Elaine Evans

The accused, charged with attempted murder, brought a motion to exclude a statement made to police.

Due to a technical error, the audio of the video-recorded interview was mostly unrecorded, and the interviewing officer's notes were sparse.

The court found the statement was voluntary and that the recording failure did not breach the accused's Charter rights.

However, the court excluded the audio component because its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect, while allowing the silent video and the officer's testimony regarding the gist of the interview.

Dans un procès criminel pour voies de fait causant des lésions corporelles, la poursuite a demandé l’admission pour la vérité de son contenu d’une déclaration antérieure fournie par un témoin à la police.

Le témoin, présent lors de l’incident allégué, a affirmé au procès ne pas se souvenir des événements ni d’avoir fourni la déclaration.

Le tribunal a appliqué l’exception raisonnée au ouï‑dire et a analysé les critères de nécessité et de fiabilité, en se référant notamment à la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême sur la fiabilité procédurale et substantielle.

Constatant la perte de mémoire du témoin, l’enregistrement vidéo de la déclaration, la possibilité de contre‑interrogatoire et l’existence d’éléments corroborants, la cour a conclu que les critères étaient satisfaits.

La déclaration antérieure a donc été admise pour la vérité de son contenu.

The accused pleaded guilty to 28 fraud and related charges after operating a Ponzi-style scheme under the guise of film production investments, defrauding 26 victims of $296,250.

The funds were largely used to support the accused's lavish lifestyle.

The court weighed the significant breach of trust, the number of victims, and the global amount against the accused's guilty plea and lack of prior record.

The accused was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment, 3 years' probation, ordered to pay full restitution, and subjected to a 5-year prohibition under s. 380.2 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown brought an application in a criminal harassment prosecution to admit evidence of the accused’s prior convictions as evidence of other discreditable conduct.

The prior incidents included a sexual assault conviction from 2001, a conviction for unlawfully being in a dwelling house in 2008, and convictions for break and enter, threats, and unlawful presence in a dwelling in 2011.

The court applied the governing principles for similar fact and other discreditable conduct evidence, including the requirement that probative value outweigh prejudicial effect.

The court held that the 2001 and 2011 events were relevant to the complainant’s reasonable fear and to the accused’s state of mind when sending numerous letters alleged to constitute criminal harassment.

Evidence relating to the 2008 events was excluded as insufficiently relevant.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for sexual assault under s. 271(1) of the Criminal Code, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, misapplied the principles in R. v. W.(D.), improperly relied on a prior statement to police, and failed to recuse himself due to an alleged reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellate court reviewed the trial judge’s credibility findings and determined that although the trial judge made minor factual errors in describing certain circumstances, those errors were not overriding and did not undermine the conviction.

The court found that the trial judge properly used inconsistencies in the appellant’s prior statement only to assess credibility and correctly applied the Browne v. Dunn rule and the reasoning in R. v. Truong when drawing inferences about new allegations raised in the appellant’s testimony.

The court also held that the W.(D.) framework had not been misapplied and that the appellant failed to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias arising from the complainant’s spouse having previously served as a judicial colleague of the trial judge.

The conviction was upheld.

The applicants brought a defence motion seeking exclusion of all evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant at a specified property.

In light of the Crown’s stated position and the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Rocha, the court granted the application.

The ruling excluded all evidence obtained through the execution of the search warrant.

The court indicated that more detailed reasons would be provided if requested by counsel and invited further submissions regarding the impact of the ruling on the charges and any potential trial.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood under s. 253(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal focused on whether the Crown proved that the first breath sample was taken within two hours of the accused operating a motor vehicle, permitting reliance on the evidentiary presumption in s. 258(1)(c).

The appellant argued the timing evidence was unreliable due to uncertainty in the officer’s timekeeping methods and discrepancies in the recording of events.

The court held that the trial judge reasonably relied on corroborated timing evidence, including synchronization of watches and consistent records of the breath technician call.

Applying the deferential appellate standard for unreasonable verdicts, the court found the conviction supported by the evidence and the reasons sufficient for appellate review.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for assault and wilfully obstructing a peace officer.

The principal issue was whether the trial judge failed to provide the minimum level of assistance required to ensure a fair trial for a self‑represented accused.

The appellate court reviewed authorities establishing that trial judges must provide meaningful guidance to unrepresented defendants regarding the trial process, their rights to cross‑examine, testify, and call evidence.

The court found that the trial judge failed to explain the trial process, the elements of the offences, or the risks of testifying, thereby falling below the minimum standard required.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial ordered.