James Lockyer

The appellant appealed his conviction for spousal sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in his credibility findings and seeking to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the grounds relating to the trial judge's reasons but allowed the appeal based on fresh evidence.

The fresh evidence included post-conviction allegations made by the complainant and undisclosed police reports that supported the defence theory that the complainant fabricated the allegations to gain sole custody of their children.

The Court found the undisclosed evidence met the Stinchcombe threshold and impaired the appellant's right to make full answer and defence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, facing financial difficulties, glued posters to public property as a cry for help.

One poster featured a city councillor's photo and the word 'murder'.

He was convicted of mischief and counselling murder.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside both convictions.

The court held that the minor inconvenience of removing glue did not constitute damage for mischief.

Furthermore, the conviction for counselling murder was unreasonable, as the poster, viewed in context, was a plea for help, not an exhortation to kill, and the appellant lacked the requisite intent.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder, applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Ancillary to his leave application, he brought a motion for the release of trial exhibits (hair clippings) for forensic testing to determine if they were scalp or facial hair, which could support a fresh evidence application regarding his unreasonable verdict argument.

The Court held it had jurisdiction to make the order under the Criminal Code and the Supreme Court Act, and concluded it was in the interests of justice to allow the testing.

The applicant, who was convicted of sexual assault, was granted court-appointed counsel under s. 694.1 of the Criminal Code for proceedings in the Supreme Court of Canada and incidental proceedings in the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The parties disagreed on the hourly rate to be paid by the Attorney General.

The Crown argued for the provincial legal aid tariff, while counsel sought higher rates based on their experience and the complexity of the case.

The Supreme Court held that the legal aid tariff is not conclusive, and the determination should be based on a broader assessment of what is fair and reasonable.

The Court fixed the rates at $225 per hour for senior counsel and $175 per hour for junior counsel.

The appellants were convicted of various offences, including murder and criminal negligence causing death, relating to the death of their infant son.

The convictions were largely based on the expert testimony of a Crown witness.

Following the dismissal of their appeals by the Court of Appeal, fresh expert evidence became available that discredited the Crown's expert.

The Supreme Court of Canada admitted the fresh evidence and ordered a new trial on all counts, finding that the unreliable expert evidence was central to the Crown's case and could have affected the jury's verdicts on both the homicide and non-homicide charges.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

At trial, the Crown relied on the testimony of a witness whose memory of seeing the appellant near the crime scene was refreshed through hypnosis, as well as similar fact evidence from a former girlfriend.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that post-hypnosis evidence is presumptively inadmissible because it does not meet the reliability requirements for novel scientific evidence.

The Court also found that the similar fact evidence lacked sufficient probative value to outweigh its prejudicial effect, and the curative proviso could not be applied.

The appellant was jointly charged with two co-accused of sexually assaulting a 14-year-old complainant.

Following a jury trial, the appellant was convicted while his co-accused were acquitted.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the verdicts were inconsistent and therefore unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdicts were reconcilable because the Crown's case against the appellant was significantly stronger than against his co-accused, supported by DNA evidence and a post-offence statement.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his young niece.

The complainant disclosed the assaults several years later, and her testimony was uncorroborated.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, and the majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, with one judge dissenting on the basis that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge was entitled to believe the uncorroborated evidence of the complainant and that the verdict was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed convictions arising from a violent kidnapping and assault connected to collection of a drug debt.

The court held that the trial judge erred by telling the jury that if it found the accused's testimony to be a fabrication, that finding could be added as positive circumstantial evidence of guilt absent independent evidence of concoction.

The court also found prejudicial Crown misconduct and related charge errors concerning the right to remain silent, improper cross-examination tied to defence counsel's failure to confront a witness under s. 11 of the Canada Evidence Act, and improper closing submissions suggesting a key Crown witness had been believed in another proceeding.

Given the credibility-driven record and the non-overwhelming Crown case, the proviso could not be applied.

A new trial was ordered.

The applicant brought a second original application for bail pending appeal from a second degree murder conviction after an earlier bail application and review had been dismissed.

The court held that a fresh application may proceed only where there has been a material change in circumstances affecting one or more of the statutory factors in s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

The court found such a change based on significantly stronger grounds of appeal, improved evidence that the applicant would surrender, and extraordinary delay caused by the pursuit of fresh evidence.

Balancing enforceability against reviewability under the public interest branch, the court concluded that further detention was not necessary and granted release pending appeal.

The appellant appealed a conviction for second degree murder arising from a fatal shooting after a house party.

The central issue was whether the trial judge's jury re-instruction on reasonable doubt improperly required jurors to articulate a logical reason for their doubt and further referred to the notion of a timid juror.

The court held that this wording was contrary to established appellate authority and inconsistent with the proper reasonable doubt framework.

In the context of a closely contested case, the error was reversible and necessitated a new trial.

The appellant appealed a second degree murder conviction arising from an entirely circumstantial prosecution based on motive, forensic evidence, and prior statements attributed to the deceased.

The principal issue was whether the jury charge was deficient for failing to distinguish direct from circumstantial evidence and for using pre-Lifchus language on reasonable doubt.

The court held that no formulaic circumstantial-evidence instruction was required so long as the jury was clearly told that guilt had to be the only reasonable inference proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also held that the Crown's speculative suggestions, the manslaughter instruction, and the cautions concerning hearsay evidence did not cause unfairness warranting a new trial.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.