Ellen B. Murray

A costs decision following an interim motion and cross-motion concerning child residential schedule, child support, and spousal support.

The respondent mother achieved greater success on the motion, particularly regarding spousal support entitlement despite a marriage contract waiver.

The applicant father sought to deprive the respondent of costs based on alleged bad faith in failing to comply with a prior consent order for mediation.

The court found the respondent's behaviour unreasonable but not in bad faith, and awarded partial costs to the respondent.

The accused sought to introduce evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity through social media accounts (Tumblr and Ask.fm) in a sexual assault trial.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the social media postings may constitute "sexual activity" under section 276 of the Criminal Code, the evidence was not admissible because it lacked relevance to the central issue of whether the complainant consented to the sexual activity.

The court rejected arguments that the evidence was necessary to explain the complainant's knowledge of sexual practices, to establish similarity with a prior alleged assault, or to impeach the complainant's credibility.

Motion and cross-motion in a family law matter involving a separated couple with a young daughter.

The father sought expanded residential time with the child, including overnight visits, and an order preventing the mother from obtaining a replacement birth certificate.

The mother sought to restructure the existing access schedule, obtain a conduct order, production of documents, questioning on financial issues, child support, and spousal support.

The court addressed the enforceability of a mediation order, the child's residential schedule, makeup time provisions, production and questioning orders, child support, and spousal support in the context of a marriage contract waiver.

The court found a triable issue regarding the enforceability of the spousal support waiver and ordered temporary spousal support despite the waiver.

The respondent brought a motion to change a 1999 child support order, seeking to terminate his obligation to support both children retroactively.

The applicant opposed the motion and sought a retroactive increase in support for both children, including section 7 expenses, and ongoing support for the adult child attending university.

The court found that the respondent's obligation to support his son terminated on July 1, 2009, when the son ceased full-time enrollment in an educational program.

The court ordered ongoing support for the daughter attending university using a hybrid approach combining table amounts and section 3(2)(b) calculations based on actual expenses.

The court granted a retroactive increase in support for the daughter from July 1, 2009 onward, but declined to award retroactive section 7 expenses for extracurricular activities.

Dispute over a workplace lottery pool after a free play ticket generated from a ticket purchased before one participant joined the group later won $1,000,000.

The court found the plaintiff had contributed to the June 25, 2010 ticket and was entitled to a one-fifth share of the winnings.

The later-joining participant's argument that the pool was a partnership under the Partnerships Act was rejected because the group was not carrying on a business with a view to profit.

Her counterclaim was dismissed, the plaintiff obtained judgment against the four co-participants for $40,000 each, and all five proper participants were granted judgment for $200,000 against her.

Three secured lenders brought competing applications to determine mortgage priorities after a first mortgage was fraudulently discharged from title and later mortgages were advanced in reliance on the register.

The court found the homeowners were responsible for the fraudulent discharge and concealed the prior debt while continuing payments to the original lender to avoid detection.

Applying the deferred indefeasibility framework under the Land Titles Act and the Court of Appeal's decision in Lawrence, the court held the later mortgagees took from fraudsters and were intermediate encumbrancers.

The original mortgage retained first priority, the later bank mortgage ranked second, and the subsequent private mortgage ranked third.

The register was ordered rectified and no costs were awarded.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual interference involving a child complainant.

The appeal alleged errors including improper admission of spousal communications obtained through cross‑examination of the accused’s spouse without advising her of spousal privilege, improper admission of similar fact evidence involving unrelated sexual conduct with an adult several years earlier, and ineffective assistance of counsel related to disclosure of a letter written by the accused.

The court held that spousal privilege under s. 4(3) of the Canada Evidence Act required the spouse to be informed of the privilege before waiving it, and the failure to do so resulted in improperly admitted evidence that materially affected the credibility findings against the accused.

The court further found that the similar fact evidence lacked probative value and created significant prejudice.

Because these errors could have affected the verdict, the conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

A child protection agency sought to reopen a trial after evidence had concluded and submissions had been made, but before judgment was rendered.

The agency wished to introduce a psychological assessment of the child conducted by an expert who had not testified during the trial.

The respondent mother opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence could have been adduced during the agency's case-in-chief, that reopening would cause significant delay in a matter where timely permanency planning was critical, and that the timing of the motion suggested the agency only sought to introduce the evidence after confirming it would support their case.

The court found that allowing the motion would be unfair to the respondent and contrary to the child's best interests.

The respondent father sought an order to change the child's registered surname from the mother's maiden name to a hyphenated surname including his name.

The child was born during the parties' brief marriage and registered by the mother alone under the Vital Statistics Act.

The father argued that the mother's refusal to acknowledge him for registration purposes was unreasonable and that the court should exercise parens patriae jurisdiction to order the change.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Ontario Court of Justice lacks parens patriae jurisdiction and that even if it possessed such jurisdiction, the evidence supported the mother's decision not to acknowledge the father for registration purposes.

A protection application brought by the Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto concerning a child (D.R.) born in 2004.

The child's parents, M.R. (mother) and C.R. (father), had not communicated since two months after the child's birth.

The society sought a finding that the child was in need of protection pursuant to clauses 37(2)(f) and (g) of the Child and Family Services Act, alleging that the mother had consistently failed to support the child's relationship with the father and had caused emotional harm through her actions.

The court found that the child was in need of protection due to emotional harm caused by the mother's interference with the father-child relationship and her rigid belief that the father had abused the child, despite investigations finding no evidence of abuse.

The court ordered that the child be placed in the father's care subject to society supervision for 12 months, with the mother's access to be at the society's discretion.

The court emphasized the need for therapeutic intervention with the mother to address her dysfunctional beliefs about the father.

A voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of a videotaped statement given by a young person charged with robbery with a firearm and disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The Crown sought to introduce the statement as evidence of the accused's admission to participation in a jewellery store robbery.

The defence opposed admission, alleging that the statement was obtained through police assault and threats in a holding room prior to the videotaped interview.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was made voluntarily, and therefore excluded the statement from evidence.

The young persons were charged with robbery with a firearm and disguise with intent in relation to a 2007 jewellery store robbery.

They brought a motion alleging a violation of their right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter, seeking a stay of proceedings.

The court analyzed the delay from the time the charges were laid in 2013 following DNA hits.

The court found the total delay of 14 months for one young person and 11.5 months for the other to be reasonable, attributing only 3.25 months to institutional and Crown delay.

The motion was dismissed.

Two young persons charged with robbery with a firearm and disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence in relation to a jewellery store robbery brought a motion alleging violation of their right to trial within a reasonable time under Section 11(b) of the Charter.

The defendants sought a stay of charges.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the defendants' Section 11(b) application, finding that the total delay from charge to trial was reasonable when properly allocated between Crown delay, institutional delay, and inherent time requirements of the case.

The court also adjourned the defendants' application grounded in Section 7 and Section 11(d) of the Charter to the trial dates.

The applicant mother sought permission to relocate her son from Toronto to Surrey, British Columbia, and to vary the access order accordingly.

The respondent father opposed the relocation.

The court found that the mother had established a material change in circumstances (a 25% reduction in her income) that affected her ability to meet the child's needs.

Applying the two-part test from Gordon v. Goertz, the court conducted a fresh inquiry into the child's best interests and found that the proposed move would not materially alter the father's ability to exercise access.

The court granted the mother's application to relocate, finding that her views as the custodial parent were entitled to great respect and that the move was made in good faith for legitimate financial and personal reasons.

The appellant appealed the imposition of a peace bond following an acquittal on a charge of breach of recognizance.

The trial judge imposed the peace bond without giving notice that such an order was being contemplated and without allowing the accused to make submissions or call evidence on whether it should be imposed.

The appeal court held that imposing a peace bond without affording the accused an opportunity to be heard breached principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.

The court also found there was no evidentiary basis for the peace bond, as the trial judge relied on speculation and irrelevant considerations rather than evidence establishing a risk of future breach of the peace.

The peace bond was quashed.

This is a status review application under the Child and Family Services Act concerning two children found to be in need of protection due to domestic violence between their parents and lack of supports for the mother.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order of Crown wardship with a plan for adoption.

The mother sought custody under supervision, while the father sought placement with his grandparents.

The court rejected both the Society's plan for Crown wardship and the mother's plan for return to her care, finding instead that placement with the paternal grandparents under Society supervision best served the children's interests while maintaining family connections and protecting them from the risks posed by their parents' conflicted relationship.

A motion by a maternal grandfather to be added as a party to child protection proceedings, or alternatively to have specified rights to participate.

The child, a 15½-year-old girl, had been in the temporary care of the Children's Aid Society for one year following allegations of physical and emotional abuse by the mother and failure to protect by the father.

The grandfather proposed a plan for the child's placement in his care.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the grandfather had a legal interest in the proceedings and had proposed a carefully thought-out plan, the child's clear and consistent rejection of contact with him rendered the plan unlikely to be viable.

The court noted that the child's views and preferences are an important factor in determining best interests for a child of this age, and that the parents' counsel could adequately present the grandfather's plan without him being added as a party.

This is a child protection trial under the Child and Family Services Act involving two children, K.A.J. (born 1998) and I.C. (born 2006), who were found to be in need of protection on July 7, 2011.

The Society sought Crown wardship for both children.

The respondent mother sought return of the children under Society supervision, citing her completion of an alcohol treatment program.

The respondent father sought custody of I.C. with a plan to take the child to Angola upon his deportation.

The court found that both children should be made Crown wards, with the Society's plan for long-term care and independent living for K.A.J., and adoption for I.C. The court granted limited access orders to both parents and between the siblings.

A custody dispute between the biological father and the deceased mother's partner over two children, ages 12 and 11.

The father sought custody following the mother's death in July 2012, while the partner, designated as guardian in the mother's will, also claimed custody.

The court awarded custody to the partner, finding that despite the father's biological relationship to the children, the partner had provided stable care, the children consistently wished to remain with him, and the father had demonstrated insensitivity to the children's emotional needs by denigrating their deceased mother and the partner in their presence.

The father retained Saturday access as previously ordered.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking an order of Crown wardship for a child who had been in temporary Society care for over 30 months, exceeding the statutory 12-month limit.

The respondent parents sought return of the child under supervision or, alternatively, a 6-month extension of Society wardship.

The court found that despite the Society's arguments regarding serious protection concerns—including the mother's seizure disorder, the father's substance abuse and criminal history, domestic violence, and both parents' mental health issues—there remained genuine issues of material fact requiring trial.

The court noted significant developments, particularly the mother's successful brain surgery resulting in seizure freedom and improved mental health.

The motion was dismissed and the matter was directed to trial.