Gregory Hendry

The Ontario Court of Justice sentenced Akashkumar Narendrakumar Khant, who pleaded guilty to attempted commission of an indecent act contrary to section 173(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, following a police sting operation targeting individuals seeking sexual services from minors.

The Crown sought 90 days custody, while the Defence proposed a conditional discharge with probation and house arrest.

The Court considered extensive psychological assessments, mitigating factors including Khant’s remorse, rehabilitation efforts, and severe immigration and professional consequences of a conviction.

The Court distinguished this case from more serious precedents, noting evidentiary weaknesses and the incomplete nature of the offence.

Ultimately, the Court imposed a conditional discharge with 12 months probation, including 3 months house arrest, emphasizing proportionality, rehabilitation, and the avoidance of disproportionate collateral consequences.

This decision addresses the criminal liability of Shawn Collinge on three counts of child luring under the Criminal Code.

The Court considered two key issues: whether it matters if Collinge was unknowingly communicating with a third party rather than the alleged minor, H.O., and whether Collinge had the requisite mens rea regarding H.O.'s age.

The Court held that liability depends on who the accused believed he was communicating with, not the actual recipient, and found that Collinge knew and believed H.O. was 14 years old.

The Court rejected Collinge's claim that he believed H.O. was over 18, finding his evidence not credible.

Collinge was found guilty on all counts.

This criminal trial concerned charges against Johnathan Cox and Steven Cox related to sex trafficking, procuring, advertising sexual services, financial benefit from sexual services, and aggravated assault.

The complainant (C) alleged Johnathan initiated her involvement in the sex trade, managed her activities, and took her earnings, as well as physically assaulting her.

Steven, Johnathan's father, was accused of facilitating C's sex work by renting hotel rooms and paying for advertisements.

The court found the complainant's testimony credible and largely reliable, while rejecting Johnathan's evidence as unbelievable.

Steven's evidence was found conflicted, acknowledging his efforts to help C but also his knowledge and facilitation of her sex work.

Johnathan was found guilty on all counts except one procuring charge (over 18), while Steven was found guilty only of advertising sexual services, being acquitted of procuring and financial benefit charges due to a lack of specific intent to facilitate the purchase of sex.

Tevin Bailey, charged with human trafficking and related offenses, applied for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under the Jordan framework.

The total delay was nearly 41 months.

The court analyzed periods of defence delay, attributing 7 months and 13 days, and subtracted 7.5 months for pandemic-related administrative delays as exceptional circumstances.

The resulting net delay of 26 months fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling, leading to the dismissal of the application.

The accused, a gymnastics coach, was charged with sexual interference and luring in relation to a young female athlete he coached.

The Crown alleged the accused repeatedly touched the complainant's buttocks during training and later sent her pictures of his genitals via Snapchat.

The trial judge applied the W.(D.) framework to assess the competing testimonies.

The court found significant inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and noted the absence of corroborating evidence, including the missing Snapchat photos.

The court was left with a reasonable doubt regarding both the actus reus and mens rea of the offences.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The Crown brought an application seeking reconsideration of the admissibility of evidence of prior discreditable conduct statements made by the accused to police in 2013.

The Crown argued that the accused's re-election to a judge-alone trial constituted a material change in circumstances justifying reconsideration.

The court found that while the evidence had some probative value, its prejudicial effect, particularly the danger of moral prejudice and undermining trial fairness, significantly outweighed its probative value, even in a judge-alone trial.

The Crown's application was denied.

The accused, charged with sexual interference and luring, brought a pretrial motion alleging his s. 7 and s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated during a 2013 police interview regarding a separate incident.

The Crown brought a cross-motion seeking to admit the 2013 statement as voluntary and as prior discreditable conduct.

The court found the statement was voluntary and that the accused was not psychologically detained during the interview.

However, the court ruled that the probative value of the statement as prior discreditable conduct was outweighed by its prejudicial effect, as it would invite propensity reasoning.

The Crown's application to adduce the evidence was denied.

The appellant, Satgur Singh, appealed his convictions for impaired driving and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The sole ground of appeal was that the trial judge's findings of guilt were unreasonable, specifically regarding the identification of the appellant as the driver.

The appellate court reviewed the trial judge's assessment of eight alleged inconsistencies in eyewitness identification evidence.

The court found that the trial judge was alive to the inconsistencies, addressed them fairly, and reasonably concluded that the appellant was the driver.

The cumulative evidence, beyond just eyewitness description, supported the conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with child pornography offences, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence obtained from a search of his home and digital devices.

The search warrant was obtained using subscriber information linked to an IP address provided by an ISP prior to the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Spencer.

The court found that while the search violated section 8 of the Charter, the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) because the police acted in good faith reliance on the law as it existed at the time.

The court also dismissed arguments that the warrant lacked reasonable grounds, failed to specify computers, and was executed unreasonably.

The applicant, Ethan Miazad, sought certiorari to challenge his committal to stand trial on charges of fraud over $5,000.

The Crown alleged that Miazad and a co-accused defrauded Dr. Rhuel Maano by using him as a "straw man" to secure a $350,000 business loan for a medical clinic, personally guaranteed by Maano, while diverting funds to companies associated with the accused and failing to repay the loan, leaving Maano with the debt.

The court reviewed the preliminary inquiry judge's decision and the law of fraud and certiorari, finding sufficient evidence for committal based on the overall "straw man" fraud theory and non-disclosure of related-party transactions.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

Akash Ghotra, having been found guilty of internet luring, applied to stay the proceedings on the basis of entrapment.

He argued that an undercover police officer, posing as a 14-year-old girl in an internet chatroom, provided an opportunity to commit the offence without a pre-existing reasonable suspicion or a bona fide inquiry.

The Crown contended that merely stating an age of 14 did not create an opportunity and that the officer was engaged in a bona fide inquiry in an area where such offences were likely.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the officer did not create an opportunity for internet luring, as the applicant initiated the conversation and directed it towards sexual matters.

Furthermore, the court held that the internet chatroom constituted an area where criminal activity was reasonably suspected, thus justifying the police operation as a bona fide inquiry and not random virtue testing.

The applicant, charged with internet luring of a child after communicating with an undercover police officer posing as a 13-year-old, brought an application challenging the constitutionality of sections 172.1(3) and (4) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant argued that the presumption of age and the requirement to take reasonable steps to ascertain age violated sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the provisions do not create a reverse onus or require the accused to disprove an element of the offence.

The court held that requiring an accused to exercise due diligence by taking reasonable steps to ascertain age does not violate the principles of fundamental justice or the presumption of innocence.

The applicant sought a second bail review after his initial release was revoked by a Superior Court judge.

The applicant argued the reviewing judge erred in law by giving insufficient weight to the proposed plan of release under the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention, and by denying natural justice.

The court dismissed the application, finding no errors of law or inappropriate weighing of factors by the reviewing judge, who had properly concluded the applicant posed a substantial risk of reoffending and would not abide by any plan of release.

The offender was convicted of invitation to sexual touching and attempting to obtain sexual services of a minor after making telephone calls to his friend's 14-year-old daughter offering money for dirty panties and sexual acts.

The Crown sought two to three years in custody, while the defence sought six to nine months.

The court found the offender was in a position of trust, which was an aggravating factor, but noted the offences consisted of brief conversations.

The court sentenced the offender to one year of imprisonment concurrent on both counts, followed by two years of probation, and imposed a lifetime SOIRA order and a five-year s. 161 prohibition order.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving, impaired driving, and driving with blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit.

The trial addressed five key issues: whether dangerous driving was proven; whether the arrest and breath demand were lawful; whether the right to counsel was violated; whether evidence should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter; and whether impaired driving was proven.

The court found the defendant guilty of dangerous driving and excess blood alcohol concentration, but acquitted on the impaired driving charge due to reasonable doubt regarding whether the defendant's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol, despite a blood alcohol concentration of 2.5 times the legal limit.

The applicants brought an application for certiorari seeking to quash their committal for trial on a charge of first-degree murder.

They argued that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded his jurisdiction by failing to consider the totality of the evidence, particularly frailties in the identification evidence.

The reviewing judge found that the preliminary inquiry judge correctly applied the law, noting that there was sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict of guilty.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for dangerous driving and the resulting suspended sentence.

The conviction arose from a collision between the appellant's taxi cab and a moped, preceded by erratic driving including speeding, tailgating, and unsafe lane changes.

The appeal court found no material misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge, concluding that the appellant's driving constituted a marked departure from the norm.

The appeal against both conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He argued that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make an approved screening device demand and that the trial judge erred in rejecting his evidence regarding alcohol consumption.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court held that the constellation of factors—including departure from a bar near closing time, admission of recent drinking, and bloodshot eyes—objectively supported reasonable suspicion.

The court also found no reversible error in the trial judge’s credibility findings or rejection of the defence theory that mislabelled beer bottles explained the elevated readings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol, arguing that the trial judge erred in relying on pre‑Charter roadside statements, improperly accepted police testimony about statements not recorded in the officer’s notebook or disclosure, reversed the burden on a Charter application, and wrongly concluded the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make an Intoxilyzer demand.

The court held that roadside statements may be used on a Charter application to assess the reasonableness of the officer’s grounds.

The absence of notebook entries does not automatically render police evidence unreliable and credibility findings are owed deference on appeal.

Considering the circumstances, including the approved screening device result and the officer’s belief about recent consumption, the trial judge’s findings were open on the evidence.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for refusing to provide a breath sample under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had concluded the accused lacked a settled intention to refuse because he acted on perceived legal advice and confusion, and also relied on a “last chance request” analysis.

On appeal, the court held that the offence is one of general intent requiring only knowledge or awareness of the refusal, not wilfulness.

The court further found the last‑chance defence inapplicable because the accused made no immediate request to provide a sample and remained adamant in refusing despite repeated explanations.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.