Jason Dos Santos

The accused was charged with assault, assault causing bodily harm, impaired driving, and driving with excess alcohol arising from events on May 7, 2013.

The accused brought a Charter section 11(b) motion alleging his right to trial within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The trial commenced on March 9, 2015, and the accused renewed the 11(b) motion at the conclusion of trial on January 18, 2016.

The court found total delay of approximately 32 months from charge to trial completion, with 15 to 16 months of institutional delay.

Despite the seriousness of the charges and the substantial delay, the court initially dismissed the motion at the outset of trial.

Upon renewal, the court found the delay constituted a breach of section 11(b) rights and stayed all charges.

The accused challenged the admissibility of crack cocaine, marijuana, and cash seized during a roadside search following a vehicle stop based entirely on anonymous and confidential source information.

The court held the police lacked reasonable grounds to suspect the occupants were connected to a particular recent or ongoing crime, finding the tips vague, stale, uncorroborated, and unsupported by proper note-taking.

Applying the Waterfield, Debot, and Grant frameworks, the court found breaches of ss. 9 and 8 of the Charter and concluded the subsequent search and strip search flowed from an unlawful detention.

The seized evidence was excluded under s. 24(2), and the court found it unnecessary to address the requested stay relating to the strip search.

The accused was charged with impaired driving contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to s. 253(1)(b).

The trial addressed two issues: whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol consumption, and whether the accused's rights to counsel were violated by police failing to provide legal advice in Korean.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, rejecting the accused's explanations for observed signs of impairment and finding no Charter violation regarding the right to counsel.

The accused brought a motion on the second day of trial to dismiss charges of impaired driving and driving with over 80mg of alcohol in 100ml of blood.

The accused argued that the Crown was barred by statute from proceeding without the consent of the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General.

The accused was charged in February 2011, released on a Promise to Appear with a March 2011 court date, but no Information was before the court at that appearance.

The accused heard nothing until receiving a Summons in February 2012, over one year later.

The court found that jurisdiction was lost when no Information was before the court at the first appearance, and that the Crown failed to regain jurisdiction within the three-month statutory period.

Accordingly, the charges were deemed dismissed for want of prosecution, and the Crown could not proceed without the required consent, which was never obtained.

The motion was granted and the charges were dismissed.

The accused was charged with two driving-related offences and required a Korean interpreter.

The defence challenged the competency of the proposed interpreter, Mr. Hu-Kal Kim, who held only conditional accreditation, having failed to achieve the passing grade of 70% on two of three accreditation tests.

A voir dire was held to determine whether the interpreter was competent to provide forensic interpretation services.

The court applied the five-part test from R. v. Tran and found that despite partial accreditation, the interpreter possessed sufficient competency based on his extensive experience in forensic interpretation since 1981, prior successful qualification voir dires, and specific expertise in drinking and driving trials.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence sought to exclude breath readings obtained by police on the grounds of Charter breaches relating to the "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code and alleged violations of the right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter, claiming language difficulties prevented meaningful comprehension.

The court found that the "forthwith" requirement was met, that no special circumstances existed requiring additional steps to ensure comprehension of rights, and that the accused understood his rights and waived his right to counsel.

The breath readings were admitted and the accused was found guilty.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of his right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The accused was charged with falsely representing himself to be a peace officer on October 12, 2010.

The information was sworn on November 12, 2010, and the trial was scheduled to proceed on March 27, 2012, representing an overall delay of sixteen months.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Morin and subsequent jurisprudence, including R. v. Lahiry, to calculate the delay.

The court found that the total period of unjustified delay was five and a half months, consisting of four and a half months of institutional delay and one month of Crown delay, which fell well within the eight to ten month guidelines for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found no significant prejudice to the accused and concluded that the societal interest in hearing the matter on the merits outweighed any prejudice suffered.

The motion was dismissed.