Estey

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which held that a Director appointed under section 253 of the Canada Business Corporations Act is entitled to bring an action for compensation on behalf of aggrieved shareholders against both the offeree corporation and its directors for failing to meet statutory disclosure requirements in a directors' circular.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The mother of a mentally retarded adult daughter applied for court authorization to consent to her daughter's sterilization for non-therapeutic purposes.

The trial judge denied the application, but the Appeal Division allowed it, authorizing a hysterectomy under the court's parens patriae jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the parens patriae jurisdiction cannot be used to authorize the non-therapeutic sterilization of a mentally incompetent person, as it can never be safely determined that such a procedure is for their benefit.

The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed by the panel.

The appellant trust company retained the respondent solicitors to perform legal services for a mortgage transaction.

The mortgage was later declared void under the Nova Scotia Companies Act because it constituted unlawful financial assistance for the purchase of the company's shares.

The appellant sued the respondents for negligence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a solicitor can be concurrently liable to a client in tort and contract.

The respondents were found negligent for failing to identify the statutory prohibition and warn the appellant.

The Court also applied the discoverability rule to the limitation period, holding that the tort action was not statute-barred because the cause of action did not arise until the appellant discovered or ought to have discovered the negligence.

The appellants, RCMP officers, were the subject of a complaint to the Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission alleging arbitrary arrest and detention contrary to section 7 of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code.

A Board of Inquiry was established to investigate.

The appellants sought an order of prohibition, arguing the Board lacked jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that section 7 of the Code is inoperative in relation to arrest or detention under the criminal law, as it encroaches on the federal government's exclusive jurisdiction over criminal law and procedure.

The appeal was allowed.

The accused was convicted of rape at his first trial, but a new trial was ordered on appeal.

At the second trial, the Crown cross-examined the accused on inconsistent testimony he had given at his first trial to establish consciousness of guilt.

The accused was convicted again, but the Court of Appeal ordered a third trial.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that cross-examining an accused at a retrial on testimony given at a previous trial on the same charge violates the right against self-incrimination under section 13 of the Charter.

The Court further held that this violation was not justified under section 1 of the Charter.

The appellants sued the respondent in the Federal Court, Trial Division for a declaration that they had the status of Indians and that a piece of land in Newfoundland was an Indian reserve.

The respondent successfully moved to strike out the portion of the statement of claim relating to the reserve declaration, which was upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the Federal Court lacks jurisdiction under s. 17 of the Federal Court Act to grant relief affecting the property rights of a province.

The accused was charged with rape.

The only issue at trial was the identification of the accused by the complainant.

The trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal, finding the identification evidence unreliable due to difficult observation conditions and improper police identification procedures.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, holding that a trial judge cannot withdraw a case from the jury where there is admissible evidence which could, if believed, result in a conviction.

The frailties of the identification evidence should have been left to the jury with a proper caution.

The accused was charged with several sexual offences nearly three years after the alleged incidents, primarily due to the police's inability to locate the complainant.

A Provincial Court judge stayed the proceedings, finding the pre-charge delay violated the accused's right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, holding that the time frame for assessing a section 11(b) claim generally runs only from the moment a person is charged, and pre-charge delay is irrelevant to this analysis.

The respondent carrier transported electronic calculators by sea to Montreal, where they were stored by the appellant stevedore/terminal operator.

Thieves stole a portion of the cargo from the terminal operator's shed due to inadequate security.

The consignee sued both the carrier and the terminal operator in the Federal Court.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Federal Court had jurisdiction because the short-term storage of cargo within the port area is integrally connected to the contract of carriage by sea, falling within Canadian maritime law.

The Court further held that the 'Himalaya clause' in the bill of lading effectively extended the carrier's limitation of liability to the terminal operator, and that the exemption clauses were broad enough to cover the terminal operator's negligence.

Consequently, the actions against both the carrier and the terminal operator were dismissed.

The appellant employer claimed damages from the respondent union for losses resulting from an illegal sympathy strike by mill employees, which violated both the collective agreement and the Industrial Relations Act.

The trial judge raised the preliminary question of whether the court had jurisdiction to hear a claim arising out of a collective agreement, given the statutory provision for binding arbitration.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the grievance and arbitration procedures provided for in labour relations statutes generally provide the exclusive recourse open to parties to a collective agreement for its enforcement.

The appeal was dismissed, confirming that the court lacked jurisdiction to award damages in these circumstances.

The appellant was charged with making an obscene publication after a commercial film developer handed over a photograph to the police.

At the preliminary hearing, there was no evidence of an intent to publish.

The committing magistrate committed the appellant for trial, finding the word 'publication' in the indictment to be surplusage.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and quashed the committal.

The Court held that while the statutory test for obscenity applies to all charges whether publication is involved or not, the Crown's inclusion of the word 'publication' in the indictment meant it could not be disregarded as surplusage without prejudicing the accused.

Therefore, evidence of an intent to publish was required.

The appellant was injured while riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven by the respondent, who was impaired by alcohol.

At trial, the jury found that the appellant had impliedly absolved the respondent from liability by willingly assuming the role of passenger while knowing of the impairment, successfully establishing the defence of volenti non fit injuria.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the volenti defence is rarely applicable in drunken driver-willing passenger cases, it was open to the jury on the evidence to reach that conclusion.

The Court also found that despite potential confusion in the trial judge's charge regarding the relationship between volenti and contributory negligence, the jury's answers were clear and their verdict was not unreasonable.

The appellant, a French-speaking person, was charged with speeding and received a summons in English only.

He challenged the validity of the summons and the conviction on the basis that the underlying statutes were enacted in English only, contrary to s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the statutes were invalid, the summons was preserved by the de facto doctrine, and the conviction was preserved by the rule of law principle.

The Court also held that s. 23 does not require a summons to be printed in both English and French.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged a conviction arising from a municipal traffic prosecution on the basis that the initiating summons was issued only in French, contrary to s. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court held, by majority, that it had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal notwithstanding the provincial appellate court's refusal of leave, given the constitutional significance of the issue.

On the merits, the majority concluded that s. 133 protects the language choice of speakers, writers, and issuers in judicial proceedings, but does not entitle a litigant to receive court process in the litigant's own language.

A unilingual French summons issued by a Quebec court was therefore valid, and the appeal was dismissed with costs, Wilson J. dissenting.

The appellants challenged an order granting a newly formed parents' association leave to appeal and an extension of time to appeal from school-language litigation, and also argued that a judge on the New Brunswick Court of Appeal lacked sufficient French comprehension.

The Court upheld the appellate court's inherent jurisdiction under the Judicature Act to grant leave to a non-party and found no reviewable error in its discretionary decision extending time.

On the constitutional issue, the Court divided on whether s. 19(2) of the Charter itself guarantees that judges understand the language used by the parties, but all members agreed the appeal should be dismissed and that the evidentiary record did not establish disqualification of the impugned judge.

The case is a foundational authority on the distinction between constitutional language rights, natural justice, and the institutional implementation of bilingual adjudication.

The appellant was discharged at a preliminary inquiry after the judge applied a 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard to the identification evidence.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari to quash the discharge, which was upheld by the Court of Appeal.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held that certiorari is available to review a discharge at a preliminary inquiry only for jurisdictional error.

The Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by applying the wrong standard of proof, thereby arrogating to himself the function of the trial court to determine guilt or innocence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, while highly intoxicated, was charged with her husband's murder and informed of her right to counsel.

She stated there was 'no point' in having counsel and was interrogated by police despite her aunt's requests to wait for a lawyer.

The trial judge excluded her inculpatory statements because she lacked the capacity to understand the consequences of making them, leading to an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, applying the 'operating mind' test.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that a valid waiver of the section 10(b) Charter right to counsel requires a true appreciation of the consequences.

The police's deliberate exploitation of the appellant's intoxicated state violated her rights, and the evidence was excluded under section 24(2).

The accused, a 16-year-old male, was convicted of second degree murder after fatally stabbing a man who allegedly made uninvited homosexual advances.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury that the 'ordinary person' in the objective test for provocation must be of the same age and sex as the accused.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that while age and sex may be relevant contextual factors for the jury to consider, it is not a mandatory requirement of law for the trial judge to specifically instruct the jury to ascribe the accused's age and sex to the ordinary person.

The appellant paid his former wife $360 a month pursuant to a divorce judgment to repay two hypothecs and municipal and school taxes on her property.

The Minister of National Revenue disallowed the deductions claimed for these payments.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the payments qualified as an 'allowance' under s. 60(b) of the Income Tax Act because they were limited, predetermined, paid for the maintenance of the recipient, and at her complete disposition for her own benefit.

The appeal was allowed and the deductions were permitted.