

The argument that provincial authority over electrical generation under s. 92A(1)(c) displaced federal authority was rejected.

The appeals were dismissed and the Canada Labour Code was held to apply to employees employed on or in connection with the nuclear facilities.

The complainant alleged that the respondent insurance company discriminated against young, single, male drivers by charging them higher automobile insurance premiums than other groups.

The respondent conceded a prima facie infringement of the Human Rights Code but argued the distinction was based on reasonable and bona fide grounds under s. 21.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the discriminatory practice was reasonable because it was based on sound and accepted insurance practice and there was no practical alternative available to the industry at the time.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown commenced a civil action for forfeiture against the respondent corporation under the Customs Act for making false declarations.

The Crown sought to examine an officer of the respondent for discovery.

The respondent argued it was protected from discovery by common law privilege and section 11(c) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the common law privilege against self-incrimination in forfeiture actions was abrogated by the Canada Evidence Act and modern discovery rules.

Furthermore, the Court ruled that a corporation cannot be a 'witness' and therefore cannot claim the protection of section 11(c) of the Charter.

The Crown's appeal was allowed and the corporation was ordered to produce an officer for discovery.