Helen M. Pierce

The successful appellant sought costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $27,295.59.

The respondent argued the claimed hourly rates and preparation time were excessive, suggesting $5,000 all inclusive.

Applying the principles from Boucher, the Divisional Court fixed costs at $12,000 all inclusive, finding this amount fair and reasonable given the nature and complexity of the matter, the number of appearances, and reasonable preparation time.

The Municipality of Bluewater appealed a decision of the Normal Farm Practices Protection Board, which had granted the respondent farmer an exemption from the minimum distance separation requirements in the municipality's zoning by-law.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Board lacked jurisdiction to interfere with land use planning matters, which fall exclusively under the Planning Act.

The Board's authority is limited to protecting farmers from nuisance claims regarding normal farm practices, not granting zoning variances.

The plaintiff sued the defendant lawyer, Highley, and his insurer, LPIC, for professional negligence based on discussions Highley had with the plaintiff's lawyer concerning a priorities motion.

Highley had been retained by LPIC to defend another lawyer in a related matter, and the interests of Highley's client and the plaintiff were aligned at the time.

The motion judge refused to grant summary judgment dismissing the action against Highley and LPIC.

On appeal, the Divisional Court allowed the appeal and granted summary judgment, holding that a lawyer does not owe a duty of care to a non-client represented by their own counsel, even when their interests are aligned, due to a lack of proximity and compelling policy reasons.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent wife $1,000 per month in spousal support, arguing it constituted impermissible double recovery from his equalized pension.

The wife cross-appealed for increased retroactive support.

The Divisional Court allowed the husband's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by encroaching on the equalized survivor pension to fund support.

The court reduced spousal support to $140 per month, representing half of the unequalized pre-marriage portion of the pension, and dismissed the wife's cross-appeal.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her claims for spousal support, a restraining order, and a $24,000 lump sum pursuant to a marriage contract.

The Divisional Court determined it lacked jurisdiction under section 19(1)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act because the total monetary value of the claims could not be ascertained to be under $25,000.

The court transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario pursuant to section 110 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent worked as an illustrator for the appellant until her employment was terminated.

She initially filed an Employment Standards Act complaint against the employment agency that placed her, but later withdrew it and commenced a civil action for wrongful dismissal against the appellant.

The appellant moved to dismiss the action, arguing it was barred by s. 64.3(2) of the ESA, which prevents an employee from commencing a civil action relating to the same termination if they have filed a complaint.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory bar only prevents a civil action against the same alleged employer against whom the complaint was filed.

The insured retained a public adjuster on a contingency fee basis to assist with a fire insurance claim.

The insured applied for a declaration that the adjuster's fees were a 'loss' under statutory condition 11 of the Insurance Act, and therefore subject to the appraisal process under s. 128.

The application judge agreed.

The insurer appealed, arguing that 'amount of loss' should be restricted to property damage.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that economic losses were covered by the policy and the enhancer endorsement, and that any ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the insured.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board that reduced the current value assessments of a zinc mine for the 1998, 1999, and 2000 taxation years.

The mine had suspended operations in late 1998 and was closed by 2000.

The applicant argued the Board made errors of law regarding the valuation method, economic obsolescence, and reliance on expert evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the Board's decision was not patently unreasonable and the applicant failed to show good reason to doubt the correctness of the decision on a question of law.