Court File and Appearances

Court File No. CR-23-00000157
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
His Majesty the King v. Daniel Thompson

Before: James Stribopoulos
Date: April 29, 2025
Location: Brampton, Ontario

Appearances:
E. Perchenok and R. Ward, Counsel for the Federal Crown
V. Palermo, Counsel for Daniel Thompson

Table of Contents

• Witnesses
• Exhibits
• Reasons for Sentence

Introduction

Following an unsuccessful Charter application, Mr. Thompson pleaded guilty to three charges: trafficking in cocaine, possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possessing a loaded restricted firearm.

The Circumstances of the Offences

In February 2022, members of the Toronto Police Service's Drug Squad responded to an ad on Leo’s List, which read"Snow party favours all night long."

Mr. Thompson had posted the advertisement and responded to texts sent to him by an undercover police officer inquiring about purchasing cocaine.

On three separate dates, Mr. Thompson met with the undercover officer in Brampton and sold him cocaine:

• February 9, 2022: 2.1 grams of cocaine for $300
• February 21, 2022: 5.81 grams of cocaine for $550
• March 5, 2022: 2.53 grams of cocaine for $300

The police arrested Mr. Thompson after the final sale.

The police then secured a warrant to search Mr. Thompson's residence. Upon execution of the warrant, inside his bedroom, the police located and seized:

1. 124.76 grams of cocaine
2. 27.1 grams of MDMA
3. 122.89 grams of phenacetin, a commonly used agent for cutting drugs
4. $700 in cash
5. A Glock 27, .40 calibre, semi-automatic handgun, a "restricted firearm" with eight rounds in the magazine and one in the chamber
6. A detachable box cartridge magazine loaded with 14 rounds of .40 calibre ammunition
7. 63 rounds of ammunition of various calibres, including .40 calibre ammunition
8. Three functioning digital scales

In pleading guilty to the firearm offence, Mr. Thompson admitted he did not have an authorization or licence to possess it at the time.

Circumstances of the Offender

After entering his guilty pleas, Mr. Thompson, who is Black, requested that the court order an Enhanced Pre-Sentence Report (EPSR), which it did. The EPSR provided considerable insight into his background and circumstances.

Mr. Thompson is now 24 years old but was just 21 when he committed his offences. He does not have a criminal record.

Mr. Thompson was born in Mississauga. He has an older maternal brother and three paternal sisters. Although his parents separated when he was young, they remained on good terms and co-parented him effectively throughout his childhood. His parents, while strict, were loving and supportive.

Growing up, Mr. Thompson lived primarily with his mother. She worked multiple jobs to make ends meet, and at least when Mr. Thompson was young, she had to rely on food banks and handouts from the church to ensure that they had enough to eat. During those years, Mr. Thompson's clothes were often purchased from Goodwill. As a result, Mr. Thompson felt that they were "poor" when he was growing up, and by any objective measure, that appears to be a fair assessment of his mother's and his financial circumstances during that period.

Until the age of nine, Mr. Thompson and his mother lived in a well-maintained subsidized housing complex in Mississauga. Most of the residents were Black or otherwise racialized. The police were a constant presence in their community, and Mr. Thompson witnessed his brother's negative interactions with them. He remembered that on one occasion, he was placed in the back of a police cruiser while the police dealt with his older brother. He was crying and distressed by how the police treated his brother.

Growing up, Mr. Thompson developed a passion for sports, especially basketball, which he aspired to play professionally. His parents supported him in pursuing that goal. They each regularly attended his games. However, rather presciently, his father encouraged Mr. Thompson to continue pursuing his education to have options in case basketball did not pan out.

From an early age, Mr. Thompson struggled academically. He started school at his local public school in Mississauga. The students there were mainly racialized. While in Grade 2, he was placed on an Individual Education Plan (IEP) and remained on one until he graduated from high school.

In Grade 5, Mr. Thompson transferred to a private school in Toronto, where his basketball prowess resulted in a waiver of most of the school fees. His basketball coach at the time recommended the school, suggesting that Mr. Thompson's basketball skills would benefit from that school's program. His parents agreed to the move because they believed Mr. Thompson would have greater academic support at the private school.

Unfortunately, Mr. Thompson struggled academically at the private school. The school had few Black students, and he believed most teachers expected them to fail. After Grade 7, Mr. Thompson's poor academic standing required him to leave the private school.

Mr. Thompson returned to public school for Grade 8 and attended a high school in Brampton commencing in Grade 9. Unfortunately, despite his IEP and being in the applied stream of studies, he continued to experience academic difficulties. Although he remained committed to playing basketball, he was sometimes not allowed to do so because of his poor grades or not allowed to attend tournaments because he skipped classes.

By Grade 10, Mr. Thompson was skipping classes regularly to hang out with friends and smoke marijuana. He failed courses as a result. His mother reports a significant shift in his attitude by then, with him not attending school, hanging out with negative peers and drifting away from basketball. Ultimately, by the end of the school year, due to his persistent truancy, Mr. Thompson was suspended and told he was not welcome to return to the school the following academic year.

Things worsened by Grade 11, with Mr. Thompson leaving his mother's home because he was no longer willing to live by her rules. He was somewhat adrift for about a year. During that time, Mr. Thompson lived with a girlfriend's family in Scarborough and kept bad company. However, he ultimately returned to his mother's home by the end of that school year.

In Grade 12, his parents agreed to have him move in with his former basketball coach, with whom he had remained in contact, and attend a Catholic high school in Scarborough. The coach agreed to this arrangement because he thought Mr. Thompson was "a good kid" with potential and wanted to assist him in getting back on track.

Although Mr. Thompson entered Grade 12 with only nine high school credits, during the year he lived with his former basketball coach, he completed a conditional high school diploma that would have enabled him to attend college after waiting a year. Although he played basketball at the new high school, as a newcomer to the basketball scene in Scarborough, he did not get as much play time as he wanted.

Unfortunately, no American college offered Mr. Thompson a basketball scholarship, as he had long hoped. Because basketball was his primary focus, Mr. Thompson never had a part-time job during high school and failed to develop any career aspirations beyond basketball.

To the author of the EPSR, Mr. Thompson explained that when his prospects for pursuing basketball ended, his disappointment led him "to the streets." There, he found peers who "were living the fast life" making money by selling drugs and decided to join them. At the time, Mr. Thompson believed drug dealing would be the easiest way to earn an income and support himself and his mother.

Concerning the firearm, Mr. Thompson explained having it for protection because of the dangers inherent in the drug trade and denied having any intention to harm anyone with it. In that regard, he noted that he had friends who had died because they were the victims of violence.

Mr. Thompson's parents were shocked by his arrest and charges. His mother noted that he had never been in trouble before. Although his father was concerned about Mr. Thompson's friend group, he had no idea he had immersed himself in a criminal lifestyle.

Mr. Thompson reported having negative interactions with the police, beginning with the incident involving his older brother. For example, he described being a passenger in a car with a few white women that police stopped and that he was the first person searched during that interaction.

More recently, while driving to his lawyer's office with his mother, they were stopped by police. The police searched the vehicle, claiming they had smelled marijuana, even though neither he nor his mother had consumed any. A second cruiser arrived at the scene to provide backup. His mother corroborated this account, expressing the view that once police learned Mr. Thompson was facing charges, they used the pretext of detecting the odour of marijuana to search their car. Mr. Thompson found that experience extremely stressful and expressed concern that the police would forever harass him because he is a Black man.

Following his arrest on March 15, 2022, Mr. Thompson was eventually granted bail on strict terms on April 5, 2022. He was required to reside with his father in Ajax and was subject to house arrest with GPS ankle monitoring. In April 2023, a curfew replaced the house arrest and GPS monitoring conditions.

By all accounts, Mr. Thompson has complied with the strict terms of his bail over the last three years. While on bail, he had a summer position with a transportation company from April to September 2023, which was why the Crown agreed to loosen his bail terms in April 2023.

In March 2024, Mr. Thompson enrolled in a full-time online human resources program at Canadian College. He was due to complete that program this month and earn a certificate in Human Resource Management.

To the author of the EPSR, Mr. Thompson expressed his remorse for engaging in criminal activity. He made similar comments when afforded an opportunity to address the court at the end of his sentencing hearing.

The Positions of the Parties

There is no disagreement between the parties regarding the ancillary orders the court should impose as part of Mr. Thompson's sentence. That includes a DNA order (each of his offences is a secondary designated offence), a weapon's prohibition order under section 109 (which is also mandatory for each of his offences) and victim surcharges totalling $600. Additionally, the parties agree that Mr. Thompson should receive credit for his 12 days in custody before being granted bail. However, the parties disagree sharply concerning the carceral component of the sentence the court should impose.

On behalf of the Crown, Ms. Perchenok submitted that the court should impose a global sentence of five years' imprisonment.

In taking that position, Ms. Perchenok notes that Mr. Thompson's offences are such that the court must prioritize denunciation and deterrence. Although she acknowledges the presence of significant mitigating factors, including Mr. Thompson's youth and his status as a first offender, making rehabilitation a relevant consideration, she disputes that anti-Black racism played much of a role in Mr. Thompson's decision to commit his offences.

Ms. Perchenok submits that if the court were sentencing Mr. Thompson for his offences individually, even after accounting for the mitigating factors, the possession for the purpose offence and the firearm offence would each warrant a sentence of two and a half to three years' imprisonment. Further, the trafficking offence would warrant a sentence of two and a half years' imprisonment. That would result in a sentence of six to seven years' imprisonment.

However, Ms. Perchenok submits that a global sentence of five years' imprisonment is appropriate to account for the totality principle.

In contrast, on behalf of Mr. Thompson, Ms. Palermo submitted that the court should impose a global sentence of two years less a day and permit Mr. Thompson to serve his sentence in the community, subject to the terms of a conditional sentence order. Additionally, the court should place Mr. Thompson on probation for one year, requiring him to attend school or maintain gainful employment, and to perform community service, thereby maximizing his chances for rehabilitation.

Although Ms. Palermo acknowledges that denunciation and deterrence are the primary sentencing objectives for Mr. Thompson's offences, she submitted that the court can effectively address those objectives through the terms of a conditional sentence order.

In her submissions, Ms. Palermo emphasized the mitigating factors in this case, including Mr. Thompson's guilty plea, his youth, his lack of a prior criminal record and his conduct since being charged, including his employment and his online studies. Further, she argued that anti-Black racism played at least some role in shaping Mr. Thompson's worldview and his decision to take up drug dealing to earn money.

Ultimately, Ms. Palermo submitted that the sentence she proposed would adequately address the principles and objectives of sentencing applicable in this case.

Law and Analysis

Purpose, Objectives, and Principles of Sentencing

Sentencing is discretionary by nature. There is no set formula that judges follow to decide the appropriate sentence. Instead, judges must consider the purpose and objectives of sentencing and be mindful of the governing sentencing principles, especially the need to impose a proportionate sentence. Against that backdrop and after accounting for the aggravating and mitigating factors, the sentencing judge must fashion a just and appropriate sentence.

Sentencing judges must remember the fundamental purpose of sentencing, which Parliament has identified as protecting society and contributing "to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society:" Criminal Code, section 718.

Achieving that purpose requires the court to impose "just sanctions" that reflect one or more traditional sentencing objectives: see Criminal Code, section 718. These include denunciation, general and specific deterrence, separation of offenders from society, rehabilitation, reparation to victims, promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledging the harm done to victims and the community: see subsections 718(a)-(f).

Ultimately, the court must respect the fundamental principle of sentencing: that any sentence "must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender:" Criminal Code, section 718.1. In other words, the sentence must fit both the seriousness of the crime and the offender's level of moral blameworthiness in its commission: see R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, at paras. 36-37; R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, at paras. 40-43.

The principle of parity is an essential consideration in arriving at a proportionate sentence. Proportionality is a function of the circumstances of the offence and offender compared to sentences previously imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. As the Supreme Court has explained, a sentencing judge must reconcile individualization and parity to achieve a proportionate sentence: see R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, at para. 53, citing Criminal Code, subsections 718.2(a) and (b). However, they do not operate in tension; "parity is an expression of proportionality": R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, at para. 32; see also at paras. 30-33 more generally; see also R. v. Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23, at para. 51.

Sentencing youthful first offenders, such as Mr. Thompson, involves unique considerations. Recently, in R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830, the Court of Appeal made some general observations about the sentencing of youthful first offenders before reiterating certain well-established sentencing principles that apply when sentencing them.

By way of general observations, the Court of Appeal in Habib noted that sentences imposed on youthful first offenders must hold them accountable, especially for serious offences: see Habib at para. 30. In such cases, the objectives of denunciation and deterrence (general and specific) remain essential: see Habib, at para. 30. However, general deterrence carries less weight since young adults often lack the maturity to be influenced by the sentences imposed on others: see Habib, at footnote 2. As a result, a crime's seriousness and public safety concerns may necessitate significant prison terms, even for youthful first offenders. Practically speaking, it may not always be feasible for these offenders to avoid incarceration, for sentencing judges to impose only the shortest prison terms or a sentence at the lowest end of the applicable range: see Habib, at para. 30.

The Court of Appeal in Habib then reminded sentencing judges to consider and apply several well-established sentencing principles when sentencing such youthful offenders.

First, sentencing judges must exercise restraint when sentencing youthful first offenders. That means not imprisoning them when possible. And, if imprisonment is necessary, imposing the shortest sentence capable of achieving the principles and objectives of sentencing: see Habib, at para. 31.

Second, when sentencing youthful first offenders, judges must impose sentences that prioritize rehabilitation as the paramount sentencing objective: see Habib, at para. 31. When the offender's circumstances require it, they must also prioritize specific deterrence: see Habib, at para. 31.

Third, sentencing judges cannot focus exclusively on denunciation and general deterrence, or elevate those objectives above rehabilitation or specific deterrence when sentencing youthful first offenders: see Habib, at para. 31.

Finally, whenever sentencing young adults, sentencing judges must consider their reduced moral culpability and the harsher impact of incarceration on them due to their stage of life: see Habib, at para. 31.

With the purpose, objectives and principles of sentencing summarized, these reasons turn next to the sentencing ranges established by the jurisprudence for Mr. Thompson's offences.

Sentencing Ranges for the Offences

I will begin with the sentencing range for section 95(1) offences before addressing the sentencing range for Mr. Thompson's drug offences.

The gravity of gun crimes cannot be exaggerated. Guns intimidate, they maim, and they kill. They are implements of human destruction. That is why criminals seek to possess and use them. The cases recognize that unlawful firearms are a scourge in our community, and their possession must be discouraged through exemplary sentences that denounce and deter their possession and use and thereby enhance public safety: see R. v. Nur, 2013 ONCA 677, at para. 206, affirmed 2015 SCC 15; R. v. Mohiadin, 2021 ONCA 122, at para. 12; R. v. Burke-Whittaker, 2025 ONCA 142, at para. 44.

Further, as the Court of Appeal has recognized"[d]enunciation and deterrence assume places of prominence in determining a fit sentence for crimes involving firearms, especially loaded semi-automatic firearms in the possession of drug traffickers": R. v. Mohammed, 2017 ONCA 691, at para. 6.

In Nur, in affirming the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision, the Supreme Court of Canada agreed with Justice Doherty that firearm offences fall along a spectrum, with regulatory infractions at one end and guns used for criminal purposes at the other. Cases near the "true crime" end of the spectrum warrant sentences of three years or more. Writing for the majority in Nur, Chief Justice McLachlin explained, at para. 82:

Section 95(1) casts its net over a wide range of potential conduct. Most cases within the range may well merit a sentence of three years or more, but conduct at the far end of the range may not. At one end of the range, as Doherty J.A. observed"stands the outlaw who carries a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm in public places as a tool of his or her criminal trade. ... [T]his person is engaged in truly criminal conduct and poses a real and immediate danger to the public": para. 51. At this end of the range — indeed for the vast majority of offences — a three-year sentence may be appropriate. A little further along the spectrum stands the person whose conduct is less serious and poses less danger; for these offenders three years' imprisonment may be disproportionate, but not grossly so. At the far end of the range, stands the licenced and responsible gun owner who stores his unloaded firearm safely with ammunition nearby, but makes a mistake as to where it can be stored. For this offender, a three-year sentence is grossly disproportionate to the sentence the conduct would otherwise merit under the sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code.

Since Nur, courts have often imposed sentences approaching or at the maximum reformatory range (two years less a day) in cases involving first offenders who unlawfully possess a restricted firearm but have not otherwise engaged in criminal activity: see R. v. Smickle, 2013 ONCA 678, at para. 30; R. v. Filian-Jiminez, 2014 ONCA 601 (18 months); R. v. Boussoulas, 2015 ONSC 1536 (21 months), affirmed 2018 ONCA 222; R. v. Shomonov, 2016 ONSC 4015 (21 months); R. v. Downey, 2017 ONCA 789 (two years less a day); R. v. Hassan, 2023 ONSC 5040 (two years less a day).

In such cases, where exceptional circumstances were also present, sentencing judges have even imposed conditional sentences. For example, they have done so in cases where Morris factors significantly mitigated an offender's degree of responsibility and/or where the offenders had already made considerable strides toward rehabilitation: see R. v. Moses, 2022 ONSC 332 (conditional sentence of two years less a day); R. v. Stewart, 2022 ONSC 6997 (same); R. v. Beharry, 2022 ONSC 4370, at paras. 30-31 (same); R. v. Ramos, 2023 ONSC 1094 (same); R. v. Marier, 2023 ONSC 5194 (same); R. v. Stewart, 2024 ONSC 281 (same); R. v. Roy, [2023] O.J. No. 4931 (S.C.J.) (18-month conditional sentence).

In contrast, offenders with prior criminal records, even youthful offenders, tend to receive sentences of three years of imprisonment: see R. v. Bedward, 2016 ONSC 939 (three years); R. v. Jama, 2018 ONSC 1252 (same); R. v. Johnson, 2022 ONSC 2688 (same).

Similarly, courts have imposed sentences ranging between two and four years of imprisonment where an offender's firearm possession is associated with other criminal activity, like drug trafficking: see R. v. Wong, 2012 ONCA 767, at paras. 9-15 (three years); R. v. Marshall, 2015 ONCA 692 (42 months); R. v. Mansingh, 2017 ONCA 68 (43 months); R. v. Prosser, 2014 ONSC 6466 (30 months); R. v. Griffith, 2019 ONSC 358 (four years); R. v. Marfo, 2020 ONSC 5663 (two years).

On the facts in this case, I am satisfied that Mr. Thompson's firearm offence falls within the two-to-four-year sentencing range. After all, when he committed it, he was actively involved in the drug trade and has admitted possessing the firearm as a tool of that trade for his protection in an inherently dangerous industry in which he chose to participate.

Concerning Mr. Thompson's offences of trafficking approximately ten and a half grams of cocaine and possessing nearly four and a half ounces of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, the applicable sentencing ranges are also well-established. These ranges reflect the reality that commercial drug offences involving cocaine are gravely serious because cocaine kills and harms both directly and indirectly: see R. v. Hamilton (2004), at para. 104.

The Court of Appeal has recognized that the sentencing range for offenders who traffic or possess for the purpose of trafficking smaller amounts of cocaine is between six months and two years less a day of imprisonment: see R. v. Woolcock, [2002] O.J. No. 4927 (C.A.), at para. 15 (6.3 grams – 15 months); R. v. Butters, 2017 ONCA 973, at para. 6 (0.20 grams – six months); R. v. Ahmed, 2016 ONCA 831, at para. 4 (28 grams – two years); R. v. Speziale, 2011 ONCA 580, at paras. 22-24 (14.87 grams – 14 months). Mr. Thompson's trafficking offences would fall within this range, given the amount of cocaine he sold to the undercover officer.

In contrast, where more substantial quantities of cocaine are involved, a higher sentencing range applies. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly recognized that for first offenders who possess large quantities of cocaine (more than half a kilogram for trafficking), the range of sentences is between five and eight years of imprisonment: see R. v. Bryan, 2011 ONCA 273, at para. 1; R. v. Wawrykiewicz, 2019 ONCA 21, at para. 15; R. v. Brown, 2021 ONCA 35, at para. 9; R. v. Morgan, 2021 ONCA 812, at para. 20.

After citing various cases, Justice Weiler, in R. v. Bajada (2003), noted, at para. 13, that it "would appear that sentences of five to five and one half years are not uncommon for possession of a substantial amount of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking following an accused's plea of guilty or where the accused has no prior record."

Mr. Thompson possessed nearly four and a half ounces of cocaine, placing his offences above the Woolcock range but below the Bajada range. Given the amount of cocaine involved, the applicable sentencing range appears to be between two and three and a half years of imprisonment: see R. v. Graham, 2018 ONSC 6817, at para. 48 (3 ounces - three years); see also R. v. Nguyen, 2016 ONSC 1286 (182 grams - two years); R. v. Ceballos, 2015 ONSC 720 (326 grams - two and a half years); R. v. Griffith, 2020 ONSC 1387 (424 grams - three and a half years); R. v. Tulloch, 2016 ONSC 5997 (260 grams - two years, and two years' probation).

Having reviewed the sentencing ranges, it deserves mention that sentencing ranges are "guidelines rather than hard and fast rules": Nasogaluak, at para. 44. They help structure a sentencing judge's exercise of their discretion because they reflect the application of the objectives and principles of sentencing when it comes to sentencing for a particular offence: see Lacasse, at para. 57. Nevertheless, a sentencing judge may determine that a sentence below or above the established range is necessary, given that the "determination of a just and appropriate sentence is a highly individualized exercise that goes beyond a purely mathematical calculation": Lacasse, at para. 58; see also Nasogaluak, at para. 44.

Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

In determining the appropriate sentence, a sentencing judge must consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender: see Criminal Code, section 718.2(a). A proper inventory of these is essential to evaluating the offence's gravity and the offender's degree of responsibility in its commission. They serve to "push the sentence up or down the scale of appropriate sentences for similar offences": Nasogaluak, at para. 43.

There would appear to be four aggravating factors in this case.

First, although Mr. Thompson only pleaded guilty to one count of trafficking, it is, of course, aggravating that he acknowledged that on three separate occasions, he sold small amounts of cocaine to an undercover police officer.

Second, the fact that the controlled substance involved was cocaine is an aggravating factor because cocaine is a hard drug that visits direct and indirect harms on users and the larger community.

Third, that he possessed his firearm as a tool of the drug trade is an aggravating factor as it concerns the firearm offence.

Finally, that Mr. Thompson possessed a substantial amount of ammunition is also somewhat aggravating.

At the same time, there are several mitigating factors, and each is significant.

First, there is Mr. Thompson's youth (he was only 21 years old when he committed his offences).

Second, Mr. Thompson has no criminal record; he is a first offender.

Third, there is the fact that Mr. Thompson pleaded guilty. However, it was by no measure an early guilty plea; it came after trial dates were scheduled and only after an unsuccessful Charter application. Nevertheless, it is deserving of at least some weight in mitigation especially in a jurisdiction as busy and overburdened as Brampton.

Fourth, Mr. Thompson has remained out of trouble for the last three years while subject to strict bail terms and has made at least some strides toward his rehabilitation, including by working for five months and pursuing online studies this past year.

Fifth, Mr. Thompson thankfully continues to enjoy the love and support of his family, which also bodes well for his eventual rehabilitation.

Sixth, Mr. Thompson is remorseful for his crimes. He has expressed that remorse to the author of the EPSR and the court. I accept that he is genuine in doing so and has obtained insight into the gravity of his offences. That, too, speaks to his potential for rehabilitation.

Seven, Mr. Thompson spent nearly a year on house arrest bail, and the last two years were subject to a curfew. Although there is no set formula for the credit to be given for time spent subject to liberty restricting bail conditions, it requires consideration as a mitigating factor: see R. v. Downes (2006), at para. 37.

Finally, the court has benefited from a comprehensive EPSR, which provides valuable insight into Mr. Thompson's background and circumstances. To be sure, Mr. Thompson was fortunate to be raised by parents who loved and cared for him. His parents met all his needs while he was growing up. Nevertheless, his parent's best efforts could not shield him from the caustic effects of anti-Black racism.

Unfortunately, despite his mother's best efforts, poverty marked Mr. Thompson's formative years. Additionally, throughout his life, he witnessed and experienced the over-policing of the Black community. Although school officials recognized his heightened need for educational support early on, the assistance he received ultimately proved inadequate. Consequently, he attended high school in the applied stream. Issues with his attendance led to school suspensions rather than the provision of additional support. Ultimately, Mr. Thompson's lack of academic success and employment history fueled his mistaken belief that only success on the basketball court would provide him with a good life.

Bearing all of this in mind, I am satisfied that anti-Black racism played at least some role in limiting Mr. Thompson's educational opportunities, shaping his worldview, and narrowing his potential peer group. All of that contributed to bringing Mr. Thompson to a point in his life where he came to believe that selling drugs and arming himself with a handgun to do so was his only viable option to earn money once his dreams of a career on the basketball court did not come to fruition. Considering all of this is essential to putting Mr. Thompson's life circumstances in context, assessing his degree of responsibility for his offences, and arriving at an appropriate sentence for his crimes: see R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, at paras. 76, 99-101, 105-107, 123.

The Appropriate Sentence

Beyond considering the aggravating and mitigating factors, as noted, the court must also respect the principle of parity in fashioning an appropriate sentence. Although the parties relied on various sentencing decisions to support their submissions concerning the appropriate sentence, each of the cases relied on by the parties is distinguishable, some more so than others.

Most of the cases relied upon by Mr. Thompson where conditional sentences were imposed involved offenders who possessed loaded firearms but whose drug offences were not nearly as grave as those committed by him, given the number of drug sales he made and the quantity of cocaine he possessed for the purpose of trafficking: see Stewart (simple possession of 9.9 grams of fentanyl); R. v. Senior, [2022] O.J. No. 5811 (C.J.) (three sales of crack cocaine to an undercover officer totalling approximately three grams); R. v. Goodridge, 2022 ONCJ 139 (trafficking $60 worth of crack cocaine to an undercover police officer); R. v. Desmond-Robinson, 2022 ONCA 369 (simple possession of marijuana and cocaine).

Only two of the cases cited by the defence involved a loaded prohibited firearm and comparable drug offences.

In R. v. Collins, 2023 ONSC 5768, the offender pleaded guilty to trafficking cocaine, possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possessing the proceeds of crime, possessing a loaded prohibited firearm and breaching a section 109 weapon's prohibition order. He was 26 when he committed his offences. He possessed a loaded semi-automatic handgun, trafficked small amounts of cocaine on multiple occasions, and possessed approximately 67 grams of cocaine.

There were significant aggravating factors in Collins. The offender had a lengthy criminal record that included prior convictions for drug offences. Additionally, he was subject to two probation orders and two weapons' prohibition orders, which he breached when he committed his offences. Further, his trafficking activities were especially predatory because he had travelled to an isolated and vulnerable Indigenous community to sell cocaine.

There were also significant mitigating factors in Collins. The offender pleaded guilty to the offences. He had a horrific childhood. He grew up in a high-crime neighbourhood where criminal behaviour had become normalized for him. Additionally, he was diagnosed with PTSD. Further, he appeared to have made considerable progress toward rehabilitation before sentencing, which led Justice Code to remark that the offender was "completely reformed" and that he could "not recall another case where [he had] seen such a complete and successful reformation" before sentencing (para. 68). Furthermore, the police had violated Mr. Collins' rights under sections 8 and 10(b) of the Charter, which Justice Code gave "some mitigating effect" in sentencing: at para. 71.

Ultimately, in Collins, Justice Code, after emphasizing the combined effect of all the significant mitigating factors, imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day for the drug and firearm offences, a one-year conditional sentence for breach of the weapons prohibition and a six-month conditional sentence for the possession of proceeds, all to be served concurrently.

(As an aside, I note that Justice Code's assessment of Mr. Collins' complete transformation was ultimately proven incorrect. At a subsequent hearing, Justice Code found that within a week of imposing the conditional sentence, Mr. Collins participated in an armed robbery. As a result, he committed Mr. Collins to serve the remainder of his sentence in custody: see R. v. Collins, 2024 ONSC 4054.)

In R. v. Lewis, 2022 ONSC 1260, the offender pleaded guilty to possessing a loaded, prohibited firearm and 49.7 grams of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. Unlike Mr. Thompson, he did not also plead guilty to trafficking cocaine. The offender was 22 at the time of his offences and had two prior but unrelated convictions. He spent seven and a half months in pre-sentence custody, subject to especially harsh conditions, before his release on strict bail terms, which remained in place for 20 months. After obtaining bail, he started a snow removal and landscaping business, which quickly became successful. Mr. Lewis's upbringing was made difficult because of his mother's mental health issues and his father not being in the picture. His circumstances engaged the principles recognized in Morris. Justice Boswell noted that Mr. Lewis had already been "significantly punished" by his time spent in pre-sentence custody and emphasized that since his release on bail, he had completely turned his life around. As a result, he concluded that it would be "counter-productive" to reincarcerate him and, after giving him enhanced credit for his time spent in pre-sentence custody, imposed a global six-month conditional sentence.

Most of the cases the Crown relied upon are readily distinguishable. In Graham, for example, the offender was much older when he committed his offences and had a lengthy and related criminal record. The same was true of the offender in R. v. Barreira, 2024 ONSC 4682.

Marshall was the only case cited by the Crown that was somewhat analogous concerning the nature of the offences and the offender's circumstances. Mr. Marshall was similar in age (21) to Mr. Thompson when he committed his offences. He did not have a criminal record. He was found guilty of the firearm charge after trial and pleaded guilty to possessing 60 grams of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, less than half the amount possessed by Mr. Thompson. He was not convicted of trafficking cocaine, unlike Mr. Thompson. However, Mr. Marshall had committed his drug offence while on bail for the firearm offence, a significant aggravating factor. Further, unlike Mr. Thompson, Mr. Marshall minimized and rationalized his firearm's offence and was not remorseful. Lastly, Marshall predates the Court of Appeal's decision in Morris. In Marshall, the trial judge imposed a global sentence of three and a half years’ imprisonment. The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence on appeal, describing it as "entirely fit": at para. 56.

I have carefully considered the circumstances of Mr. Thompson's offences, the purpose, objectives and principles of sentencing, the range of sentences for his offences, the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case and the sentencing cases relied upon by the parties.

Concerning the sentencing precedents, the search for a perfectly analogous case, as it often does, has proven elusive.

Ultimately, I reject the Crown's submission that a five-year sentence would be just and appropriate in Mr. Thompson's case. In my view, a sentence of that duration, mindful of the significant mitigating factors in this case and the sentencing precedents, would be grossly disproportionate.

At the same time, I reject the defence's submission in favour of a reformatory sentence. Such a sentence would be inadequate given all the circumstances of Mr. Thompson's offences, including that, after brazenly advertising it for sale online, he sold cocaine at least three times to an undercover police officer, that he possessed a substantial quantity of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking (more than twice as much as any of the offenders in the cases relied on by the parties) and that he possessed the loaded firearm as a tool of his work in the drug trade.

In my view, despite the significant mitigating factors in this case, including Mr. Thompson's youth, his lack of any prior criminal record, his guilty pleas, his remorse, the time subject to stringent bail terms, his efforts toward and prospects for rehabilitation and the Morris considerations, nothing short of a penitentiary sentence would be adequate to the task of denouncing Mr. Thompson's gravely serious crimes and deterring others from engaging in similar criminal conduct.

Nevertheless, given Mr. Thompson's youth, the need to not lose sight of his potential for rehabilitation and the corresponding need to exercise restraint, after giving Mr. Thompson the benefit of the mitigating effect of his nearly three years spent subject to relatively strict bail conditions, I believe that the shortest possible sentence still capable of achieving the objectives of denunciation and deterrence in his case would be 30 months of imprisonment.

Given my conclusion regarding the appropriate global sentence in Mr. Thompson's case, he is not eligible for a conditional sentence: see Criminal Code, section 742.1; R. v. Fice, 2005 SCC 32.

I would apportion Mr. Thompson's sentences as follows:

• For the offence of trafficking in cocaine - count 1 – 8 months of imprisonment.
• For the offence of possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking - count 7 – two years of imprisonment concurrent to the sentence on count 1.
• For the offence of possessing a loaded restricted firearm - count 12 - two and a half years of imprisonment, concurrent to his sentences on counts 1 and 7.

I shall credit Mr. Thompson for 18 days of pre-sentence custody toward his sentence on count 12. As a result, the sentence imposed today for that offence shall be 882 days (essentially, two and a half years less 18 days).

As a result, Mr. Thompson's total sentence going forward will be two years, five months and 12 days of imprisonment.

The following ancillary orders shall also issue:

1. An order directing the taking of a sample of Mr. Thompson's blood for the inclusion of his DNA profile in the National DNA Databank;
2. An order prohibiting Mr. Thompson from possessing, for the rest of his life, any firearm, crossbow, restricted weapon, ammunition or explosive substance;
3. Victim surcharges totalling $600, with Mr. Thompson having five years to pay these amounts.

The court will sign a forfeiture order for the drugs and firearm and the other offence-related property once the Crown furnishes a draft order.

...PROCEEDING CONCLUDED

Certification

FORM 3
Electronic Certificate of Transcript
Evidence Act, Subsection 5(2)

I, Brenda Ferland, certify that this document is a true and accurate transcription of the recording of R. v. Daniel Thompson in the Superior Court of Justice held at 7755 Hurontario Street, Brampton, Ontario taken from Recording(s) No. 3199_407_20250429_083443__30_STRIBOJ which has been certified in Form 1.

May 6, 2025 ________________________________

(Date) (Electronic signature of authorized person)

__ 9077034862 ____________________

(Authorized court transcriptionist's identification number)

__ Ontario, Canada_______________

(Province of signing)

A certificate in Form 3 is admissible in evidence and is proof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the transcript is a transcript of the certified recording of evidence and proceedings in the proceeding that is identified in the certificate.