Frederick L. Myers

This endorsement addresses the costs following the Law Society of Ontario’s unsuccessful attempt to place Shahryar Mazaheri’s law practice under trusteeship.

The court reviews the parties’ submissions, the relevant by-laws, and the principles governing costs, ultimately awarding Mr. Mazaheri $2,000 in costs for the main proceeding and $1,500 net after offsetting $500 in costs to the Law Society for the costs proceeding.

The court emphasizes the limited entitlement of self-represented litigants to costs and the absence of grounds for punitive or full indemnity costs.

The applicants, grandchildren of the deceased Mary Jane Hockney, sought an order requiring the respondent, Mary Jane Kneeland (the estate trustee and lawyer), to account for and complete the administration of the estate.

The court found that Ms. Kneeland had failed for over a decade to distribute approximately $150,000 held in trust for the beneficiaries, despite repeated requests and complaints to the Law Society of Ontario.

The court ordered Ms. Kneeland to pass her accounts by a set deadline and provided directions for the continuation of the proceeding, including steps to be taken if Ms. Kneeland fails to participate.

This endorsement addresses objections by John J. McAteer to the passing of accounts by the respondents as estate trustees for the estates of their late parents.

The court considers the applicant's entitlement to production of documents, especially those relating to corporations managed by the respondents as attorneys for property for their mother.

The court emphasizes the principle of fiduciary accountability and transparency, discusses proportionality in production, and addresses issues regarding interim distribution and mediation.

The court orders production of relevant documents (with a minor exception), declines to order an interim distribution or mediation at this stage, and directs the parties to cooperate on scheduling.

The Law Society of Ontario applied to be appointed as trustee over the law practice of Shahryar Mazaheri and Mazaheri Law Professional Corporation, seeking to preserve and distribute client property and wind up the business following Mr. Mazaheri’s interlocutory suspension.

The court found that the Law Society failed to provide sufficient admissible evidence to justify the appointment of a trustee or the immediate winding up of the practice, emphasizing that a suspension alone does not automatically warrant such a remedy.

The application was dismissed.

The court considered whether Ms. Dubuisson, previously found incapable of managing her property, could move to substitute her guardian under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992.

The court found that while she had standing to bring the motion, she could not do so without a litigation guardian due to her status as a person under disability.

The motion was dismissed, with the court emphasizing the importance of procedural protections for individuals found incapable and the statutory respect for autonomy.

This decision concerns two related lawsuits between siblings over the estate of their late mother, Carmen Debono.

The first action is for wrongful dismissal and oppression by David Debono and Elizabeth Muscat against the estate, its trustees, and two corporations.

The second is a claim by the estate, through its trustees, against David Debono, Elizabeth Muscat, and Jennifer Nesci for recovery of debts and alleged misappropriation of funds.

The court addresses interim motions for distributions and legal fees, as well as document production and the effect of an in terrorem clause in the will.

Both motions are dismissed, with the court emphasizing the need for transparency and full disclosure, and declining to enforce the in terrorem clause or grant interim relief at this stage.

The court dismissed two actions by will beneficiaries against the drafting lawyer for negligence, holding that the claims were statute-barred by the 15-year ultimate limitation period in section 15(2) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that the limitation period began to run from the date of the negligent drafting, not the testator’s death, and that no statutory or common law exception applied.

The court also addressed the application of the Trustee Act and concluded that the two-year limitation period for estate claims did not revive or extend the beneficiaries’ claims.

The applicant employer sought judicial review to quash an arbitrator's interim order compelling it to produce documents for a full audit by the respondent union.

The union brought a cross-motion to dismiss the application as premature.

The court dismissed the employer's application for judicial review, agreeing with the union that the application was premature because the arbitrator's order was an interim award that did not resolve the grievance on its merits.

The court emphasized that judicial review of interim orders is only available in very narrow "exceptional circumstances," which were not met here, and found no significant harm to the employer from the ordered production and audit.

The appellant abandoned her appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board decision.

The respondent landlord sought costs for the abandoned appeal.

The court considered Rule 61.14(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court declined to award costs, finding that the appellant's decision to abandon the appeal after obtaining the transcript was responsible and that a significant costs award would impede access to justice.

This endorsement addresses procedural matters in an appeal from a partial summary judgment.

The respondent argued the order under appeal was interlocutory, requiring leave to appeal.

The court set a schedule for submissions on whether the order is interlocutory or final, and for an expedited appeal hearing.

It noted that a motion to stay was likely moot as the tenant had already been evicted, preferring to expedite the appeal.

The judge also raised a potential jurisdictional concern regarding the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction over the appeal.

The parties brought a consent motion in an appeal from the Ontario Court of Justice, seeking to set aside the lower court's order and implement a new settlement.

The Superior Court dismissed the motion, holding that it would not exercise its appellate jurisdiction to set aside an order on consent without a showing of reversible error.

The court emphasized that any settlement on the merits of the original proceeding should be implemented in the court where that proceeding is being carried, after which the appeal could be dismissed.

The applicant sought to remove the estate trustee (her brother) and appoint an Estate Trustee During Litigation (ETDL) for their deceased father's estate.

Despite previous court orders and warnings, the respondents, particularly the brother, failed to participate, file material, or approve orders, leading to the estate's house mortgage falling into arrears.

The court ultimately appointed a replacement estate trustee and, in this endorsement, addressed the issue of costs.

The court found the respondents' inaction and allegations to be an abuse of process, warranting substantial indemnity costs against them, jointly and severally, including recovery of the applicant's litigation loan interest.

The self-represented applicant sought various accommodations for disabilities and a blanket extension of filing deadlines in an application for leave to appeal.

The court ordered the parties to comply with an agreed-upon schedule for the motion.

While granting some accommodations like in-person hearings for the case conference, in-person document filing, and use of electronic devices with conditions, the court denied the request for a blanket extension of deadlines and automatic adjournments, emphasizing the need for fair process for all parties and the court's neutrality.

The applicant sought divorce, child support, spousal support, and equalization of property after the respondent fled the country, leaving debt and abandoning the matrimonial home.

The court imputed income to the respondent, ordered lump sum spousal support, child support, and payment for house expenses.

The court also ordered an unequal sharing of the matrimonial home in the applicant's favour but denied the applicant's request to vest title of the home in the children's names or the abandoned car in her name, citing lack of legal basis and improper use of vesting orders to circumvent laws.

The plaintiff, a self-represented litigant, initiated an action against the Attorney General of Ontario, seeking judicial review of a court staff member's decision to cancel a scheduled appearance in a prior dismissed case.

The plaintiff disputed the validity of the prior dismissal order on various grounds.

The court found the current proceeding frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1, noting the plaintiff's history as a serial vexatious litigant and a prior order requiring leave for further proceedings.

The action was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiffs, Pilbro III Inc. and E.D. Carpenters Ltd., sought leave to bring a motion to compel the defendants to answer refused questions from examination for discovery.

This motion was brought after the action had been set down for trial and past multiple court-ordered deadlines for interlocutory motions.

The court dismissed the motion, emphasizing the need to combat the "culture of complacency" in civil litigation and enforce scheduling orders, despite acknowledging the defendants' own delays in providing undertakings.

The applicant sought to void a 2013 divorce order, declare a later separation date, or extend time for equalization.

The motion was adjourned due to the applicant's failure to provide sufficient evidence, non-payment of previously ordered costs, late delivery of inadmissible evidence, and improper scheduling as a short motion despite complex factual disputes.

The court emphasized that the issues required viva voce evidence and that counsel's procedural missteps had caused unnecessary expense.

The motion was adjourned to a case conference, and the applicant was ordered to pay $7,500 in costs thrown away for the current hearing.

This costs endorsement followed a decision to strike a third-party claim brought by the defendants against the plaintiff's lawyers.

The court found that the third-party claim, alleging breach of settlement privilege, did not plead a reasonable cause of action, as settlement privilege is a rule of evidence, not a basis for a lawsuit.

The court characterized the claim as an abuse of process and reprehensible litigation conduct.

Consequently, the third parties (plaintiff's lawyers) were awarded substantial indemnity costs, fixed at $23,500, as the court deemed the amount fair, reasonable, and proportional given the circumstances and the defendants' persistence in an improper claim.

The defendants commenced a third-party claim against the plaintiffs' lawyers, alleging they improperly pleaded information protected by settlement privilege.

The plaintiffs' lawyers moved to strike the third-party claim.

The court granted the motion, finding no cause of action exists to sue opposing counsel for litigation conduct, and that such a claim is an abuse of process.

The court affirmed the doctrine of absolute privilege protects participants in litigation from such lawsuits, distinguishing it from a client suing their own lawyer for negligence.

The proper remedy for improper pleadings is to strike the offending passages, not to sue opposing counsel.

The applicants sought a court order to rectify the land register under s. 57(13) of the Land Titles Act, declaring a mortgage on their home void and fraudulent due to forged signatures.

The respondents, Ryan Mortgage Income Fund Inc. and the Director of Titles, did not oppose the application.

The court found the mortgage to be a fraudulent instrument and granted the order, directing rectification.

The judge criticized the respondents for requiring the applicants to bring an unnecessary proceeding, causing significant delay and cost, when the respondents could have acted themselves.