Reasons for Sentence

Court File No.: CR-23-3-721
Date: 2025-02-18
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:
His Majesty the King
-and-
Sajeeth Vijayakumaran

Beverley Olesko, for the Crown
Allan Lobel, for the accused

Heard: January 20, 2025

Kenneth L. Campbell:

A. Overview

[1] On September 9, 2024, after the conclusion of a short judge-alone trial, the accused, Sajeeth Vijayakumaran, was found guilty of three criminal offences, namely: (1) the unlawful possession of a restricted firearm, namely a handgun, together with readily accessible ammunition, without being the holder of the requisite authorization, license, or registration certificate, contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code; (2) the unlawful possession of a restricted handgun, while knowingly not the holder of the requisite license or registration certificate, contrary to s. 92(1) of the Criminal Code; and (3) the unlawful possession of a prohibited magazine, while knowingly not the holder of the requisite license, contrary to s. 92(2) of the Criminal Code. These offences were committed by the accused in Toronto on or about July 2, 2021. I found the accused not guilty in relation to three other alleged offences of “threatening.” See: R. v. Vijayakumaran, 2024 ONSC 4396.

[2] Essentially, following a heated verbal dispute between the accused and his then girlfriend, Kirushika Anandaraja, she contacted the police and told them that the accused possessed a handgun, that he kept inside a lockbox that looked like a “book.” She explained that she had seen the accused with the gun at least twice in the recent past. When the police executed a search warrant at the home of the accused the following day, where he lived with his family, they found and seized the handgun, magazine and ammunition, as well as the lockbox that looked like a “book.”

[3] The accused now appears for sentencing in relation to his firearms offences. This date was selected, in part, to permit the accused to have some wisdom teeth surgically removed, in Montreal, on February 12, 2025. I understand that this dental surgery had been scheduled for some time, and something the accused medically needed, so we have all tried to accommodate his request in this regard.

[4] At the sentencing hearing in this case, the Crown sought the imposition of a three-year term of penitentiary imprisonment on the accused. Defence counsel contended that the accused should receive a conditional sentence of two years less a day. The parties, essentially, agreed that there were a number of ancillary sentencing orders that should be imposed in this case.

B. The Facts of the Offences

[5] Ms. Kirushika Anandaraja testified that she dated the accused, romantically, for approximately two years, starting sometime in 2019. She knew the other members of the accused’s family (i.e. his brother and his parents), and had been to their home many times.

[6] Ms. Anandaraja testified that she had seen the accused with a dark grey or black handgun on at least two occasions, probably a couple of weeks before she called the police. This happened once when they were alone together in his bedroom, and once when they were alone together in his car. The accused just held the firearm – she never touched it – and he kept it in a locked box that looked like a “book.” She explained that the accused “moved it around” in their house, but kept it in the metal box that was locked with a “code.” The complainant recognized the photographs of the lockbox, when those photographs were taken by the police when the lockbox was found in the recycling bin. Ms. Anandaraja testified that she never saw anyone else with that handgun.

[7] Ms. Anandaraja testified that the “incident” that led to her call to the police took place on “Canada Day” in 2021. According to the complainant, she and the accused became engaged in an argument that day, during which the accused threatened her, and indicated that he was also going to shoot members of her family, including her grandmother and her brother. The complainant testified that, at the time the accused was making these threats to her and her family, she was very concerned about these threats as she knew that the accused had a gun. Indeed, she had seen him in possession of a handgun relatively recently. In the result, later that day, she contacted the police and told them about the gun and the unique lockbox.

[8] The police attended at the Toronto premises occupied by the accused, his brother, and their two parents on July 2, 2021, with a search warrant. During the course of their execution of the search warrant, the police located and seized a handgun, a magazine with some ammunition for the handgun, and a lockbox that looked like a “book.” More particularly, the police discovered and seized the following:

(1) a SAR B6P 9 millimeter, semi-automatic handgun and a detachable box magazine cartridge, capable of holding some 15 rounds of 9 millimeter ammunition, but which, in fact, contained just two cartridges of 9 millimeter, centre-fire, ammunition. The police found these items next to each other in a clear, rubber basket covered with clothes, in the closet attached to the primary bedroom of the residence, which was obviously occupied by the accused’s parents; and

(2) an empty metal box, locked with a three-digit combination lock, but which appeared to be a “book” entitled “New English Dictionary.” The police found this item, by itself, in a blue recycling bin, outside, just a few steps from the side door of the residence. When the police forced open the lock box it was empty, but it appeared to be large enough to contain the handgun that the police found in the closet of the primary bedroom.

[9] The police were not able to learn, specifically, how these various seized items came to be in the location in which they were found.

[10] While I was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt in relation to the alleged “threatening” offences, I was entirely satisfied, beyond any reasonable doubt, that the accused unlawfully possessed the firearm, the over-capacity magazine, and the ammunition found by the police. More particularly, I concluded that the evidence showed, overwhelmingly, that after some type of verbal dispute between the accused and Ms. Anandaraja, she contacted the police and told them about the accused’s possession of the firearm in the lockbox that looked like a “book” that she had seen recently. In my view, Ms. Anandaraja simply could not have known about the accused’s handgun and the unique lockbox unless she saw them (as she fully and candidly explained in her testimony).

[11] I was also satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that, on the late afternoon of July 1, 2021, the accused and the complainant exchanged words, and following their heated argument, the accused became concerned that the complainant, who he knew had seen him with the handgun and the unique lockbox, became concerned that she might tell the police about them (as she did). Accordingly, the accused personally put his handgun, its magazine and its ammunition, in a large plastic container, and hidden under some clothes, in his parent’s bedroom closet, and he put the unique lockbox in the recycling bin just outside their house – where all of these items were found by the police. I was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did this to try to distance himself (and thereby insulate himself) from these incriminating items in the event that the complainant contacted the police.

[12] I also concluded that the accused still had “constructive possession” of these contraband items, according to s. 4(3)(ii) of the Criminal Code, as he knowingly had them in a place (i.e. the closet of his parent’s bedroom, where he had stored them), for the use or benefit of himself. Having hidden them there, the accused knew exactly what they were, he knew their precise location, and he had full control over them. In other words, the accused knew the character of these things, knowingly put them in this particular location, and intended to have those things in that place for his own use and/or benefit. See: R. v. Beaver; R. v. Kocsis, paras. 14-24; R. v. Pham, para. 15; affirmed: 2006 SCC 26; R. v. Chalk, 2007 ONCA 815, paras. 17-19; R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8, paras. 16-17; R. v. Tyrell, 2014 ONCA 617; R. v. Montague-Mitchell, 2018 SKCA 78; R. v. Lights, 2020 ONCA 128, paras. 44-53.

[13] As I have mentioned, I have also concluded that the accused, after his heated verbal argument with the complainant, not only tried to hide his handgun, magazine and ammunition in his parent’s bedroom closet, but he also tried to distance himself from the unique lockbox that looked like a “book,” by putting it in the recycling bin just outside their house.

[14] I rejected the entirely speculative, conjectural possibility (without any supporting evidence), that, coincidentally, someone else (i.e. perhaps the accused’s parents, or his brother) may have put the accused’s handgun, magazine and ammunition in the parent’s bedroom closet, under the clothes, and put the unique lockbox in the recycling bin (by itself) sometime on July 1-2, 2021, coincidentally right after the heated verbal argument between the accused and the complainant had ended. See: R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, paras. 18-22, 28, 30, 32-34, 35-42, 50.

C. The Circumstances of the Accused

1. Introduction

[15] I ordered the preparation of a Pre-Sentence Report in this case, and one was helpfully prepared. It outlined many of the personal circumstances of the accused. While defence counsel talked about the possible eventual preparation of a Morris Report and has suggested that the sentencing of the accused should be postponed for the year or so it would likely take to obtain such an additional Report, I refused to wait for such a lengthy period of time for the preparation of such an additional Report. In my view, the Pre-Sentence Report and the submissions of counsel were sufficient to provide me with all of the relevant personal circumstances of the accused, so that they could be properly and fully considered in connection with the sentencing of the accused.

2. The Pre-Sentence Report (As Edited)

[16] The first exhibit filed on the sentencing hearing was the Pre-Sentence Report that had been prepared in this case. That document was, however, slightly edited by defence counsel, with the consent of the Crown, in a number of respects. However, this edited Pre-Sentence Report still provided the court with considerable information concerning the personal circumstances of the accused, including all of the following.

[17] The accused is now just over 29 years of age. He is a Canadian citizen. His parents are originally from Sri Lanka, but they immigrated to Canada more than 40 years ago. The accused was born in Scarborough, Ontario. He has a younger brother. While he is not especially close to his parents or his brother, the accused claims that he has a good relationship with each of them, despite the serious financial challenges his family faced while he was growing up. I must note, however, that while the author of the Pre-Sentence Report “reached out” to the accused’s mother and brother, both of them “declined to participate, citing the emotional toll the case has already taken on them.”

[18] The accused claimed that their family’s problematic financial situation caused him to become angry and get into “fights” in his youth.

[19] The accused now lives in Montreal, where he resides with his paternal cousin and his family. The accused moved there in 2021, after he was “granted bail” in the present case.

[20] The accused is single, but he has a long-term relationship with his current girlfriend, a nurse who lives and works in Montreal, who he first met in 2021. He has no dependents. They both describe their romantic relationship as “very good” and they are planning a future together.

[21] The accused has a criminal record. First, on March 14, 2019, he was convicted, in Toronto, of driving with more than 80 mgs. of alcohol in his blood, and he was sentenced to a $1,300 fine and prohibited from driving for one year. Second, on September 15, 2022, the accused was convicted, in Newmarket, of impaired operation of a conveyance (by drugs or alcohol, or a combination of both) and given a four-month long conditional sentence, followed by a 23-month term of probation, and prohibited from the operation of a motor vehicle for three years.

[22] The accused claimed that, in his younger years, the police were frequently “harassing the brown guys” (including him), for “no reason,” at a time when “racial profiling” seemed to be “legal.”

[23] The accused agreed, however, that the neighbourhood that he grew up in, in Scarborough, was the “hood,” there was “crime everywhere,” and the people he “grew up with were up to no good.” The accused candidly admitted that, in his younger years, he was personally not doing the “right thing.” He admitted that, “back in the day” (starting when he was in grade 10), he would “smoke weed” and “drink,” get “high” and “do stupid things.” He thought it was “a gateway to temporary happiness.”

[24] The accused emphasized how much he has changed since those former days, and he claims to have learned many “lessons.” More specifically, he claims to have learned that “clearly alcohol is a problem” for him. Now he enjoys “pro-social” activities, such as “playing basketball, rugby, volleyball and track.” The accused completed a Martial Arts program in 2011, and holds several certifications, including Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (2017), Improvement in Respect, Self-Control and Self-Discipline (2011) and Conflict Resolution Development (2008). The accused was also an Assistant Coach at a senior public school for a number of months in 2011, and he volunteered as an Election Enthusiast for three months in 2011.

[25] The accused attended high school in north-eastern Toronto. While he admitted that he had “faced some suspensions” there for “fighting and smoking weed,” he claimed to have obtained “decent grades” and had “pretty good” relationships with his teachers. Further, the accused received a Diploma in “Protection, Security and Investigation” from Durham College in 2017.

[26] In terms of his employment history, the accused claims to have had a series of jobs, starting with a retail company in 2012, then working with a car rental company, then working as a cashier at a supermarket, then as a customer service representative and manager at a fitness club. Currently, the accused is employed as a warehouse assistant with his cousin’s trucking company. The accused says that he has never been on welfare and works consistently to support himself financially.

[27] Currently, the accused also volunteers at a Y.M.C.A. in Montreal for a “couple of hours each week” to assist with activities like basketball. The accused also volunteered at “Evolu Jeunes,” for some 50 hours of “community service” in 2024, helping them with the preparation and facilitation of various “sports activities.”

[28] According to the author of the Pre-Sentence Report, the accused presented as “cooperative, respectful and engaged,” answering “most” of her questions in an “open and forthcoming” manner. However, the accused has expressed no remorse whatsoever for his possession of the firearm, over-capacity magazine and ammunition. Indeed, any passages in the Pre-Sentence Report which suggested any remorse on his part were edited out, at the insistence of his lawyer. Further, when I inquired, through his lawyer, as to why the accused had this firearm, magazine and ammunition, he simply refused to answer, as was his right.

[29] Of course, this complete absence of remorse by the accused cannot be viewed as any type of aggravating factor on the issue of sentence, but rather may only be properly viewed as the absence of a potential mitigating factor. That is how I have viewed it. See: R. v. Kozy, pp. 505-506; R. v. Anderson, pp. 535-536; R. v. Valentini, paras. 80-85; R. v. L (C.), 2013 ONSC 277, paras. 80-81; R. v. Reeve, 2020 ONCA 381, paras. 9-22; R. v. F.A., 2022 ONSC 5696, para. 48; R. v. Kovacs, 2024 ONSC 1586, para. 27; affirmed 2025 ONCA 49.

3. The Character Letters in Support of the Accused

[30] Defence counsel filed a series of letters, written by the family and friends of the accused, outlining the various traits of his positive character. These letters, collectively viewed, describe the accused as a kind, caring, thoughtful, supportive, selfless, nurturing, and considerate individual, who is eager to take care of others, including his family. Indeed, the accused has been described as a “loving family man.” His current girlfriend says that the accused has “strong moral values.” These letters suggest that the accused is, at his core, a “good human being” who “deserves another chance” and who should be shown “compassion” and “leniency” in sentencing, so that he will be able to continue on a “positive path” and “continue making positive contributions to society.”

[31] More than half of these supporting character letters suggest, in one way or another, that it is “quite evident” that [the accused] “expresses” and “feels deep remorse” for his actions and “regrets” the decisions that have led him to where he is today. In response to these comments, I say simply – not to me. Indeed, he has not expressed one word of remorse or regret to me, notwithstanding the fact that he has had many clear opportunities to do just that if he was so inclined. Accordingly, I reject these specific suggestions that the accused is remorseful for his actions – I find that he is not. Nonetheless, as I have already expressly indicated, this absence of remorse by the accused must not be perceived as an aggravating factor on the issue of sentence, but rather may only be properly seen as the absence of a mitigating factor.

D. The Governing General Sentencing Principles

[32] According to s. 718 of the Criminal Code, the “fundamental purpose” of sentencing is to contribute to “respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society” by imposing “just sanctions” that have one or more of the following objectives, namely: (a) to denounce unlawful conduct; (b) to deter the offender and others from committing offences; (c) to separate offenders from society where necessary; (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or the community; and (f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and the community.

[33] According to s. 718.1 of the Code, the “fundamental principle” of sentencing is that a sentence “must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.”

[34] Section 718.2 of the Code also dictates that, in imposing sentence, the court must also take into account a number of principles including the following:

• A sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender;
• A sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances;
• Where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh;
• An offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and,
• All available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.

E. The Present Case

[35] In all of the circumstances of this case, in my view the firearms offences committed by the accused now require the imposition of a global three-year penitentiary term of imprisonment.

[36] The former statutory three-year mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment for offences contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code was, of course, held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada. See: R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15; R. v. Charles, 2015 SCC 15.

[37] I reach my sentencing conclusion regarding the firearms offences committed by the accused only because I consider a global three-year prison term to be a fit and appropriate sentence in all of the individual circumstances of this case, and because it is supported by the applicable judicial authorities. See, for example: R. v. Harutyunyan, 2012 ONSC 58, paras. 4, 9-20; affirmed 2012 ONCA 637; R. v. Peterkin, 2013 ONSC 2116, paras. 7, 10, 21-26; affirmed 2015 ONCA 8; R. v. Scarlett, 2013 ONSC 562, paras. 3, 7, 13-14, 49-50; R. v. Brown, 2014 ONSC 4217, paras. 19-27; R. v. Mansingh, 2016 ONSC 94, paras. 40-45, 47; R. v. McKenzie, 2016 ONSC 5025, paras. 20-26; R. v. Mahamet-Zene, 2018 ONSC 1050, paras. 15-24; R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, paras. 67-81, 96-101, 149-153, 177-180.

[38] Courts have repeatedly observed that the criminal possession of handguns remains an all too prevalent threat to the people of Toronto, and to others living in the Greater Toronto Area. Such firearms are frequently employed in connection with other kinds of serious criminal activity, such as drug-trafficking, and their possession and use, on occasion, tragically results in serious bodily harm or death. The unlawful possession of firearms remains a menace to society. Indeed, it has been judicially described as a “cancer in Toronto” and a “plague” and a “blight on the city and its residents.” See: R. v. Thavakularatnam, 2018 ONSC 2380, paras. 21-26; R. v. Mohiadin, 2020 ONSC 47, paras. 30-31, 41-42.

[39] To properly confront and combat this serious social problem, these offences must be met with exemplary custodial sentences that proportionally reflect the sheer gravity of the crimes, and which appropriately stress the need to denounce and deter such crimes. In the absence of such sentences, these offences and their potentially disastrous consequences will only continue. The law-abiding public simply must be adequately protected. This can only be accomplished by the imposition of sentences that ensure that potential offenders know that their illegal possession of handguns, over-capacity magazines and ammunition, will almost invariably be accompanied by serious penal consequences. See: R. v. Danvers, paras. 77-78; R. v. Brown, 2010 ONCA 745, para. 14; R. v. Morris, 2011 ONSC 5206, paras. 10, 58; affirmed 2013 ONCA 223; R. v. Chambers, 2012 ONSC 817, paras. 15-17; affirmed 2013 ONCA 680; R. v. Mark, 2018 ONSC 447, para. 24; R. v. St. Clair, 2018 ONSC 7028, paras. 47-50; R. v. McNichols, 2020 ONSC 6499, paras. 37-41.

[40] I note in passing the obvious reality that the firearms offences in the present case were no mere “regulatory” matters, where an otherwise responsible and law-abiding gun owner inadvertently failed to obtain a proper license or registration, or possessed a firearm in a location not within the geographic scope of his or her permit. Rather, the accused was clearly engaged in true criminal activity. He somehow obtained a handgun, an over-capacity magazine, and bullets. He clearly knew it was dangerous to have these items in his possession and that it was a crime for him to have this contraband. Otherwise, he would not have kept these dangerous items in his unique lockbox that looked like a book – and immediately tried to distance himself from them when he feared that the police might arrive at his home to investigate. His unlawful possession of this firearm, its over-capacity magazine and ammunition, were very serious criminal offences, which created a significant public safety risk, and which merit the imposition of at least a three-year term of imprisonment. See: R. v. Nur, 2011 ONSC 4874, paras. 41-45, 49-52, 70, 145-149; affirmed 2013 ONCA 677; affirmed 2015 SCC 15; R. v. Smickle, 2014 ONCA 49, para. 19.

[41] Accordingly, the proper application of the applicable principles of sentencing, in all of the circumstances of this case, must result in at least a three-year global penitentiary term of imprisonment for the accused in relation to these firearms offences. As McLachlin C.J.C. stated, in delivering the judgment of the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Nur, at para. 82:

Section 95(1) casts its net over a wide range of potential conduct. Most cases within the range may well merit a sentence of three years or more, but conduct at the far end of the range may not. At one end of the range, as Doherty J.A. observed, “stands the outlaw who carries a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm in public places as a tool of his or her criminal trade . . . . [T]his person is engaged in truly criminal conduct and poses a real and immediate danger to the public”: para. 51. At this end of the range — indeed for the vast majority of offences — a three-year sentence may be appropriate. [emphasis added]

[42] I must reject the submission of defence counsel that the accused should receive a conditional sentence, under s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code. As I have already indicated, in my view, the sheer gravity of these firearm offences, and the important governing sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence, require the imposition of a three-year global term of penitentiary imprisonment. The duration of that sentence renders the accused legally ineligible for a conditional sentence. However, I must say that I would not have imposed a “conditional sentence” on this accused, even if I had concluded that he was otherwise eligible for such a sentence. The accused has a relatively recent criminal record (i.e., convictions in 2019 and 2022), he has already had the recent benefit of a conditional sentence (i.e., in 2022), and yet he committed the present firearms offences in the home where he lived with his family. In the result, I would not sentence him to a period of theoretical “imprisonment” in his own residence (where he committed these very offences) – for any period of time (whether that home now be in Toronto, Montreal, or somewhere else).

[43] The rehabilitation of the accused remains, of course, a key consideration in the sentencing process. The accused must realize, as part of that rehabilitation, that he simply cannot continue to commit criminal offences – otherwise he will be sentenced to increasingly lengthy periods of imprisonment. He must also realize that he, most certainly, must not commit further firearms offences. The accused would not tell me why he possessed a handgun, an over-capacity magazine and ammunition for that firearm. But, I will clearly tell him, right now, that if he continues to commit firearm offences in the future, he will inevitably be sentenced to a longer term of penitentiary imprisonment. Of course, the accused can engage in various educational and social programs while he is imprisoned, and can work on his rehabilitation there – while the community is being properly protected from the commission of such inherently dangerous offences.

F. Credit to the Accused for his Pre-Sentence Detention

[44] The three-year global term of penitentiary imprisonment that should now be imposed upon the accused, must be slightly reduced in order to fairly provide the accused with the credit he deserves for his brief period of pre-sentence detention.

[45] More particularly, I understand that, following his arrest for these offences, the accused was in custody between July 2 and 9, 2021. Giving the accused the appropriate enhanced statutory credit of 1.5 days imprisonment for each day of pre-sentence custody, as required by s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, means that the accused must be credited with having already served a sentence approaching two weeks. See R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, paras. 7, 34, 68-80; affirming 2013 ONCA 147. Accordingly, the sentence now imposed upon the accused must be reduced by approximately two weeks.

G. Ancillary Sentencing Orders

[46] In addition, in my view, as counsel have jointly suggested, all of the following ancillary sentencing orders are appropriate in the circumstances of this case.

[47] First, pursuant to ss. 109(1)(b) and 109(2) of the Criminal Code, I order that the accused be prohibited: (1) from the possession of any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device, and prohibited ammunition for life: and (2) from the possession of any firearm (other than a restricted or prohibited firearm), cross-bow, restricted weapon, ammunition, and explosive substance for a period of ten years after the date the accused is released from the term of imprisonment for these offences.

[48] Second, as the accused has been found guilty of at least one “secondary designated offence,” pursuant to s. 487.051(3) of the Criminal Code, I order the taking of bodily substances from the accused for forensic DNA analysis. In this regard, I am satisfied that, having regard to all of the circumstances of this case, including the gravity of the offences committed by the accused, his criminal record, and the minimal impact the order will have on the privacy and security interests of the accused, that the order should be made. Such an order is, in my view, in the best interests of the administration of justice.

[49] Third, pursuant to s. 490.1(1) of the Criminal Code, I order that the “offence-related property” in this case, namely, the firearm, the over-capacity magazine, and the ammunition that has been seized and detained in this case, be forfeited to His Majesty in right of Ontario and thereafter disposed of as directed by the Attorney General.

H. Conclusion

[50] In summary, the accused is now sentenced to concurrent terms of penitentiary imprisonment of three-years, less two-weeks, in duration in relation to each of the three “possession” offences of which the accused has been convicted, namely: (1) the unlawful possession of a restricted firearm, namely a handgun, together with readily accessible ammunition, contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code; (2) the unlawful possession of a restricted handgun, while knowingly not being the holder of the requisite license or registration certificate, contrary to s. 92(1) of the Criminal Code; and (3) the unlawful possession of a prohibited magazine, while knowingly not the holder of the requisite license, contrary to s. 92(2) of the Criminal Code.

[51] When added to his credit for his pre-sentence custody, this effectively results in the imposition of a total global penitentiary sentence of three years imprisonment. The accused is, of course, also subject to all of the aforementioned ancillary sentencing orders.

Kenneth L. Campbell
Released: February 18, 2025