Janani Shanmuganathan

The appellants were convicted of terrorism-related offences including conspiracy to commit murder for the benefit of a terrorist group and participating in terrorist activity.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the jury selection procedure used at trial.

The trial judge erroneously held that he lacked common law discretion to exclude unsworn jurors while using rotating triers to determine challenges for cause, and instead ordered the use of static triers with all jurors excluded.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's error deprived the appellants of their statutory right to rotating triers with unsworn jurors excluded, resulting in an improperly constituted jury.

The curative proviso could not be applied to remedy this fundamental procedural error.

The accused, L.E., facing charges of historic sexual assault, applied under s. 278.93 of the Criminal Code for a hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence concerning alleged prior sexual activity of one of the complainants, L.S., with other children.

The accused argued this evidence was relevant to the reliability of the complainant's memories, not to support the "twin myths." The Crown conceded the evidence did not trigger the "twin myths" but argued it was inadmissible under the "collateral fact rule." The court granted the s. 278.93 application, finding that the formal requirements were met and the evidence was capable of being admissible under s. 276(2), and ordered a s. 278.94 hearing to address relevance, probative value, and the collateral fact rule.

The Crown applied to have the offender, S.S., declared a dangerous offender under s. 753 of the Criminal Code, seeking an indeterminate sentence, following his conviction for sexual interference.

The offender resisted, arguing he should be declared a long-term offender under s. 753.1, with a determinate sentence and a long-term supervision order.

The court declined to find the offender a dangerous offender, concluding that the Crown failed to prove a "pattern of repetitive behaviour" or "persistent aggressive behaviour" and that the conduct was "intractable" beyond a reasonable doubt.

Instead, the court found the offender to be a long-term offender, imposing a 10-year term of imprisonment and a 10-year long-term supervision order, finding a reasonable possibility of eventual risk control in the community.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed by the trial judge following conviction on counts of fraud and money laundering.

The trial judge ordered the appellant to pay a fine in lieu of forfeiture in the amount of $1,150,000 within five years of release from custody.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in fixing the payment period because he failed to consider the appellant's ability to pay.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did consider ability to pay as a relevant factor, noting that both counsel made submissions on the period for payment and the trial judge's order fell within the range suggested by counsel.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a sentence of 12 years imposed following conviction on 25 of 34 counts of sexual offences against four complainants.

The trial judge had determined a fit sentence of 13 years and reduced it by one year to account for the appellant's advanced age and health challenges.

The appellant argued that age should be more substantially factored into the sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence, and that a shorter sentence could achieve these objectives for an elderly offender.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentence fell comfortably within the appropriate range and that the weight assigned to age did not reflect error.

A lawyer was convicted of three offences arising from conversations with an undercover police officer posing as a refugee claimant.

The Crown alleged the appellant counseled the undercover officer to provide false information to immigration authorities.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence, challenging the validity of the wiretap authorization on the basis of material omissions and misrepresentations in the affidavit.

The trial judge found two errors in the affidavit but concluded they would not have affected the issuance of the authorization.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge's analysis was correct and her credibility findings were entitled to deference.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the circumstances warranted a significant jail term given the seriousness of the offences and the appellant's professional status.

The appellant, who had died prior to the appeal hearing, was convicted on March 16, 2017 by Justice Randall W. Lalande of the Ontario Court of Justice.

Both the Crown and the appellant's counsel agreed that the conviction represented a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that maintained a conditional discharge while finding he remained a significant threat to public safety.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible of aggravated assault and related offences involving a near lethal knife attack.

He argued the Board erred in failing to grant an absolute discharge, contending the evidence demonstrated he no longer posed a significant threat and that the Board reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion fell within a range of reasonable outcomes based on positive evidence, including the appellant's insufficient concern about his threat when psychotic, initial reluctance to accept case management, and refusal to switch to long-acting injectable antipsychotic medication.

The Crown appealed acquittals on a 28-count indictment involving prohibited firearms, devices, and weapons, theft, damage to a police vehicle, and breach of probation.

The respondent's left palm print was found on paper in a stolen police vehicle from which firearms, magazines, and OC spray were taken.

Three days later, the respondent was found with similar distinctive items.

The trial judge rejected the palm print evidence in isolation and acquitted on all counts.

The appellate court found the trial judge erred by failing to consider the palm print evidence in the context of the cumulative effect of all evidence.

The court allowed the appeal, entered a conviction on the OC spray count (which the respondent conceded), and ordered a new trial on the remaining counts.

The appellant was convicted of possession of child pornography and appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the police search of the appellant's computer was reasonable and not unreasonably invasive under section 8 of the Charter.

The court found that where child pornography has been located on a computer during initial examination, it is reasonable for police to examine all images and videos on the computer, as well as Internet search history, to identify further material and determine who was responsible.

The court also found that the mandatory minimum six-month sentence for possession of child pornography was grossly disproportionate in reasonable hypothetical circumstances and violated section 12 of the Charter.

However, the court upheld the ten-month sentence imposed by the trial judge as fit and proportionate, given the serious nature of the offence and the appellant's collection of 89 unique videos and 50 unique images of extreme child pornography.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's sentencing decision and characterized the sentence as lenient in the extreme.

While acknowledging the appellant's efforts to remain drug-free for ten months, the court dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed both his conviction for drug trafficking and his sentence of 12 months imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the evidence fully justified the conclusion that crack cocaine in the possession of a third party came from the appellant through an intermediary.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider that this was a one-off transaction for a minimal amount of crack cocaine with no profit motive, and by failing to adequately weigh the appellant's rehabilitation efforts and significant immigration consequences.

The sentence was reduced to 160 days, which the appellant had already served through pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault, using an imitation firearm in committing an offence, threatening to cause bodily harm, and carrying a concealed weapon arising from an altercation in a secondary school washroom.

The trial judge convicted based on the complainant's evidence, which was contradicted by the appellant and co-accused.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: uneven scrutiny in the trial judge's assessment of evidence and misapprehension of evidence based on impermissible speculation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds, finding that the trial judge applied consistent standards and that the conclusions drawn were reasonable inferences from the evidence as a whole.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated December 21, 2016, which ordered his continued detention in maximum security at Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.

The appellant had previously been detained at Ontario Shores with community privileges.

He advanced two grounds of appeal: first, that the Board misapprehended evidence regarding when he decompensated after being moved to the minimum-security unit; and second, that the Board failed to address the impact of a medication change on his behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence and confirming that the Board was aware of and properly considered the medication change in its decision.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon and two counts of sexual assault against a former intimate partner, as well as seeking leave to appeal a 51-month penitentiary sentence.

The sole ground of appeal was that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by finding guilt based on rejection of defence submissions without considering whether the evidence as a whole established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversal of the burden of proof when the reasons were read as a whole.

The court upheld the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the complainant and rejected the argument that the manner of disclosure undermined her evidence.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed, as the court found the sentences reflected no error in principle and were fit given the aggravating factors present.

The appellant was charged with importing heroin and conspiracy to import heroin.

She was acquitted on the importing charge but convicted on the conspiracy charge and sentenced to six years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the acquittal on the importing charge was irreconcilably inconsistent with the conviction on the conspiracy charge, rendering the conspiracy conviction unreasonable.

Alternatively, she argued the trial judge erred in sentencing by treating her as a party to the importing charge on which she was acquitted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The accused, Gary Chen, was charged with six counts of drug trafficking and conspiracy to traffic controlled substances (heroin, BZP, MDMA, ketamine, marihuana).

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, alleging Chen aided Ken Mai's drug operation by moving drugs and providing vehicles.

The defence argued the evidence did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, highlighting Chen's lack of criminal record, absence of direct drug possession, and the concealed nature of drugs in Mai's residences.

The court found the circumstantial evidence did not exclusively point to guilt, concluding that another reasonable inference was that Chen was merely a friend assisting with vehicles without knowledge or intent regarding drug trafficking.

Chen was acquitted on all charges.

The accused, Michael Allen, was charged with assault causing bodily harm to his six-month-old stepson, Hayden Ouellette-Meissner, after the infant sustained bilateral humeral fractures.

The defense admitted the injuries but disputed causation, arguing they were accidental.

The court heard conflicting expert medical opinions from a pediatrician specializing in child abuse (Dr. Nolan) and a pediatric orthopedic surgeon (Dr. Wedge).

Dr. Nolan found the injuries highly suspicious for inflicted injury and inconsistent with the proposed accidental mechanism.

Dr. Wedge suggested an accidental mechanism involving the infant's arms getting caught in couch cushions during a fall, though his testimony was found less persuasive and inconsistent.

The court, applying the principles of R. v. W.(D.) and R. v. Griffin, found that while the case was highly suspicious, the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused caused the fractures, leading to an acquittal.

Olanrewaju Lisboa sought a Rowbotham order for state-funded counsel in a complex criminal trial involving drug trafficking charges.

While the parties agreed on the complexity of the matter and the applicant's exhaustion of Legal Aid appeals, the court dismissed the application.

The court found that the applicant failed to meet the indigence test, primarily due to insufficient, inconsistent, and unreliable financial disclosure, and a lack of effort to plan for legal costs.

The court also noted that the applicant's own conduct in failing to provide complete information to Legal Aid Ontario disentitled him to funding.

The appellant appealed his conviction for home invasion-related charges involving a firearm, including armed robbery, aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, discharge of a firearm with intent to endanger life, and unlawful confinement.

The trial judge convicted the appellant on April 8, 2015, and imposed a global sentence of nine years and six months, less three years and four months credit for pre-sentence custody on June 30, 2015.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the convictions and the sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of identification evidence and rejecting the argument that the sentence was too harsh for a youthful offender.