Ian K. Latimer

A judgment creditor brought a garnishment motion alleging that the garnishee and its principal knowingly contravened notices of garnishment by continuing to pay salary to a judgment debtor while falsely stating no employment relationship existed.

Evidence showed the garnishee entities continued paying the debtor for management services despite service of garnishment notices and filed inaccurate garnishee statements.

The court found the payments constituted wages subject to garnishment and that the garnishee ought to have remitted the statutory portion to the sheriff.

Given the deliberate misrepresentations and the integrated business structure, the court pierced the corporate veil to impose personal liability on the principal.

Judgment was granted for the garnishable portion of the wages together with interest and substantial indemnity costs.

The appellant appealed an order requiring him to pay rent arrears, arguing the motion judge was biased.

The appellant alleged institutional bias because the respondent's counsel also served as a Deputy Judge in the same region as the motion judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no institutional bias, noting that Deputy Judges are permitted to practice law and are not accorded special status.

The court also rejected the allegation of actual bias, finding the motion judge's order was a proper exercise of discretion.

The appellant challenged the motion judge’s conclusion that his claim on a $50,000 loan was statute-barred.

He argued the loan was for a specific purpose rather than a demand loan, and that the limitation period was tolled by alleged wilful concealment, misrepresentation, and incapacity.

The court held that even accepting the appellant’s evidence, he knew by June 2005 that he had a cause of action, and in any event the first written demand in May 2006 triggered the running of the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

In an estates dispute between brothers following their mother’s death, the applicant obtained an order without notice requiring the respondent to accept or refuse appointment as estate trustee under an earlier will.

The court found that the order had been obtained without notice and with material non-disclosure, including the existence of a contested passing of accounts application and a later will.

Because the judge who granted the initial order had not been informed of these material facts, the court held that the order could not stand.

The without-notice order was therefore set aside and costs were awarded against the applicant.

Following a successful motion for summary judgment that resulted in dismissal of the action, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The court reiterated the general principle that costs follow the event and rejected submissions that costs should not be awarded.

Although the plaintiff raised concerns regarding mental health issues and impecuniosity, the court concluded that these circumstances did not justify departing from the ordinary rule.

The defendant’s claimed costs were found to be reasonable in light of the work performed and the parties’ bills of costs.

Costs were awarded to the defendant on a partial indemnity basis in the amount claimed.

Costs decision following a successful application for a passing of accounts in an estate matter.

The court reaffirmed that the modern approach to estate litigation costs applies the general civil litigation principle that the loser pays, subject to Rule 57 and limited exceptions.

The respondent rejected a reasonable Offer to Settle and conducted the litigation in a manner that unnecessarily complicated a relatively straightforward estate dispute.

As a result, the court ordered partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

Additional reimbursement was also ordered for an unnecessary banking expense debited from the estate account.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of an action to recover three alleged loans made between 1998 and 2000.

The defendant argued the claims were statute-barred under the former Limitations Act, which imposed a six‑year limitation period.

The court found the first loan became due in 1999 and the other two loans were properly characterized as demand loans whose causes of action arose when the funds were advanced.

The plaintiff failed to produce written acknowledgements restarting the limitation period and provided insufficient medical evidence to establish incapacity suspending the limitation period.

The court held there was no trust or equitable claim capable of avoiding the limitation defence and no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The applicants and respondents are trustees of a religious corporation.

The applicants signed a petition alleging improprieties by the board.

In response, the respondent trustees initiated show cause hearings to terminate the applicants' membership in the corporation.

The applicants sought an order declaring these actions unlawful.

The court granted the application, finding that the respondents acted in bad faith by using the membership termination process for the oblique purpose of removing the applicants from the board of trustees, which could only be done for lack of attendance under the bylaws.

Following a successful motion by the defendants to set aside a default judgment, the court determined the appropriate costs consequences.

The defendants sought partial indemnity costs for the motion, while the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs for steps rendered wasted by the defendants’ earlier default as well as costs of the motion.

Applying Rules 19.08, 57.01, and 57.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that a fair and reasonable approach was to offset the competing costs claims.

The defendants were awarded reduced partial indemnity costs for the motion, while the plaintiff received costs thrown away arising from earlier procedural steps.

The court ordered the plaintiff to pay the net amount after set-off.

Unit owners brought an oppression application under s. 135 of the Condominium Act alleging that a condominium corporation acted oppressively by deactivating FOBs and denying access to both a condominium unit and recreational facilities.

The court found the corporation acted improperly when it deactivated the owners’ FOBs without notice, temporarily preventing access to the unit, which constituted oppressive and unfairly prejudicial conduct.

However, the denial of access to recreational facilities was not oppressive because the applicants refused reasonable requests to complete a resident information form and provide identification establishing residency.

The court held that the inability to access amenities resulted from the applicants’ own refusal to comply with reasonable condominium management requirements.

Nominal damages were awarded for the brief interruption of access to the unit.

The moving party defendants sought to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff after the defendants were noted in default and their statement of defence had been struck for failing to deliver affidavits of documents.

The defendants argued they lacked notice of the earlier motion striking the defence, acted promptly to challenge the judgment, and possessed a viable defence on the merits.

The court held that while the plaintiff had established a sufficient evidentiary basis for the original default judgment, the defendants raised a reasonably plausible explanation for their absence and demonstrated a potentially arguable defence.

Balancing the interests of justice and potential prejudice to both sides, the court concluded the matter should proceed on its merits.

The default judgment and prior order striking the defence were set aside subject to terms preserving existing execution and trust funds as security.

The appellant judgment creditor attempted to enforce a judgment through a sheriff's sale of the debtor's home.

The sheriff required mortgage discharge statements, which the respondent mortgagees refused to provide citing privacy concerns.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) prohibited the disclosure of the mortgage statements without the debtor's consent, as they constituted personal information and no statutory exemption applied.

The appellants appealed an order striking their claims against a bank and its legal counsel regarding the enforcement of two mortgages on properties in default.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that there was no basis for a claim against the bank's counsel, one appellant lacked standing, and the other appellant's claims should have been raised in the underlying enforcement proceedings.

The appellant, a former director and shareholder of a company, appealed a summary judgment enforcing his personal guarantee of the company's line of credit.

The appellant argued that the bank's restructuring of the loan from a revolving line of credit to a term loan without notice to him materially altered the credit agreement, relieving him of liability.

He also argued the bank failed to protect its security interest in the company's inventory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the restructuring was an enforcement measure contemplated by the original agreement, not a material alteration.

Furthermore, the guarantee was unconditional, and the bank had no duty to protect the security interest.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent damages for breach of an equipment rental contract.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in calculating the hours the respondent would have worked and in failing to credit a prior payment.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's finding of 1000 hours of work, as it was supported by evidence including time cards and witness testimony.

However, the Court agreed the trial judge erred by not crediting a $2,990 payment made for preparation work.

The judgment was varied downward to correct this and a minor arithmetical error, but the appeal was otherwise dismissed.