Heather A. McGee

The mother sought sole custody and permission to relocate with the parties' two-year-old child from Ontario to California.

The mother, a US citizen, had been isolated during the marriage and had no financial prospects or family support in Ontario.

The father sought sole custody but provided no clear plan and his evidence was found to be unreliable.

The court granted the mother sole custody, finding she was the primary caregiver and a better decision-maker.

Applying the Gordon v. Goertz framework, the court permitted the relocation to California, noting the mother's sound plan for financial self-sufficiency and the emotional benefits to both her and the child.

The court also dispensed with the father's consent for travel and government documents.

The respondent mother brought a motion to change child support terms.

Both parties were self-represented.

The court determined a material change in circumstances occurred on January 1, 2014, due to the mother's second marriage ending and the father's new partnership structure.

The court calculated the mother's income by grossing up non-taxable spousal support and the father's income by adding back certain corporate expenses, rejecting his claim for a deduction for capital account payments under section 12 of Schedule III of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, finding these were for asset acquisition, not business capitalization.

The father was ordered to pay child support arrears for 2014-2015 and temporary monthly child support for 2016, with a mechanism for future recalculation.

Proportional sharing of section 7 expenses was also varied.

Maria Anna Koundouros brought a motion to strike the claim of her former mother-in-law, Stavroulla Koundouros, who sought repayment of $1,598,000 advanced to Maria and her son during their marriage.

Maria argued that a promissory note for the funds was solely between Stavroulla and her son, Nicolaos, and therefore no cause of action existed against her.

The court dismissed Maria's motion, finding that Stavroulla's claim, which included allegations of unjust enrichment and trust claims based on joint benefit and Maria's access to funds, disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

The court emphasized that the Family Law Rules, not the Rules of Civil Procedure, primarily govern such family disputes and that the promissory note was not dispositive at this early stage.

The respondent mother brought a motion for temporary child and spousal support.

The applicant father claimed an income of $12,000 to $21,000, despite reporting over $125,000 in annual expenses and having previously declared over $1.2 million in assets on an immigration application.

The court found the father's financial disclosure to be vitiated by contradictions and imputed his income at $221,490 based on his unfunded expenses.

The court ordered the father to pay temporary table child support of $1,792 per month and temporary spousal support of $3,400 per month, retroactive to June 1, 2016.

The applicant mother and respondent paternal grandparents both sought sole custody of a 13-year-old child on a motion to change a 2009 final order for joint custody.

The child's father was deceased.

The court found that the relentless conflict between the mother and grandparents constituted a material change in circumstances that was actively harming the child.

Applying the best interests of the child test under the Children's Law Reform Act, the court awarded sole custody and primary residence to the paternal grandparents, finding they could provide stability, shield the child from conflict, and support her education and extracurricular activities.

A transition period was ordered during which the mother's parenting time was temporarily suspended.

The applicant sought costs of $20,000 following a motion for disclosure where success was divided, and the respondent's cross-motion for bifurcation was dismissed.

The respondent proposed costs of $7,500 payable in the cause.

The court declined to order costs in the cause, noting that bifurcation is a process, not an outcome.

After considering the factors under Rule 24(11), the lack of offers to settle, and the litigation conduct of both parties, the court awarded the applicant costs of $8,000 plus HST.

This trial decision addresses the termination of spousal support and a claim for a retrospective increase.

The applicant sought to terminate spousal support after 16 years of payments.

The respondent sought a retrospective increase, asserting ongoing need and health issues preventing self-sufficiency.

The court found the respondent's evidence regarding her income, employment, and health to be unreliable, contradictory, and indicative of deliberate efforts to obscure her financial affairs and evade tax.

The court concluded that the respondent had achieved self-sufficiency and was not economically disadvantaged by the marriage or its breakdown to an extent requiring indefinite support.

The applicant's request to terminate spousal support was granted, effective April 30, 2017, and the respondent's claim for a retrospective increase was dismissed.

A $40,500 loan advanced to the respondent for litigation funding was deemed paid by future support payments.

The applicant sought temporary spousal support and various disclosure orders against her first husband, whom she divorced in 1985 with a separation agreement and decree nisi barring future support claims.

The court dismissed the motion for temporary spousal support, finding no prima facie entitlement and insufficient factual foundation to override the thirty-year-old separation agreement, especially given contradictory evidence regarding the applicant's allegations of abuse.

Most disclosure requests were also dismissed, except for one consented-to item.

This trial determined custody, parenting schedule, child support, and section 7 expenses for three children, one with significant special needs.

The father sought joint custody and a week-about schedule, while the mother sought sole custody and primary care.

The court granted joint custody and a week-about parenting schedule, finding that both parents were capable and that joint custody would balance parental power.

No table child support was ordered due to the shared residency and similar incomes, and section 7 expenses, including nanny costs, were to be shared equally.

The father was ordered to attend a parenting course, and one child was to receive counselling.

The mother brought a second motion to change, seeking to relocate the child's residence from Barrie, Ontario, to Manchester, England, and to update child support.

The father opposed the relocation and sought increased parenting time.

The court dismissed the mother's motion to change residence, finding no unforeseen material change in circumstances since the previous order.

The court found that the mother's actions, such as enforcing supervised access, were a deliberate attempt to create a parental vacancy.

However, the father's parenting time was modestly increased, and child support payments were varied.

The applicant wife sought to set aside a separation agreement or its spousal support terms and requested significant disclosure.

The respondent husband cross-motioned for an order to bifurcate the application to set aside the agreement from the de novo claims for equalization and spousal support, seeking to limit disclosure until the agreement's validity was determined.

The court dismissed the husband's motion for bifurcation, finding no clear time or expense benefits, and ruled that a Miglin analysis for spousal support requires full financial disclosure regardless of the agreement's initial validity.

The court then made specific orders for disclosure.

The applicant father and respondent mother both sought costs following a motion where success was divided.

The father was unsuccessful on temporary custody and venue but successful on parenting schedule terms.

The mother served two offers to settle, both containing parenting terms more favourable to the father than the final order.

The court found the mother was entitled to costs due to her early and severable offers, and her success on key issues.

The father was ordered to pay the mother $9,000 in costs, payable in instalments, despite his argument regarding ability to pay.

Chappell Partners LLP (CP), counsel for the respondent Miranda Leigh Smith, sought full recovery costs of $5,518.50 against the applicant Peter Brian Cozzi.

Cozzi was the unsuccessful party on a motion heard December 16, 2015, which sought to remove a collateral mortgage secured by CP for fees.

The court found Cozzi's conduct unreasonable, noting he brought a motion for relief already pleaded in another file and made unproven, false allegations of fraud and dishonesty against CP, particularly regarding independent legal advice.

Applying Rule 24(11)(b) of the Family Law Rules and common law principles, the court awarded full recovery costs to CP against Cozzi.

The applicant father commenced a family law proceeding in Newmarket.

The respondent mother, who primarily cared for their infant daughter in London, sought to transfer the venue and requested temporary sole custody.

The court found the child ordinarily resided in London and transferred the proceeding there pursuant to Rule 5(1)(b) of the Family Law Rules.

Given the parties' lack of historical cooperation and the child's young age, the court awarded temporary sole custody to the mother while implementing a progressive parenting schedule for the father, including overnights.

The respondent father brought a motion to terminate a nesting order, evict the applicant mother from the family home, and obtain temporary custody of their children.

The parties are unmarried, and the home is solely in the father's name.

The court found that while nesting orders can exist between unmarried parents, the current arrangement was causing emotional harm to the children due to the father's deliberate involvement of the children in the conflict.

The court terminated the nesting order, dismissed the father's claim for custody, and ordered the father to remain at least 250 metres away from the family home during access exchanges.

The applicant mother sought child support based on an imputed income of $162,512, alleging the respondent father was hiding his true income and assets.

The court found the father had submitted false tax documents, lied about his residence, and failed to provide accurate financial disclosure.

Pursuant to section 19(1)(f) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, the court imputed an income of $54,909 to the father based on his unfunded expenses, and ordered table child support accordingly.

The mother's claim for section 7 expenses was dismissed due to a lack of evidentiary basis.

In a child protection proceeding, the respondent mother brought a motion seeking the immediate return of her child to her care and dismissal of the society’s protection application.

The court held that the requested final relief was not available on a motion and treated the request as a motion under s. 51(6) of the Child and Family Services Act to vary an existing order.

The court found a material change in circumstances based on the mother’s engagement with treatment, but also concluded there remained a risk of harm to the child due to the mother’s history of mental health decompensation.

The court accepted that the risk could potentially be managed through a supervision order and provided the mother an opportunity to agree to terms of supervision.

If the mother refused supervision, the motion would be dismissed.

A party brought a motion seeking costs personally against his former lawyer under Rule 24(9) of the Family Law Rules after incurring significant expenses due to the lawyer’s failure to protect the party’s procedural rights in a family proceeding.

The lawyer had been retained while the client was already in default but failed to notify opposing counsel, file an answer, or take steps to secure consent or an order permitting late filing.

As a result, the opposing party proceeded toward an uncontested trial, causing unnecessary litigation steps and costs.

Applying the two‑stage analysis for costs against counsel, the court found the lawyer’s conduct negligently caused unnecessary costs and was inconsistent with the goals of the justice system.

The court exercised its discretion to order the lawyer personally to reimburse the client for $14,500 in costs.

On competing family law motions, each spouse sought an order requiring the other to pay the expenses associated with a jointly occupied matrimonial home.

The court considered its authority under section 24(1)(e) of the Family Law Act to allocate responsibility for repair, maintenance, and liability expenses of a matrimonial home notwithstanding possession.

Both spouses remained living in the home with their children following separation, but the father’s income had significantly decreased while the mother earned substantially more.

The court held that allocation of home expenses between two spouses in joint possession may be appropriate during transitional periods before sale of the home.

Given the parties’ disproportionate financial means, the court ordered the respondent spouse to cover the mortgage, insurance, utilities, and taxes, while the applicant spouse contributed $1,000 per month on a temporary without‑prejudice basis subject to future accounting.

The appellant, CNH, appealed a decision of the Agricultural, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal.

During an attendance before the Divisional Court, the parties consented to refer the matter back to the Tribunal but could not agree on costs.

Following the Tribunal's subsequent decision, both parties sought costs for the earlier court attendance.

The court found neither party was entitled to the excessive costs sought and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the attendance fixed at $2,500.