James Renihan

The plaintiff tenant, a non-essential retailer, ceased paying rent during the COVID-19 pandemic, arguing the landlord breached the lease by failing to provide a first-class shopping centre due to government-mandated closures and restrictions.

The landlord sought to terminate the lease.

The court held that the landlord was not in breach of the lease, as it was complying with provincial laws, and the tenant was not entitled to an abatement of rent.

However, the court granted the tenant relief from forfeiture under the Commercial Tenancies Act, allowing a structured deferral of rent arrears with interest, noting the tenant's prior unblemished record and the unprecedented nature of the pandemic.

The court heard competing applications regarding the insolvent Urbancorp Management Inc. (UMI).

The Monitor sought a Bankruptcy Order, while a secured creditor sought the appointment of a receiver.

The court granted the Bankruptcy Order, appointing the Monitor as trustee, finding that the bankruptcy administration would provide a codified route to assess the secured creditor's non-arm's length claim.

The receivership application was stayed pending the trustee's review of the secured claim.

The Town of South Bruce Peninsula sought leave to appeal convictions for damaging piping plover habitat under the Endangered Species Act, 2007.

The Town argued the lower courts erred in interpreting 'damage' to habitat and in applying the test for expert evidence admissibility in a regulatory offence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal on both questions, finding the interpretation of 'damage' to be a serious legal question with broad public interest implications, and guidance on expert evidence in a regulatory setting to be appropriate.

The applicant sought to quash a permit issued by the conservation authority to the respondent town for work on a beach, which was scheduled before the return of the Piping Plover.

The Divisional Court issued a bottom-line endorsement granting the application in part, quashing the permit, and remitting the matter back to the conservation authority.

The balance of the application was dismissed, with full reasons to follow.

The landlord applicant sought declaratory relief regarding its ability to lease former Sears space in an Ottawa shopping mall to a bank for a call centre.

The respondent, Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC), argued its consent was required under the lease due to a material change to the mall's merchandising plan.

The court found that the proposed lease constituted a "major change to the merchandising balance of the mall" would "materially change pedestrian flow" and would "detrimentally affect the Tenant’s merchandising environment" thereby triggering HBC's consent requirement.

The court further determined that HBC had not waived its rights, had not unreasonably withheld consent, and had not acted in bad faith.

The application was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The applicant landlord sought an urgent hearing prior to the expiry of a conditional period in a new lease to determine if the respondent tenant had a consent right over the proposed change of use to a call centre.

The respondent sought an adjournment because its lead counsel was unavailable on the scheduled date and opposed a weekend hearing due to the impact on junior staff and preparation time.

The court granted the adjournment, noting the lack of objective urgency, the landlord's voluntary assumption of the deadline, and the importance of health and wellness for legal practitioners during the pandemic.

The applicant, Hudson's Bay Company, sought judicial review of a regulation that required its department stores to close during the COVID-19 pandemic while allowing big box stores that sell groceries to remain open.

The applicant argued the distinction was irrational and ultra vires the enabling statute.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the regulation was authorized by the Reopening Ontario Act and consistent with its purpose of balancing public health measures with economic concerns.

The court held that it is not the role of the judiciary to assess the wisdom or efficacy of the government's policy choices.

The appellant purchased land from the respondent, agreeing to develop it for retail use.

The agreement included an indemnity clause for community cost-sharing agreements.

The appellant later obtained a zoning amendment for residential development, triggering a $2.8 million fee for school lands, and sought indemnity from the respondent.

The application judge dismissed the claim, finding the appellant breached its obligation to develop the land for retail use and could not profit from its own breach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation of the contract.

The Kanata Greenspace Protection Coalition brought a motion to intervene as an added party in an application between the City of Ottawa and Clublink Corporation ULC regarding the proposed redevelopment of a golf course into residential housing.

The City sought to enforce a 40% green space agreement, and the Coalition, representing local residents, sought to support the City's position.

The court granted the Coalition restricted party status, finding that its members had a direct interest in the subject matter and could make a useful contribution without unduly delaying the proceedings or adding new issues.

The applicant, Bovaird, purchased land from the respondent, Mattamy, with the intention of developing it for district retail use.

Mattamy agreed to indemnify Bovaird for all future obligations under a cost-sharing agreement.

Bovaird later changed its plans and developed the land for residential use, triggering an additional $2.8 million contribution under the cost-sharing agreement.

Bovaird sought indemnification from Mattamy.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the broad indemnity must be read in the context of the parties' agreement as a whole, which included a specific contractual commitment by Bovaird to develop the land for district retail use.

The court held that Bovaird could not rely on the indemnity to profit from its own breach of that commitment.

The applicant, a shareholder, sought reimbursement from the corporation for expenses incurred in requisitioning, calling, and holding a shareholders meeting under the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The corporation resisted, arguing the applicant did not act in good faith and did not technically "hold" the meeting.

The court found the applicant acted in good faith and was entitled to reimbursement, rejecting the corporation's technical argument regarding holding the meeting.

The court then determined the reasonable quantum of expenses, distinguishing between legal fees and disbursements and setting time limits for recoverable expenses, ultimately awarding the applicant USD$117,047.38.

The defendants, a law firm and lawyer, brought a motion to temporarily stay a negligence action against them.

The plaintiffs, estate trustees, had sued the defendants for allegedly negligent advice regarding a share transfer to a charitable foundation, which led to a significant tax liability after a Canada Revenue Agency reassessment.

The plaintiffs had also appealed this reassessment to the Tax Court of Canada.

The court granted the temporary stay, finding a substantial overlap of issues and factual background between the negligence action and the tax appeal.

It concluded that the outcome of the tax appeal would significantly influence, if not be determinative of, the negligence claim, and that a stay would avoid unnecessary and costly duplication of judicial and legal resources without causing significant prejudice to the plaintiffs' access to justice.

The individual defendants, former directors and officers of Old Noranco, brought a motion seeking advancement of legal expenses from the plaintiff (successor to Old Noranco and the purchaser) to defend against claims of misrepresentation in financial statements and a crossclaim by BDO Canada LLP.

The court determined that the claims, despite being framed against them as shareholders, implicated their fiduciary capacities, thus triggering indemnification rights.

The plaintiff failed to establish a "strong prima facie" case of bad faith against one defendant, Kelly Clinton, which would have disentitled him to funding.

The court also ruled that the existence of third-party funding did not preclude the individual defendants from recovering their legal expenses.

The motion for advancement of legal expenses was granted.

The appellant appealed a decision granting the respondent a declaration that a lease to a competing fitness facility was void and an injunction preventing the appellant from performing development services.

The core dispute concerned the interpretation of a non-competition agreement and a right of first refusal executed in connection with the sale of fitness facilities.

The application judge found that the non-competition agreement took precedence over the right of first refusal and prevented the lease.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred by relying on negotiations to interpret the contracts and by misunderstanding the factual matrix.

The court held that the plain language of the two agreements, read together, permitted the lease while requiring compliance with the non-competition agreement and the right of first refusal.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court that struck out certain allegations in his statement of defence and counterclaim as irrelevant, scandalous, and vexatious under Rule 25(11)(b).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, granting leave to amend the pleadings to include allegations of misconduct relevant to defences against claims for aggravated, exemplary, and punitive damages, as well as potential equitable defences and claims regarding duress, undue influence, or unconscionability.

The court emphasized the need for proportionality and case management.

The costs award was set aside with no costs awarded throughout.

The trustee in bankruptcy brought a motion for a declaration that the bankrupt's interest in two properties, held in joint tenancy with his wife, were assets of the estate.

The bankrupt and his wife claimed the properties were held in trust for their children, relying on trust documents allegedly created in 1995 and 2004.

The trustee introduced uncontradicted expert evidence proving the fonts used in the documents did not exist on the dates they were allegedly signed.

The court found the trust documents were backdated and the trusts were shams, or alternatively fraudulent conveyances, designed to defeat creditors.

The declarations sought by the trustee were granted.

The applicant, GoodLife Fitness Centres Inc., sought an injunction to enforce a non-competition agreement (NCA) against the respondents, Rock Developments Inc. and Rocco Tullio.

The NCA was executed when GoodLife acquired Tullio's previous fitness business.

The respondents subsequently entered into a lease agreement with Movati Athletic, a competing fitness facility, for a property that was a specific concern during the original negotiations.

The court found that the respondents breached the NCA by having a 'business interest' in the competitor and providing 'development services' to facilitate the competing gym's establishment.

The court rejected arguments that a Right of First Refusal (ROFR) permitted the lease or that the NCA was unenforceable due to its broad territorial scope, emphasizing the clear intent of the parties.

The application for an injunction was granted.

Following a largely unsuccessful motion by the plaintiff to amend his claim and add defendants in a putative class action, the successful respondents sought costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the Independent Electrical System Operator ($24,000), the Solart-associated entities ($12,500), Melanie Lacroix ($2,500), and Sunny Natalia ($2,500).

The court declined to award the plaintiff costs against the unsuccessful respondent Nikhil Toshniwal regarding the unopposed document service relief.

The plaintiff in a putative class action regarding unfulfilled solar panel installation contracts brought a motion to amend the statement of claim, add 17 new defendants (including the IESO), and extend the time for service on several existing defendants.

The court dismissed the motion to add the IESO and 15 Solart-associated entities, finding the claims against them were statute-barred as the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of the claims more than two years prior.

The court partially granted leave to amend the claim against existing defendants, striking certain proposed paragraphs that improperly pleaded evidence or lacked material facts.

The court granted the extension of time for service on several defendants, finding no actual prejudice to the defence.

The appellant law firm appealed a Master's order declining to strike out paragraphs from the respondent's Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, and awarding costs to the self-represented respondent.

The impugned paragraphs alleged abusive conduct by a partner of the firm.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, finding the Master erred in law by failing to consider whether the paragraphs were relevant to the pleadings regarding a contingency fee agreement.

The court struck the paragraphs as irrelevant and set aside the costs award, allowing the parties to file written submissions on costs.