James A. S. Wilcox

The Sahebdivani defendants were successful on a motion for security for costs and sought full or substantial indemnity costs, arguing the plaintiff's conduct was disorganized and protracted the proceedings.

The court found that while the plaintiff's situation was somewhat disorganized, its conduct did not rise to the level of reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous behaviour required for an elevated costs award.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at $12,500 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The applicant sought an order under the Partition Act for the listing and sale of a jointly-owned property, requesting sole carriage of the sale.

The respondent opposed, seeking a co-listing and the right to bid on the property without restrictions.

The court found that the respondent's prior conduct had distorted the sale process and depressed the property's value.

The court granted the applicant sole carriage of the sale, ordered the property listed with the applicant's chosen realtor, and established parameters allowing the respondent to bid through an independent realtor.

The respondent father sought an urgent order for the resumption of parenting time for the parties' 12-year-old child, Porter, after the applicant mother unilaterally withheld access citing COVID-19 concerns.

The court, applying principles from Ribeiro v. Wright, affirmed the presumption of maintaining existing parenting arrangements.

While the mother's initial COVID-19 concerns were addressed, her subsequent arguments based on the child's preferences, anxiety, and asthma were deemed non-urgent and lacking specific evidence.

The court ordered the immediate resumption of the father's parenting time with a minor schedule adjustment, but denied requests for make-up time and a police enforcement clause.

The Crown sought an order of certiorari to quash discharge orders made by a preliminary inquiry judge on two counts: possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The preliminary inquiry judge had discharged the accused due to a lack of evidence, specifically the absence of a certificate of analysis for the suspected cocaine and insufficient evidence linking seized money to criminal activity.

The Superior Court dismissed the Crown's application, finding no jurisdictional error in the preliminary inquiry judge's decision.

The court reiterated that an erroneous conclusion on the sufficiency of evidence, even if a reviewing court would differ, does not constitute a jurisdictional error, provided the judge considered the whole of the evidence.

It also highlighted the difficulty in inferring the nature of an unremarkable white powder as cocaine without scientific analysis, distinguishing it from more easily identifiable substances like marijuana.

The applicant sought adjustments to retroactive and ongoing child and spousal support, interim disbursements, security for costs, and a Certificate of Pending Litigation.

The respondent brought a cross-motion seeking dismissal of the applicant's motion, termination of child support due to alleged repudiation, and other relief.

The court varied temporary child and spousal support orders based on updated income information, dismissed claims for interim disbursements and security for costs due to insufficient evidence, and denied the Certificate of Pending Litigation due to procedural deficiencies and its inappropriate use for securing support.

The court also ordered the parties to amend their pleadings to reflect the actual issues being litigated and to facilitate disclosure.

The defendant, Ljudmilla Jefremova, brought a motion under Rule 51.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to clarify or withdraw an admission made in a Reply to Request to Admit concerning the location of an abscess in a medical negligence action.

The plaintiff opposed the motion.

The court declined to rule on the interpretation of the admission at this stage, finding it should be considered after trial submissions.

Applying the four-part test for withdrawing an admission, the court found no triable issue regarding the truth of the admission itself, only its interpretation.

Consequently, the motion to withdraw the admission was dismissed.

Following a motion by the defendant to stay the action for lack of jurisdiction and for summary judgment, the court stayed the action to allow a labour arbitrator to determine jurisdiction and dismissed the summary judgment motion.

The court then received written submissions on costs.

Despite the defendant's partial success on the jurisdiction issue, the court awarded costs to the plaintiff due to the defendant's unreasonable delay in bringing the motions.

The plaintiff was awarded partial indemnity costs for the jurisdiction motion and substantial indemnity costs for the summary judgment motion, totaling $270,162.08.

The applicant father sought increased unsupervised access to the child, Anthony, after relocating to Ontario.

The respondent mother opposed, seeking termination or reduction of access, citing the child's anxiety and past allegations against the father.

The court considered two Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) reports, which recommended increased unsupervised access.

The court found the respondent's concerns about anxiety and past allegations unsubstantiated or addressed.

A temporary order was made to gradually increase the father's unsupervised access, including overnights, and outlined specific terms for exchanges, communication, and parental responsibilities.

The applicant sought substantial indemnity costs of $3,000.00 following a motion for temporary child and spousal support, while the respondent argued for no costs.

The court found that success on the underlying motion was divided, as the applicant did not obtain all the support claimed, and income was imputed to her as sought by the respondent.

The applicant also failed to make an offer to settle and acted unreasonably regarding her alleged inability to work and questionable expenses.

Applying the principles of costs in family law, the court determined that the presumption of costs for a successful party did not apply due to divided success and the applicant's unreasonable behaviour.

Consequently, the court ordered no costs to either party.

The respondent successfully brought a motion for disclosure against the applicant.

Following the motion, the parties agreed on costs, but the applicant's counsel failed to finalize the settlement.

The respondent then filed costs submissions, seeking the agreed-upon costs plus additional costs for the applicant's failure to follow through.

The court reviewed the principles of costs in family law, emphasizing indemnification, settlement encouragement, and discouraging inappropriate behavior.

The court found the applicant's conduct regarding disclosure and the costs settlement unreasonable and ordered the applicant to pay the respondent's costs, including an additional amount for the delay caused by the applicant's failure to finalize the settlement.

The father appealed a trial decision that made his child a Crown ward and denied him access.

The trial judge found that the father failed to meet the statutory test under s. 59(2.1) of the Child and Family Services Act, as he could not demonstrate that continued access would be beneficial and meaningful to the child, nor did he provide evidence that access would not impair future adoption opportunities.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's decision.

The defendant, General Dynamics Land Systems - Canada, brought a motion seeking dismissal of the plaintiff's claim, primarily arguing that the Ontario Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter, which it contended was exclusively vested in a labour arbitrator under a collective agreement and the Labour Relations Act.

The plaintiff, Helga Louise Brillon, opposed the motion, arguing that the defendant had attorned to the court's jurisdiction through delay and that the dispute's essential character concerned wrongful interference with long-term disability benefits, not arbitrable employment issues.

The court, distinguishing between Rule 17.06 and Rule 21.01(3)(a) motions, found that delay in bringing a subject matter jurisdiction challenge does not vest jurisdiction in the court but may affect costs.

Applying the "exclusive jurisdiction model" from Weber v. Ontario Hydro, the court determined that the essential character of the dispute was not clearly non-arbitrable.

Consequently, the court allowed the motion in part, staying the action and referring the matter to a labour arbitrator to determine the issue of jurisdiction, and dismissed the alternative request for summary judgment.

In an uncontested trial, the applicant sought divorce, equalization of net family property, and transfer of specific assets.

The respondent did not participate in the proceedings.

The court granted the divorce, ordered the transfer of a jointly owned triplex and a snowmobile to the applicant in full satisfaction of the equalization payment owed by the respondent, and awarded costs to the applicant.

The plaintiff, Dianne Messier, brought a motion for judgment under Rule 19.05 against the defendant, Life Labs Medical Laboratory Services, after the defendant failed to file a statement of defence and was noted in default.

The plaintiff alleged constructive dismissal from her long-term employment and sought special, general, and punitive damages.

The court found that the defendant unilaterally and fundamentally altered the terms of employment, constituting constructive dismissal.

The plaintiff was awarded damages for lost income in the amount of $38,904.98, calculated based on 32 years of service at two weeks' pay per year, less employment insurance benefits.

Claims for general and punitive damages were dismissed, as the court was not persuaded the defendant's conduct was unduly insensitive.

Partial indemnity costs of $9,000.00 were awarded to the plaintiff.

Corrected reasons for judgment were released on November 1, 2018, replacing the amount in paragraphs 18(g) and 19 with $38,904.98.

The accused, Dwayne Nelson, applied for a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, challenging the denial of bail by a Justice of the Peace.

The application focused on whether there had been a material change in circumstances since the original bail hearing.

The court considered the withdrawal of certain drug charges by the federal Crown and the development of a new release plan with new sureties and more onerous conditions.

Applying the principles from R. v. St-Cloud and R. v. Antic, the court found that the proposed new sureties, combined with the tightened plan, constituted a material change in circumstances that addressed the original concerns regarding secondary and tertiary grounds for detention.

The bail review application was allowed, and the accused was released on a recognizance with specific conditions.

This decision addresses the costs of an application where the Town of Cobalt sought a finding that its aggregate extraction use was permitted under a zoning by-law, which was ultimately dismissed.

The Township of Coleman, as the successful respondent, sought full indemnity costs.

The court determined that costs should be awarded on a partial indemnity basis, deducting expenses unrelated to the Superior Court application and ruling that a prior proposal by the respondent did not qualify as a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The Town of Cobalt was ordered to pay $85,000.00 in costs to the Township of Coleman.

This decision addresses the costs arising from the plaintiffs' unsuccessful motion for summary judgment and the dismissal of the balance of their main action concerning the public highway status of Trussler Road.

The defendants, as the wholly successful parties, sought partial indemnity costs.

The court, applying principles from the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, awarded the defendants costs for both the motion and the main action, adjusting the hourly rate for counsel to align with previous decisions in the case.

The court issued an addendum to a previous costs decision after discovering the respondent's costs submissions had been misplaced and not initially considered.

Upon reviewing the submissions, the court found no reason to vary its original order for full recovery costs against the respondent.

The court reiterated that the respondent's financial disclosure was late, incomplete, and made in bad faith, justifying the original costs award.

This decision addresses costs following a successful cross-application by the respondent, Gordon Robert Anderson, in a land dispute.

The respondent filed costs submissions, while the applicants, Karen Jean Weaver and William Bryce Weaver, did not.

The court applied Rule 49.10(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which entitles a party to partial indemnity costs to the date of an offer to settle and substantial indemnity costs thereafter if they obtain a judgment as favourable as their offer.

Considering factors under Rule 57.01(1), including the complexity of the proceeding, the importance of the issues, and the value of an expert report, the court awarded the respondent $48,654.30 in fees plus applicable taxes, and $17,706.80 in disbursements, to be paid by the applicants within 90 days.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

Applying the R. v. Jordan framework, the court calculated a total delay of approximately 90 months from charge to anticipated trial end.

After subtracting 25 months (750 days) attributed to defence delay and 36 days for exceptional circumstances, the net delay remained 65 months, significantly exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay, leading to a finding that the accused's s. 11(b) right was infringed and a stay of proceedings was entered.