Mario Jorge De Sousa Paiva

The Applicant sought urgent access to his 20-month-old child, Mikael, after being arrested and released with conditions prohibiting contact with the Respondent and requiring third-party arrangements for child contact.

The Respondent brought a cross-motion seeking supervised access and temporary custody.

The court granted leave for the urgent motion, finding that the child's well-being was impacted by the lack of contact.

The court denied the Respondent's request for supervised access, finding insufficient evidence of risk, and established a temporary access schedule for the Applicant to have unsupervised access three times a week at the paternal grandmother's home, with specific arrangements for transportation and exchanges.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking an order of Crown wardship for a child who had been in temporary Society care for over 30 months, exceeding the statutory 12-month limit.

The respondent parents sought return of the child under supervision or, alternatively, a 6-month extension of Society wardship.

The court found that despite the Society's arguments regarding serious protection concerns—including the mother's seizure disorder, the father's substance abuse and criminal history, domestic violence, and both parents' mental health issues—there remained genuine issues of material fact requiring trial.

The court noted significant developments, particularly the mother's successful brain surgery resulting in seizure freedom and improved mental health.

The motion was dismissed and the matter was directed to trial.

A residential property owner brought an action against neighbouring commercial businesses alleging obstruction and misuse of a shared right-of-way and seeking damages and injunctive relief.

The defendants denied interference and counterclaimed for damages and an injunction based on alleged harassment and interference with their business operations.

The court reviewed the scope of easement rights, including the principle that a right to pass and repass does not inherently include a right to park, and considered whether commercial delivery and parking activities unreasonably interfered with other users’ rights.

The court found that certain vehicle parking and delivery practices had at times unreasonably obstructed access but that many issues had improved over time.

A limited injunction regulating parking, delivery vehicle use, and positioning of security lights and cameras was granted, while all claims for damages and the defendants’ counterclaim were dismissed.