Gideon Clare Forrest

The Court-appointed liquidator of Morrison Laurier Mortgage Corporation sought approval for the sale of the Corporation's last non-cash asset, an office building.

The motion was opposed by a preferred shareholder who proposed an alternative transaction involving share redemption.

The court granted the liquidator's motion, affirming the deference owed to a liquidator's business judgment and the integrity of the court-approved sales process.

The court found the alternative proposal was not properly submitted within the process and lacked sufficient detail and financial backing.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their summary judgment motion and granting summary judgment and a permanent stay to the respondents.

The core issue was the appellants' failure to immediately disclose settlement agreements with other defendants, which altered the litigation's adversarial landscape.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that these contingent settlement agreements, which included provisions for private evidence gathering and financial incentives for cooperation, changed the adversarial relationship into a cooperative one, triggering the immediate disclosure rule from Handley Estate.

The court reiterated that immediate disclosure is mandatory, regardless of contingencies or confidentiality clauses, and that a stay of proceedings is the appropriate remedy for such an abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Ali Amiri, brought two appeals from Superior Court decisions concerning certiorari applications related to his criminal trial for threatening his wife.

The first appeal (C70004) challenged the dismissal of his certiorari application to quash a procedural order, which was deemed moot as the trial judge had since decided the underlying issues.

The second appeal (C70051) challenged the granting of certiorari applications by two subpoenaed witnesses (a lawyer and a Legal Aid Ontario employee) to quash their subpoenas, based on solicitor-client privilege and statutory privilege, respectively.

The Court of Appeal summarily dismissed both appeals under s. 685(1) of the Criminal Code, finding them frivolous or vexatious, emphasizing the limited scope of certiorari in criminal proceedings and the lack of merit in the appellant's arguments regarding privilege exceptions.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants Elko and its principal for knowing receipt and knowing assistance, alleging they participated in a scheme to divert business from a family company to avoid a prior judgment.

Elko brought a motion to stay the action because the plaintiffs failed to disclose settlement agreements with co-defendants that changed the adversarial landscape.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion and granted summary judgment in favour of Elko, finding no evidence that Elko had actual or constructive knowledge of the breach of fiduciary duty.

In the alternative, the court held it would have permanently stayed the action due to the plaintiffs' failure to immediately disclose the settlement agreements, which prejudiced Elko.

The appellant, a former lawyer whose license was revoked, appealed a motion judge's decision to dismiss his action against 11 of 16 defendants under Rule 2.1 as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal against the Law Society Tribunal and Legal Aid Ontario, finding the claims abusive due to outstanding appeals and multiplicity of proceedings.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, reinstating claims against Doctor Michael Colleton and the Hamilton Police Service, ruling that these claims were not "clearest of cases" for Rule 2.1 dismissal and involved complex legal issues (e.g., absolute privilege, negligent investigation) better suited for a Rule 21 motion.

Following the dismissal of the self-represented plaintiff's action against several defendants under Rule 2.1.01, the successful defendants sought partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff argued that the claim raised novel issues, the costs claimed were excessive, and an award would cause undue hardship.

The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments, finding the claims were not novel and there was no evidence of impecuniosity.

The court awarded global costs of $10,500 to the successful defendants, applying a 20% reduction to the amounts claimed to reflect the possibility that the defendants could have filed a joint motion.

The self-represented plaintiff, a disbarred lawyer, commenced an action against 16 defendants, including the Law Society of Ontario, the Law Society Tribunal, Legal Aid Ontario, Hamilton Police Services, and various individuals involved in his disciplinary and criminal proceedings.

Several defendants brought requests under Rule 2.1.01(1) to dismiss the action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the claims against the Law Society Tribunal defendants as an improper collateral attack, against the Legal Aid Ontario defendants as duplicative of an existing action, against the Colleton defendants as barred by absolute privilege, and against the Hamilton Police defendants as frivolous and an abuse of process.

The action was allowed to continue against the remaining defendants who had not filed Rule 2.1 requests.

An appeal from a costs order against Legal Aid Ontario (LAO) as a non-party funder in a family law dispute.

The application judge found that LAO engaged in an abuse of process by failing to adequately monitor and assess the merits of the defence it was funding in a case involving a vulnerable individual.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the costs award, holding that LAO's role as a statutory funder does not expose it to non-party costs awards absent evidence of bad faith or improper purpose, and that requiring LAO to monitor litigation would impermissibly invade solicitor-client privilege and frustrate the statutory legal aid scheme.

Legal Aid Ontario brought a motion to re-open the evidence and vary a costs decision that held it liable for 50% of the full indemnity costs awarded against the respondent.

LAO sought to introduce evidence refuting the court's presumptions that it had received an expert report and notice of a Public Guardian and Trustee certificate earlier than it claimed.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the presumptions did not constitute a 'mistake' under Rule 25(19)(b) of the Family Law Rules, that LAO had ample opportunity to address these issues prior to the costs decision, and that the proposed evidence would not have changed the result.

The moving party brought a motion to vary a prior judgment to permit a company to accept a new, higher offer to purchase a commercial property.

The parties had previously signed minutes of settlement agreeing to sell the property to a tenant based on a revived earlier offer.

The moving party argued the new offer constituted new facts discovered after the judgment under Rule 59.06(2)(a).

The court dismissed the motion, finding the new offer was solicited before the settlement became binding and did not constitute new facts.

The court emphasized the finality principle and held the parties to their freely negotiated bargain.

The moving parties sought an interlocutory injunction preventing the responding parties from excluding them from jointly operating several addiction-treatment medical clinics and pharmacies following a breakdown in their business relationship.

The applicants also sought directions regarding patient communications, access to clinics, and division of software and other assets.

Applying the test for interlocutory injunctions from R.J.R.-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), the court held that the applicants failed to demonstrate irreparable harm if access to the clinics was denied.

The court found that the applicants had already established alternative clinic locations and were intending to compete with the respondents.

Instead of granting the injunction, the court ordered a structured disengagement process, including patient choice protections and limited directions regarding software and patient database access.

In a long-running judgment enforcement proceeding arising from a family business dispute, the judgment creditors sought answers to refusals and undertakings from the debtor's examination in aid and sought third-party examinations of the debtor's wife and son under Rule 60.18(6).

The court held that there was clear difficulty enforcing the judgment, given years of non-payment and evidence of asset transfers, opaque dealings involving coins, racehorses, a luxury vehicle, and a Florida condominium.

The court found the wife may have knowledge of the debtor's assets and that it was just to examine her, and also found grounds to order the son's examination, to proceed after additional production from Heritage Auctions and horse records.

The motion was granted and costs were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The defendants moved to strike several corporate defendants from a wrongful dismissal action on the basis that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action against them.

The plaintiff alleged she was employed by a group of related corporations operating collectively and that they wrongfully dismissed her and withheld personal property.

Applying the test for striking pleadings, the court held that the pleadings and incorporated documents sufficiently alleged a common employer relationship among the corporate defendants.

It was not plain and obvious that the claim against the additional defendants had no reasonable prospect of success.

The motion to strike was therefore dismissed.

The plaintiff brought motions for leave to appeal two orders of a motion judge: one adding a competing car dealership as a party defendant, and another dissolving an interim interlocutory injunction that had restrained the defendant manufacturer from appointing an additional dealer in the plaintiff's market area.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decisions and no issues of general importance to the administration of justice.

The appellants appealed an order declining to stay the respondent's action.

The appellants argued that an arbitration clause in their agreement encompassed the issues raised in the litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there was no arguable arbitration provision in the contract at the relevant time, as the written contracts containing such clauses had expired and the appellants had previously communicated their desire not to arbitrate disputes.

The court also agreed with the motion judge that the claims did not fall within the alleged clause and that Ontario was the more convenient forum.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the respondents.

The dispute arose from the exercise of a shotgun buy/sell provision in a unanimous shareholders' agreement.

The appellant alleged breach of fiduciary duty, theft of corporate opportunity, and other claims after learning the respondent financed the buyout by agreeing to transfer corporate properties to a lender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge applied the correct summary judgment test and correctly concluded that no fiduciary duty exists between shareholders exercising a shotgun provision, nor was there any appropriation of a corporate opportunity.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order of a motions judge who declined to order the defendants to answer certain questions refused on discovery and cross-examination.

The underlying action involved a dispute over a shotgun buy/sell agreement between two brothers and subsequent property transfers.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision on relevance, and concluding that the issues did not transcend the interests of the parties to warrant appellate consideration.

The appellants appealed an order confirming a Master's report that awarded compound interest on the respondent's lost profits from misappropriated trust property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the Master's discretionary decision to award compound interest.

The Court noted that in cases of wrongfully misappropriated trust property, it is open to the court to presume the injured party is entitled to compound interest, and the appellants failed to adduce evidence to rebut this presumption.

The appellant appealed an order allowing the respondent to access $370,000 from frozen accounts to fund legal fees for an ongoing reference.

The Court of Appeal held that while the motion judge had jurisdiction to hear the motion, she erred in granting the relief.

The respondent failed to meet the burden of establishing that he had no other assets available to pay his legal fees, particularly given his son's refusal to answer questions about family resources during cross-examination.

The appeal was allowed and the underlying motion dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to fully vacate notices of garnishment issued against their bank accounts.

The appellants argued the garnishments conflicted with prior freezing orders that permitted them to use funds for legal fees.

The Court of Appeal (majority) dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge properly exercised his broad discretion under Rule 60.08(16) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to uphold the garnishments while allowing limited access to funds for legal fees, preventing the frustration of the respondent's judgment.