James Lockyer

The respondent, a commercial truck driver, was acquitted at trial of importing and possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after 39 kilograms of cocaine were found in his trailer at the border.

The trial judge accepted the respondent's 'blind courier' defence.

The Crown appealed the acquittal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge made speculative findings of fact unsupported by evidence and committed a legal error by applying a piecemeal approach to the evidence rather than considering its cumulative effect.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of guns and drugs and public mischief, arguing that the trial Crown's conduct deprived him of a fair trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown improperly cross-examined the appellant by demanding his 'theory' of the case, which undermined the presumption of innocence.

Furthermore, the Crown improperly telephoned a potential witness from the courtroom and used the resulting hearsay during the cross-examination of a key defence witness.

The Court concluded that the Crown's conduct was sufficiently prejudicial to deprive the appellant of a fair trial, allowed the appeal, and directed a new trial.

The appellants appealed their convictions for second degree murder and obstruction of justice.

The primary grounds of appeal related to the reasonableness of the verdict, the trial judge's refusal to admit third-party suspect evidence, jury instructions on out-of-court statements and identification evidence, and alleged Crown misconduct during cross-examination and closing addresses.

The Court of Appeal found that while the Crown's conduct fell below the expected standard of propriety, the trial judge's strong corrective instructions were sufficient to cure the damage and preserve the right to a fair trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder based entirely on circumstantial evidence.

At trial, the defence relied heavily on the absence of any forensic evidence linking the appellant to the brutal killing.

The trial judge directed defence counsel not to submit that the absence of forensic evidence made it impossible for the appellant to be the killer, and gave the jury a 'CSI instruction' warning that real-life forensic evidence is not as definitive as portrayed on television.

On appeal, the appellant argued these actions resulted in an unfair trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the 'CSI instruction' was unwarranted, it did not affect the result when considered in the context of the entire jury charge, which properly instructed the jury on reasonable doubt and the absence of evidence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in 1992 in connection with the death of her stepdaughter, largely based on the pathology evidence of Dr. Charles Smith.

Decades later, fresh expert evidence unanimously discredited Dr. Smith's findings regarding the cause and mechanism of death.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding that the original guilty plea was uninformed and the conviction unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter for his participation in a robbery where a co-assailant shot and killed the victim.

The trial judge sentenced him to eight years' imprisonment, treating the use of a firearm as an aggravating factor despite the mandatory minimum under s. 236(a) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence of the appellant's rehabilitation and held that his failure to cooperate with police was not an aggravating factor.

The court reduced the sentence to six years' imprisonment, balancing the aggravating circumstances of the robbery with the appellant's strong mitigating factors and rehabilitative efforts.

The appellants were convicted of first and second degree murder following a home invasion and shooting.

On appeal, they raised several issues regarding the trial judge's instructions to the jury, including late alibi adverse inference instructions, the Crown's theory of concocted alibis, the admission of discreditable conduct evidence, the lack of a Vetrovec warning for a key witness, and the instructions on voice and eyewitness identification.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions and dismissed the appeals.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial because errors in assessing the defence and credibility caused a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his convictions for manslaughter and aggravated assault arising from a gunfight on Yonge Street that resulted in the death of Jane Creba by a stray bullet.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by admitting expert evidence on how armed persons conceal firearms, by inadequately instructing the jury on the mutual gunfight theory of causation, and by refusing to leave self-defence to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, or conclusion that self-defence lacked an air of reality.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in 1971 for the death of his common-law wife and served over three years in prison.

Decades later, fresh medical evidence from multiple pathologists concluded the deceased died of natural causes following a fall, contradicting the trial evidence of blunt force trauma.

The Supreme Court of Canada remanded the case to the Court of Appeal.

On a joint submission with the Crown, the Court admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal, noting the appellant was wrongly convicted.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of first degree murder.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by allowing the accused to lead her lengthy, exculpatory police video statement as part of her defence under the Edgar exception for prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge applied the correct principles and reasonably exercised his discretion in finding the statement was spontaneous and made when the accused was first confronted with an accusation of a crime.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, two commercial truck drivers, were convicted of importing $3.5 million of cocaine after the drugs were found hidden in their trailer at the border.

They appealed their convictions, arguing they were 'blind couriers' and the trial judge erred in his credibility assessments, particularly regarding their knowledge of English and a purported alibi.

The Court of Appeal (majority) dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge's factual conclusions were supported by the evidence.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeals, reducing the sentences from 16 and 14 years to 12 and 10 years, as the original sentences were outside the range for first-time couriers.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder and accessory after the fact to murder.

At trial, the Crown called the common-law spouses of two of the appellants as witnesses and introduced out-of-court statements made by one of the spouses shortly after the shooting.

The appellants appealed, arguing the spousal incompetency rule should be extended to common-law spouses under s. 15(1) of the Charter, and that the out-of-court statements were inadmissible hearsay.

The Court of Appeal held that while failing to extend the spousal incompetency rule to common-law spouses violates s. 15(1) of the Charter, the limitation is justified under s. 1.

The court also upheld the admission of the out-of-court statements under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule.

The appeals were dismissed.

In a manslaughter appeal, the Crown challenged an order for a new trial based on alleged misdirection to the jury concerning post-offence photographs and characterization of a school conversation as a confession.

The Court held the photographs were admissible on identity because appearance at the time of the offence was in dispute and any prejudice was manageable through limiting instructions.

Reading the charge as a whole, the Court found no realistic risk that jurors would reason impermissibly from broad eyewitness descriptions.

The Court also held that referring to confession in recounting the Crown's submissions was not a toxic instruction where the jury was repeatedly cautioned to assess the actual words and context.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction restored, and sentencing issues were remitted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge considered an email exchange in isolation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably interpreted the appellant's email response to the complainant's detailed allegations as a virtual confession when viewed in the context of all the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, administering a noxious substance, and failing to provide the necessaries of life in relation to her two-year-old son.

At trial, the Crown relied on expert evidence from the Motherisk Program regarding hair testing to prove the child had ingested cocaine over a 14-month period.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh expert evidence challenging the methodology and validity of the hair testing.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it credible and potentially decisive.

The convictions related to cocaine ingestion were quashed and a new trial was ordered, but the order was stayed because the appellant had already served her sentence.

The appeal from the fracture-related convictions was abandoned.

The appellant, a tax preparer, appealed his convictions for two counts of fraud and his sentence of three years' imprisonment and a $448,000 fine.

He argued that his rights under s. 11(b) of the Charter were violated due to a 65-month delay, and that his s. 8 Charter rights were violated during the execution of search warrants at his home and office.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the delay was largely attributable to inherent time requirements and a mistrial caused by the trial judge's illness, and that the seized documents were properly obtained under s. 489(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The sentence was upheld as being within the accepted range for a serious fraud against the public purse.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for an unprovoked and brutal aggravated assault, arguing it was manifestly unfit and failed to give proper effect to denunciation and deterrence.

The sentencing judge had effectively imposed a low penitentiary sentence after giving credit for pre-sentence custody, emphasizing the principle of rehabilitation to give the respondent one last chance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion regarding the respondent's rehabilitative prospects and seeing no basis for appellate intervention.

The appellant, a repeat firearms offender, appealed his global sentence of eight years' imprisonment for eight firearm-related offences, including possession of a restricted firearm and breaches of two firearms prohibition orders.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in imposing consecutive sentences for the prohibition breaches, that the global sentence offended the parity principle, and that the mandatory minimum sentence was unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the consecutive sentences and concluding the global sentence was fit and did not offend the parity principle.

The Court declined to address the constitutional challenge as the sentence was justified regardless of the mandatory minimum.

The appellant appealed his indeterminate sentence as a dangerous offender, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to consider the long-term offender (LTO) option.

The appellant also introduced fresh evidence of a 2010 risk assessment showing rehabilitation progress.

The Court of Appeal applied the curative proviso and dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable possibility the trial judge would have imposed an LTO order in 1998 even with the fresh evidence.

The court noted that the appellant's progress should be assessed by the Parole Board, not through a new sentencing hearing.