Fergus O'Donnell

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples obtained at a police detachment following a roadside approved screening device test.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath samples under sections 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that the Crown failed to establish that the roadside device was an approved screening device due to imprecision in the officer's testimony regarding the device's identification.

The trial judge found that the Crown had proven the device was an approved screening device based on the officer's reference to it as such and the description of its functioning, relying on the Court of Appeal's guidance in R. v. Gundy.

The defendant was found guilty as charged.

The appellant appealed two sentences imposed for convictions under s. 2(1)(a) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The first conviction arose from operating an uninsured motor vehicle in 2012, with a fine of $20,000 imposed in absentia in 2013.

The second conviction arose from operating an uninsured motor vehicle in 2013, with a fine of $25,000 and a six-month driving suspension imposed in absentia in 2014.

The court found errors in principle: the sentencing courts failed to consider the appellant's ability to pay and failed to account for the substantial fifteen-year gap between the appellant's prior convictions in the 1990s and the current offences.

The court reduced the fines and applied s. 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act to provide mitigation based on exceptional circumstances, including the appellant's struggle with alcoholism and limited financial means.

The appellant appealed his convictions for driving while his licence was suspended and for possession of a suspended licence contrary to sections 53(1) and 35(1)(b) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant claimed he did not receive notice of the suspension and was unaware his licence had been suspended.

The court found that although the appellant likely did not receive the notice within the statutory deemed notice period, he had been suspended three times previously for unpaid fines and therefore had knowledge of how the suspension system worked.

The court held that the appellant failed to exercise due diligence by not taking any steps to verify his driving status despite knowing he had an unpaid fine and having prior experience with licence suspensions.

The appeals were dismissed.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with blood alcohol concentration exceeding the lawful limit following a traffic stop on the Queen Elizabeth Way.

The Crown presented evidence of erratic driving, observations of impairment by the arresting officer, and breath test results of 143 and 141 mg/100ml.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath results on Charter grounds, alleging a violation of his right to counsel of choice.

The court acquitted on the impaired charge due to insufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, but convicted on the excess blood alcohol charge after finding no Charter breach and determining that even if a breach occurred, the breath results would be admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the permissible limit.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter application alleging that the police lacked reasonable suspicion for the roadside screening demand, failed to properly advise him of his right to counsel, and failed to take breath samples 'as soon as practicable'.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding the police evidence credible and the delays reasonable.

The court also noted the lack of audio and video recording of the police interaction, urging police services to adopt such technology.

The accused was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the permissible limit.

The trial focused primarily on whether the defendant's Charter rights were violated and whether the breath test results should be excluded from evidence.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the approved screening device demand, alleging lack of reasonable suspicion, and argued that he was not properly informed of his right to counsel at various stages of the investigation.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to demand the screening device, that the defendant was properly informed of his rights to counsel, and that the breath samples were obtained as soon as practicable.

The defendant was found guilty.

The offender, an 18-year-old first-time offender, pleaded guilty to possessing a loaded, prohibited firearm.

He was arrested after police responded to an unrelated 911 call and observed him acting suspiciously.

The Crown sought a four-year penitentiary sentence, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Nur, while the defence sought 18 months.

The court balanced the need for denunciation and deterrence with the offender's youth, guilty plea, and prospects for rehabilitation.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less a day in reformatory, followed by three years of probation and 240 hours of community service.

A young person, age 19, pleaded guilty to conveying a false message contrary to s. 372 of the Criminal Code.

The defendant called 911 reporting a false armed threat at a community centre, describing himself as the armed individual, with the intention of provoking police to shoot him ("suicide by cop").

The Crown sought a nine-month conditional sentence followed by three years probation.

The defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with three years probation, finding that despite the seriousness of the offence, the defendant's youth, first-offender status, genuine remorse, strong pro-social character, and the mental health crisis underlying the offence warranted rehabilitation-focused sentencing rather than incarceration or conviction.

The defendant pleaded guilty to twelve serious charges arising from two shooting incidents in northwest Toronto on April 15-16, 2015.

On April 15, he participated in an attempted murder at Mount Olive Drive.

On April 16, he participated in a more serious attack at Driftwood Court where five people were shot.

The defendant was sentenced to seventeen years imprisonment, with the sentence structured to reflect the gravity of the offences, the number of victims, the use of firearms, and the defendant's breach of probation and prohibition orders.

The court emphasized that the defendant's actions constituted attempted murder with the same moral culpability as murder, and that general deterrence and denunciation were paramount sentencing considerations.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

The trial focused on whether breath testing results should be excluded due to alleged Charter violations.

The accused was stopped for traffic violations and subsequently subjected to an approved screening device test and breath samples at the police station.

The central issue was whether the police failed to inform the accused of the reason for his continued detention and his right to counsel in a timely manner.

The Crown brought an application for forfeiture of funds in three bank accounts held by the defendant, alleging they were proceeds of crime arising from a series of financial frauds perpetrated in 2013-2014.

The defendant had pleaded guilty to eight counts of fraud and three counts of failure to comply.

The court found that the defendant had generated approximately $84,500 in proceeds of crime through various fraudulent schemes targeting insurance policy holders and their beneficiaries.

The court ordered forfeiture of the restrained funds under section 462.37 of the Criminal Code, finding that the funds constituted proceeds of crime either under the mandatory forfeiture provision or the discretionary forfeiture provision.

The Crown charged the defendant with impaired driving following a serious motor vehicle collision on Islington Avenue in Toronto on October 7, 2014.

The defendant's vehicle left the roadway, struck a fire hydrant and hydro pole, and came to rest in an apartment building driveway.

The Crown relied on forensic toxicological evidence establishing the defendant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The defendant testified that he had consumed only one glass of wine and two bottles of beer over the course of the evening and attributed the collision to another vehicle veering into his lane.

The court found the defendant's evidence unreliable and accepted the expert toxicological evidence demonstrating significant impairment.

The defendant pleaded guilty to assault with a weapon following an incident on Christmas morning 2014 in which he stabbed the victim once in the chest with a knife.

The Crown sought fifteen months' imprisonment while the defence sought less than six months.

The court considered the defendant's background, including his status as a permanent resident, his mental health and substance abuse issues, his positive pre-sentence report, and the relatively modest physical injuries sustained by the victim.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of approximately six months based on pre-sentence custody credit, suspended the passing of sentence, and placed the defendant on three years' probation with conditions including community service, substance abuse and mental health counselling, and a no-contact order with the victim.

A nineteen-year-old first-time offender pleaded guilty to four counts of robbery but admitted to six knifepoint robberies of young women committed over a two-month period in winter 2013-2014.

The offender drove the getaway vehicle while his co-accused committed the robberies.

The Crown sought eighteen months to two years less a day imprisonment, while the defence sought six to nine months with potential credit for pre-sentence custody and bail conditions.

The court imposed ninety days intermittent imprisonment on each count, three years probation with strict conditions, 240 hours community service, and an increased victim surcharge of $8,000, balancing denunciation and deterrence with rehabilitation prospects for a youthful first offender with no prior record.

The accused was charged with theft, assault with a weapon, and possession of a knife for the purpose of committing a criminal offence in connection with a robbery at knifepoint of a York University student.

The victim could not identify his assailants.

The Crown's case relied on video evidence from a nearby apartment building, eyewitness testimony placing the accused at the scene, recognition evidence from a police officer, and physical evidence of clothing seized from the accused's home.

The trial judge found the Crown had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt through the convergence of video evidence, eyewitness testimony, recognition evidence, and physical evidence linking the accused to the robbery.

Two defendants pleaded guilty to multiple counts of residential break and enter, theft, conspiracy to steal motor vehicles, and possession of property obtained by crime.

The offences were part of "Project Yellowbird" a sophisticated burglary ring targeting affluent Toronto neighbourhoods from late 2013 to August 2014.

The ring stole high-end vehicles, jewelry, electronics, and cash, with losses at individual locations reaching hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Buczel, a first-time offender, appeared to be a central figure in the organization based on phone records and seized property.

Czeranowski had a significant prior record for similar offences.

The court imposed sentences of four years for Buczel and four and a half years for Czeranowski, with credit for pre-sentence custody applied at a 1.5:1 ratio.

The offender pleaded guilty to stealing $777 from his employer, the LCBO, due to severe family financial stress.

The court granted a conditional discharge, finding it was in the offender's best interest and not contrary to the public interest given his lack of prior record and extensive community service.

The offender also challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge under s. 12 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenge, holding that the surcharge is a user-fee or general restitution rather than a sentence, and its mandatory imposition does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

The offender was ordered to pay a $200 victim surcharge with one year to pay.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, contrary to section 253 of the Criminal Code.

The sole issue at trial was whether the police violated the defendant's right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter.

The defendant claimed she was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to exercise her right to counsel and sought exclusion of the breath sample evidence under section 24(2).

The court found that the defendant was properly informed of her right to counsel, understood this right, but failed to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to retain counsel.

The defendant repeatedly claimed to have a lawyer but could not identify one, refused to pursue duty counsel despite being informed of this option, and engaged in what appeared to be deliberate delay tactics.

The court dismissed the Charter motion and found the defendant guilty.

Mary Wagner was charged with breach of probation and mischief interfering with private property arising from her attendance at an abortion clinic where she allegedly offered roses and pamphlets to patients to discourage them from having abortions.

Wagner brought an application seeking production of all medical records, counselling records, identities, and contact information for the fifteen clinic patients and staff.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the requested information failed both branches of the O'Connor test: the information was not likely relevant to any material issue at trial, and even if it were, the privacy and dignity interests of the patients and employees outweighed any benefit to the defence.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration.

The Crown conceded a Charter breach occurred when the constable delayed approximately twenty minutes in reading the approved instrument demand to the accused.

The court applied the s. 24(2) Charter analysis from R. v. Grant and admitted the breath sample evidence, finding that the seriousness of the breach was minimal (simple human error), the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests was slight to moderate, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits strongly favoured admission.

The accused was found guilty.