Court File and Parties
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
Gregory Hendry, for the Crown
- and -
NAVDEEP NAGRA
Michael Little, for Mr. Nagra
HEARD: May 15, 2024, and December 12, 2025
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
Stribopoulos J:
Introduction
1Mr. Nagra pleaded guilty to possessing a loaded prohibited firearm without an authorization or license, contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code.
Circumstances of the Offence
2On January 23, 2023, a police officer pulled Mr. Nagra over for a routine traffic stop due to excessive noise from his vehicle’s muffler and the tint on his car windows. While dealing with Mr. Nagra at the roadside, the officer began investigating him for having an open alcoholic beverage in his car.
3As the investigation unfolded, Mr. Nagra suddenly stepped away from the officer, leading the officer to believe he was about to flee. In response, the officer tasered and then arrested Mr. Nagra.
4During a search following his arrest, the officer found a .45 calibre Glock handgun in Mr. Nagra’s jacket pocket. The firearm was loaded with a magazine, and Mr. Nagra had a second magazine in his pocket; each held 10 rounds.
5In Mr. Nagra’s car, the arresting officer also found a throwing knife, two grams of cocaine, and an open alcoholic beverage.
Circumstances of the Offender
6At the time of his offence, Mr. Nagra was 18 years old and had no criminal or youth record. He was born and raised in Peel Region and is the youngest of two siblings; he has an older brother.
7Mr. Nagra’s childhood was marked by domestic conflict. His father was a long-distance truck driver and was rarely home. When present, his father often drank excessively, had a temper, and was physically abusive towards him, his mother, and his brother.
8Mr. Nagra’s parents separated when he was 15. After that, he lived with his mother and brother. As a result of losing his father's income, the family faced financial hardship, and his mother struggled to provide for them.
9Mr. Nagra attended high school in Mississauga, where he participated in sports and maintained positive relationships with teachers and peers. During his parents’ separation, he experienced disciplinary issues and declining grades. By grade 12, however, he improved his performance and graduated with honours. He also volunteered regularly at his Sikh temple, where he was described as a “spectacular” volunteer.
10At the time of his arrest, Mr. Nagra was taking a gap year after graduating from high school. Following his arrest, he enrolled in a social work program at a community college.
11Over the years, Mr. Nagra has enjoyed gainful employment; his supervisor at his last job described him as extremely responsible and as having an excellent work ethic. Additionally, Mr. Nagra has an uncle who owns an HVAC business, and he is interested in pursuing a career in that field.
12Mr. Nagra expressed remorse for his offence both to the pre-sentence report author and in his statements to the court at the end of his sentencing hearing.
13Mr. Nagra has spent 480 days in pre-sentence custody. He was initially released on bail under strict conditions but was re-arrested for breaching his release order. He pleaded guilty and received a one-day sentence. He remains in custody due to additional outstanding charges scheduled for trial later this year.
14While in pre-sentence custody at Maplehurst Correctional Complex (MCC), Mr. Nagra was in lockdown for 209 days. He was triple bunked for 419 days.
15In an affidavit filed at sentencing, Mr. Nagra described how MCC’s triple bunking and lockdowns affected his privacy and mental health. During lockdowns, he had limited access to showers, programming, and the outdoors. Visits were cancelled, making it difficult to stay connected to family and friends. Clean laundry and bedding were inconsistent. Bugs were a constant presence in his range. He noted that these conditions made the environment tense and led to frequent arguments and fights among inmates.
16When available, Mr. Nagra took some of the programming offered at MCC. This included programs on substance abuse, life skills, and understanding emotions and behaviour. He indicated that he looked forward to these programs. However, they were frequently cancelled, which he found frustrating and demoralizing.
17Mr. Nagra maintained that the conditions he endured at MCC negatively impacted his mental and physical health.
Positions of the Parties
18The parties agree on the ancillary orders that should form part of Mr. Nagra’s sentence. These include a DNA order, a section 109 weapons prohibition order (for ten years and life), a forfeiture order (for the firearm, magazines, ammunition, throwing knife, and cocaine), and the victim surcharge. However, they disagree on the length of imprisonment the court should impose.
The Crown’s position
19The Crown submitted that the court should sentence Mr. Nagra to 40 months' imprisonment for his offence, less credit for his time spent in pre-sentence custody. In taking that position, the Crown placed considerable emphasis on the circumstances of the offence and the offender in Nur, as well as on the sentence he received: see R. v. Nur, 2013 ONCA 677, 117 O.R. (3d) 401, aff’d 2015 SCC 15, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773.
20The Crown noted that Mr. Nur received a sentence equivalent to 40 months' imprisonment. The Court of Appeal and then the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the three-year mandatory minimum sentence then prescribed for a first offence under s. 95(1). However, they each upheld the sentence Mr. Nur received.
21The Crown submitted that Mr. Nur’s circumstances were analogous to those of Mr. Nagra. Mr. Nur was a 19-year-old first offender from a supportive, prosocial family. He was attending school, aspired to attend university, and had a positive employment and volunteer record. Given this, the Crown submitted that it would be entirely arbitrary for this court to impose any lesser sentence on Mr. Nagra.
22Further, the Crown submitted that Nur’s direction regarding the sentencing of offenders for “true crime” firearm offences is directly applicable in Mr. Nagra’s case. The Crown argued that Mr. Nagra’s purpose in possessing a firearm was criminal by its very nature. The Crown asked, what other reason would he have for possessing an illegal handgun but to use it in the commission of a crime? It follows, the Crown maintains, that Nur’s observation that a three-year sentence would be appropriate for such offenders is instructive in fashioning a fit and appropriate sentence for Mr. Nagra.
Mr. Nagra’s position
23In contrast to the Crown’s position, Mr. Nagra submitted that the court should impose a sentence of two years less a day of imprisonment. With credit for his time in pre-sentence custody, including enhanced credit for the harsh conditions at MCC, he has essentially already served his sentence. As a result, he urged the court to either impose a further one-day custodial sentence or suspend his sentence and place him on probation.
24In taking that position, Mr. Nagra emphasized the mitigating factors in his case. These include his youth, status as a first offender, prosocial antecedents, guilty plea, and remorse. He argued that a robust body of case law post-Nur has established that for s. 95(1) offences, when there are strong mitigating factors, sentences at or near the maximum reformatory sentence range are appropriate.
25Mr. Nagra submitted that the sentence he proposed falls within the established range and respects the principle of parity, which is essential to a proportionate sentence. It also reflects the need for restraint, given that he is a youthful first offender, he argued.
Law and Analysis
26Sentencing is discretionary by nature. There is no set formula for judges to follow to determine an appropriate sentence. Judges must consider the purpose and objectives of sentencing and be mindful of the governing principles, especially the need to impose a proportionate sentence. Against that backdrop and after accounting for the aggravating and mitigating factors, judges must fashion a just and appropriate sentence.
Purpose, objectives, and principles of sentencing
27Sentencing judges must remain mindful of the fundamental purpose of sentencing. Parliament has identified this as the protection of society and contributing "to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society": Criminal Code, s. 718.
28Achieving that purpose requires the court to impose “just sanctions” that address one or more traditional sentencing objectives. These objectives include denunciation, deterrence (general and specific), separation from society, rehabilitation, reparation, promoting responsibility in offenders, and acknowledging the harm done to victims and the community: see Criminal Code, ss. 718(a)-(f).
29To fashion an appropriate sentence, the court must respect what Parliament has prescribed as the fundamental principle of sentencing: that a sentence "must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender": Criminal Code, s. 718.1. Proportionality requires a sentence that fits both the seriousness of the crime and the offender's level of moral blameworthiness in its commission. This is the "central tenet" of sentencing: see R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433, at paras. 36-37; R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, at paras. 40-43; see also R. v. J.W., 2025 SCC 16, 448 C.C.C. (3d) 285, at para. 41.
30To arrive at a proportionate sentence, the court must respect the principle of parity. Proportionality is a function of the circumstances of the offence and offender, compared to sentences previously imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. As the Supreme Court has explained, a sentencing judge must reconcile individualization and parity to achieve a proportionate sentence: see R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at para. 53, citing Criminal Code, ss. 718.2(a) and (b). However, these principles do not operate in tension with one another. Parity is an expression of proportionality: see R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, at paras. 30-33; R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, [2021] 3 S.C.R. 366, at paras. 11-12.
31Ultimately, proportionality "has a restraining function" because it helps "guarantee that a sentence is individualized, just and appropriate": R. v. Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 597, at para. 51; see also Ipeelee, at para. 37. Accordingly, proportionality "acts as a brake to ensure that, in the pursuit of public protection measures, including deterrence and denunciation, sentences are not unduly excessive": R. v. Gilmore, 2025 ONCA 517, at para. 36; see also at para. 34; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Senneville, 2025 SCC 33, at para. 35.
32Parliament has also expressly mandated restraint in sentencing. It has instructed that an offender "should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances" and that "all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done" to victims or the community "should be considered for all offenders": Criminal Code, ss. 718.2(d) and (e).
33The restraint principle is directly relevant to Mr. Nagra's sentencing in two ways.
34First, the restraint principle requires prioritizing specific deterrence and rehabilitation when sentencing youthful first offenders, like Mr. Nagra: see R. v. Stein (1974), 15 C.C.C. (2d) 376 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Priest (1996), 110 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.), pp. 294-296; R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830, 99 C.R. (7th) 110, at paras. 30-31. Except for "very serious offences and offences involving violence" the need for restraint usually counsels against custodial sentences for youthful first offenders: Priest, at p. 294; see also Stein, at p. 377; Habib, at para. 31; R. v. Desir, 2021 ONCA 486, at para. 41.
35Second, the restraint principle requires that when sentencing youthful first offenders, even when the objectives of general deterrence and denunciation make a custodial sentence unavoidable, as they do with firearm offences, courts must favour the shortest possible sentence that can still achieve those objectives. Further, when sentencing such offenders, the court can never lose sight of the importance of specific deterrence and rehabilitation: see R. v. Borde (2003), 63 O.R. (3d) 417 (C.A.), at para. 36; R. v. Disher, 2020 ONCA 710, 153 O.R. (3d) 88, at paras. 59-60; Desir, at para. 41; R. v. Faroughi, 2024 ONCA 178, 171 O.R. (3d) 81, at paras. 70-71; Habib, at para. 31.
36With the purpose, objectives, and principles of sentencing summarized, I turn to the cases that provide specific guidance regarding sentencing for s. 95(1) offences.
Sentencing for s. 95(1) offences
37The gravity of unlawfully possessing a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm cannot be overstated. Illegally possessed handguns pose an inherent and serious risk to public safety. They are far too frequently used to intimidate, injure, and kill, with devastating consequences for victims and their families. Given this, the case law recognizes that illegal firearms constitute a serious threat to the community, and that their possession must be discouraged through exemplary sentences that denounce and deter and thereby enhance public safety: see Nur, at para. 206 (C.A.); R. v. Mohiadin, 2021 ONCA 122, at para. 12; R v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, 159 O.R. (3d) 641, at para. 71.
38In Nur, in concluding that the mandatory minimum sentence of three years’ imprisonment for a first offence under s. 95(1) was unconstitutional because it was contrary to s. 12 of the Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada made some important observations about the gravity of that offence. Writing for the majority, McLachlin C.J. explained, at para. 82:
Section 95(1) casts its net over a wide range of potential conduct. Most cases within the range may well merit a sentence of three years or more, but conduct at the far end of the range may not. At one end of the range, as Doherty J.A. observed, “stands the outlaw who carries a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm in public places as a tool of his or her criminal trade. . . . [T]his person is engaged in truly criminal conduct and poses a real and immediate danger to the public”: para. 51. At this end of the range — indeed for the vast majority of offences — a three-year sentence may be appropriate. A little further along the spectrum stands the person whose conduct is less serious and poses less danger; for these offenders three years’ imprisonment may be disproportionate, but not grossly so. At the far end of the range, stands the licensed and responsible gun owner who stores his unloaded firearm safely with ammunition nearby, but makes a mistake as to where it can be stored. For this offender, a three-year sentence is grossly disproportionate to the sentence the conduct would otherwise merit under the sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code.
[Underlining and bolding added.]
39As the excerpted passage makes clear, the Supreme Court in Nur described s. 95(1) offences as occupying a broad spectrum in terms of their gravity. At the most serious end are offenders whose possession of a loaded restricted or prohibited firearm is connected to other criminal activity — for example, the drug trafficker who carries a handgun because of the violence inherent in the drug trade, or the robber who carries one to intimidate their victims. For such offenders, a loaded handgun is unquestionably “a tool of [their] criminal trade.” At the opposite and least culpable end of the spectrum is the licensed firearm owner who mistakenly stores a firearm and ammunition in an unauthorized location. Between these extremes are cases where an offender unlawfully possesses a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm, while not harbouring some further criminal purpose for doing so.
40For offenders whose culpability lies more in the middle, the Supreme Court observed that a three-year sentence “may be disproportionate, but not grossly so”: Nur, at para. 82. That observation should not be understood as requiring three-year penitentiary sentences for such offenders. The Supreme Court does not establish sentencing ranges, and it did not purport to do so in Nur. Rather, the Court, as it was required to do, was assessing the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence against the full range of conduct captured by the offence: see Nur, at paras. 39, 46, and 83.
41At the same time, nothing in Nur should be taken as downplaying the inherent gravity of s. 95(1) offences, even when they fall somewhere between the two poles of culpability identified by the Supreme Court. In recent years, far too many members of the community—invariably, young men—have chosen to carry loaded handguns, notwithstanding the serious legal and public safety consequences of doing so. Ironically, such offenders frequently claim to have had a firearm for self-protection, pointing to the prevalence of guns in the community as justification for possessing one themselves.
42The cumulative effect of the widespread possession of loaded handguns is that disputes which once would have ended in fisticuffs now quickly escalate into gunfire, often with catastrophic consequences. The resulting harm is not confined to those directly involved. Time and again, entirely innocent members of the public suffer life-altering or fatal injuries simply by being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Stray bullets respect no boundaries; the death of eight-year-old JahVai Roy, shot while lying in his bed in August 2025, stands as a stark and tragic illustration. As the Court of Appeal recognized in Morris, at para. 68:
Gun crimes involving the possession of loaded, concealed firearms in public places pose a real and immediate danger to the public, especially anyone who interacts with the gun holder. When the person with the gun is confronted by the police, who are engaged in the lawful execution of their duties, the risk increases dramatically. It increases yet again when the gun holder flees, and still again when the gun holder discards the weapon in a public place. A person who carries a concealed, loaded handgun in public undermines the community's sense of safety and security. Carrying a concealed, loaded handgun in a public place in Canada is antithetical to the Canadian concept of a free and ordered society ...
43Since Nur, the sentencing decisions in this province have recognized a range of sentences for s. 95(1) offences. These decisions collectively provide a useful summary of the minimum and maximum sentences imposed in the past, and thereby help structure a sentencing judge's exercise of their discretion because they reflect the application of the objectives and principles of sentencing when it comes to this particular offence: see Lacasse, at para. 57.
44In Morris, the Court of Appeal recognized that “penitentiary terms will be required” for most offences under s. 95(1): at para. 151. At the same time, it expressly acknowledged that “where there are strong mitigating factors, sentences at or near the maximum reformatory sentence (two years, less a day), may be imposed”: at para. 151.
Consistent with that guidance, courts in this province have routinely imposed upper reformatory sentences for s. 95(1) offences involving first offenders, particularly youthful offenders who were not otherwise engaged in criminal activity.1
45The Court of Appeal has also recognized that, in appropriate cases, a conditional sentence may be a fit disposition for an offence under s. 95(1). As the Court explained in Morris, a “carefully fashioned conditional sentence that is responsive both to the needs of denunciation and deterrence and to the rehabilitative potential of the offender” can, in some circumstances, meet the objectives of sentencing for such offences: at para. 126; see also paras. 124-128, 180-81; see also R. v. Desmond-Robinson, 2022 ONCA 369, at paras. 12-14. Consistent with that guidance, courts have frequently imposed conditional sentences for s. 95(1) offences, particularly in cases involving first offenders, where the circumstances substantially mitigated their moral culpability, and/or where meaningful rehabilitative progress had already been made and would likely be undermined by incarceration.2
46In contrast, offenders with prior criminal records, even those who are youthful, tend to receive sentences of three years of imprisonment.3
47In cases where an offender’s firearm possession was associated with other criminal activity, like drug trafficking, courts have imposed sentences ranging between two and four years of imprisonment, with sentences at the lower end of that range typically resulting from an application of the totality principle.4
48Not surprisingly, the sentences for section 95 recidivists who also breached firearms prohibition orders are much longer, ranging between four and nine years of imprisonment: see R. v. Morris, 2023 ONCA 816, at para. 87 (citing the relevant cases).
49Lastly, it is worth noting that sentencing ranges are "guidelines rather than hard and fast rules": Nasogaluak, at para. 44. A sentencing judge may determine that a sentence below or above the established range is necessary, given that the "determination of a just and appropriate sentence is a highly individualized exercise that goes beyond a purely mathematical calculation": Lacasse, at para. 58; see also Nasogaluak, at para. 44.
Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
50In determining the appropriate sentence, a sentencing judge must consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender: see Criminal Code, s. 718.2(a). A proper inventory of these is essential to evaluating the gravity of the offence and the offender's degree of responsibility for its commission. They serve to "push the sentence up or down the scale of appropriate sentences for similar offences": Nasogaluak, at para. 43.
51In this case, there are two aggravating factors. First, although Mr. Nagra pleaded guilty only to an offence under s. 95(1), for unlawfully possessing a loaded prohibited firearm, he also admitted to being in possession of two grams of cocaine, a separate offence. That further offence merits consideration as an aggravating factor when evaluating the moral blameworthiness of Mr. Nagra’s conduct: see Criminal Code, s. 725(1)(c); R. v. Larche, 2006 SCC 56, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 762, at para. 28; R. v. Hoang, 2024 ONCA 361, 172 O.R. (3d) 97, at para. 65.
52Second, it is also undoubtedly aggravating that Mr. Nagra possessed the loaded firearm in a public place and that he was carrying it on his person when arrested. That exponentially increased the danger posed to anyone Mr. Nagra happened to encounter, including the police officer who arrested him.
53Before turning to the mitigating factors, it is necessary to address a further aggravating factor that the Crown urged the court to find: that Mr. Nagra possessed the firearm for the purpose of committing a crime. There is no direct or circumstantial evidence to support such a finding. The Crown’s submission invites the court to infer criminal purpose from possession alone, an inference that assumes the very fact to be proven. Aggravating factors cannot be established by speculation or circular reasoning. They must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt through evidence: see Criminal Code, s. 724(3)(e).
54Turning from the aggravating factors to the mitigating, there are several significant mitigating factors present in this case, and together they suggest that Mr. Nagra’s prospects for rehabilitation are rather positive.
55First, there is Mr. Nagra’s youth. He was just 18 at the time of his offence. In sentencing, youth is a mitigating factor: see R. v. Hills, 2023 SCC 2, 422 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at para. 161. That is because, unlike older adults"young adults are more impulsive, emotionally volatile, and susceptible to negative influences and bad judgment" which "can make them less blameworthy than more mature adults": Habib, at para. 35.
56Second, Mr. Nagra did not have a criminal record at the time of his offence. The absence of a prior criminal record is also a mitigating factor in sentencing because it speaks to an offender’s potential for rehabilitation: see R. v. Dobis (2002), 58 O.R. (3d) 536 (C.A.), at para. 28.
57Third, Mr. Nagra entered a guilty plea relatively early after his first appearance in Superior Court; he never scheduled trial dates. His guilty plea spared the expenditure of scarce prosecutorial and judicial resources, a significant mitigating factor, especially in a jurisdiction as busy and overburdened as Brampton.
58Fourth, Mr. Nagra is remorseful for his crime. He expressed that remorse to the author of the pre-sentence report and to the court at the end of the sentencing hearing. I accept that he is genuine in doing so. That reflects rather positively on his potential for rehabilitation: see R. v. Reeve, 2020 ONCA 381, 151 O.R. (3d) 65, at para. 11.
59Fifth, despite some challenges during his upbringing, with the exception of the offence for which the court is sentencing him, Mr. Nagra has otherwise led a prosocial life. He graduated from high school with honours, has a positive employment record and has volunteered at his temple.
60Finally, the conditions Mr. Nagra endured during his 480 days at MCC warrant mitigation from the sentence that would otherwise be imposed: see R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754, at paras. 6-7. Mr. Nagra’s affidavit details the adverse impact of those conditions—including prolonged lockdowns, triple-bunking, unhygienic living conditions, and limited access to programming—on both his physical and mental health. I accept his evidence without reservation. The conditions at MCC have become sufficiently well-documented that courts in this jurisdiction have been prepared to take judicial notice of them: see, for example, R. v. D.F., 2024 ONSC 4621, at para. 69(d).
The Appropriate Sentence
61In determining the appropriate sentence, the court must consider the circumstances of the offence and the offender, the purpose, objectives, and principles of sentencing—particularly as they apply to offences under s. 95(1)—the applicable sentencing range and precedents, and the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors. The sentence must give primacy to denunciation and deterrence, while remaining attentive to rehabilitation in light of Mr. Nagra’s status as a youthful first-time offender. Ultimately, the court’s task is to balance all these considerations to arrive at a proportionate sentence.
62In seeking a sentence of 40 months’ imprisonment, the Crown placed substantial reliance on the circumstances of the offence and the offender in Nur. While there are points of similarity between Mr. Nur’s circumstances and those of Mr. Nagra, and while the offences themselves are roughly comparable, I am unable to accept the Crown’s submission for two principal reasons.
63First, neither the Supreme Court of Canada nor the Court of Appeal in Nur purported to establish a sentencing range, and a single decision cannot, standing alone, do so. Second, although the Court of Appeal declared the mandatory minimum sentence unconstitutional—a conclusion later affirmed by the Supreme Court—it observed that Mr. Nur, “despite the mitigating factors, could well have received a sentence of three years”: Nur, at para. 206 (C.A.). In declining to wade further into the appropriateness of the sentence, the Court noted that the trial judge had effectively imposed a sentence of time served, leaving “no reason to alter that disposition”: at para. 208. In these circumstances, the sentence imposed by the trial judge in Nur cannot reasonably be treated as establishing the benchmark urged by the Crown.
64Of far greater relevance are the Court of Appeal’s pronouncements in the years since Nur concerning sentencing for s. 95(1) offences, and the sentencing range that has emerged in the cases decided over the intervening years. Given that Mr. Nagra is a youthful first offender whose offence was not connected to any other criminal activity, the sentence he proposes falls squarely within the range repeatedly endorsed by courts in this province for similarly situated offenders. With respect, acceding to the Crown’s submission would offend the principle of parity and result in a sentence that is disproportionate to both the gravity of the offence and Mr. Nagra’s degree of responsibility in its commission.
65In all the circumstances, I agree with Mr. Nagra that a fit sentence is two years less a day of imprisonment. That is a substantial sentence. It adequately addresses the objectives of denunciation and deterrence, while giving appropriate weight to Mr. Nagra’s rehabilitative prospects, which remain a significant consideration given his youth and lack of prior criminal record. The circumstances do not warrant a penitentiary sentence, which would carry a real risk of undermining rehabilitation by placing Mr. Nagra in an environment dominated by more mature and hardened offenders. A sentence of two years less a day is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and to Mr. Nagra’s degree of responsibility for its commission.
66Mr. Nagra has spent 480 days in pre-sentence custody. At a minimum, he is entitled to credit at the statutorily prescribed rate of 1.5 days for each day served: see Criminal Code, ss. 719(3), 719(3.1); R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575. This results in credit equivalent to 720 days—just nine days short of two years less a day. When account is taken of the enhanced credit warranted by the particularly harsh conditions Mr. Nagra endured at MCC, it is clear that he has now more than served what amounts to the appropriate custodial sentence.
Conclusion
67A sentence of two years less a day of imprisonment shall be noted. After credit is given for the time Mr. Nagra spent in pre-sentence custody (480 days, credited as 720 days), the court will suspend the passing of sentence and place Mr. Nagra on probation for a period of one year. The purpose of the probation order is to facilitate Mr. Nagra’s rehabilitation following his release from custody.
68In addition to the statutory conditions, the probation order shall require Mr. Nagra to report to probation services within two business days of his release from custody, and thereafter as directed by his probation officer; to reside at an address approved by his probation officer; to attend counselling as recommended by his probation officer; to either attend school or a vocational training program on a full-time basis, or to seek and maintain full-time employment; and to cooperate with his probation officer, including by signing any required releases, to permit the monitoring of his compliance with the terms of the probation order.
69The following ancillary orders shall also issue:
a DNA order;
a weapons prohibition order under s. 109 (ten years and life, under subsections 2(a) and 2(b) respectively);
a forfeiture order in respect of the firearm, magazines, ammunition, throwing knife, and cocaine; and
a victim surcharge in the amount of $200, with one year to pay.
Stribopoulos J.
Released: January 5, 2026
CITATION: R v. Nagra, 2026 ONSC 29
COURT FILE NO.: CRIM J(P) 576/23
DATE: 20260105
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
- and -
NAVDEEP NAGRA
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
Stribopoulos J.
Released: January 5, 2026
Footnotes
- See R. v. Smickle, 2013 ONCA 678, 304 C.C.C. (3d) 371, at para. 30 (two years less a day); R. v. Downey, 2017 ONCA 789 (same); R. v. Hassan, 2023 ONSC 5040 (same); R. v. Fagan, 2024 ONSC 2718 (same); R. v. Shomonov, 2016 ONSC 4015 (21 months); R. v. Boussoulas, 2015 ONSC 1536, aff'd 2018 ONCA 222, 407 C.R.R. (2d) 44 (same); R. v. Filian-Jiminez, 2014 ONCA 601 (18 months); R. v. Marsan, 2020 ONCJ 638, 69 C.R. (7th) 431 (same).
- See R. v. Desmond-Robinson, 2022 ONCA 369 (conditional sentence of two years less a day); R. v. Moses, 2022 ONSC 332 (same); R. v. Stewart, 2022 ONSC 6997 (same); R. v. Beharry, 2022 ONSC 4370 (same); R. v. Ramos, 2023 ONSC 1094 (same); R. v. Marier, 2023 ONSC 5194 (same); R. v. Stewart, 2024 ONSC 281 (same); R. v. Hussey-Rodrigues, 2024 ONSC 2671 (same); R. v. Papilota, 2024 ONSC 4065 (same); R. v Izaz, 2024 ONSC 6460 (same); R. v. Iqbal, 2025 ONSC 3222 (same); R. v. Alexander, 2025 ONSC 961 (same); R. v. Francis, 2025 ONCJ 21 (same); R. v. Roy, [2023] O.J. No. 4931 (S.C.J.) (same); R. v. Fernandes, 2025 ONSC 4412 (18 conditional sentence).
- See see R. v. J.B., 2016 ONSC 939 (three years); R. v. Jama, 2018 ONSC 1252 (same); R. v. Johnson, 2022 ONSC 2688 (same); R. v. Dansoko, 2024 ONSC 3350 (same); R. v. Vijayakumaran, 2025 ONSC 886 (same); R. v. Johnson, 2025 ONCJ 83 (same).
- See R. v. Griffith, 2019 ONSC 358 (four years); R. v. Wood, 2025 ONCJ 20 (same); R. v. Mansingh, 2017 ONCA 68 (43 months); R. v. Marshall, 2015 ONCA 692 (42 months); R. v. Barreira, 2024 ONSC 4682, aff'd 2025 ONCA 107 (same); R. v. Wong, 2012 ONCA 767, at paras. 9-15 (three years); R. v. Duffy, 2024 ONSC 1652 (same); R. v. Rush, 2025 ONSC 5024 (same); R. v. Swaby, 2024 ONSC 6141 (three years); R. v. Nguyen, 2024 ONSC 6830 (same); R. v. Croft, 2025 ONSC 4113 (same); R. v. Swaby, 2024 ONSC 6141 (same); R. v. Warrington-Johnson, 2025 ONCJ 61 (32 months); R. v. Prosser, 2014 ONSC 6466 (30 months); R. v. Thompson, 2025 ONSC 2768 (same); R. v. Marfo, 2020 ONSC 5663 (two years).