Edward F. Then

The defendant insurer appealed a trial judgment finding that the plaintiff, an innocent purchaser of a stolen vehicle, had an insurable interest in the vehicle after it was subsequently stolen from him.

The plaintiff cross-appealed the quantum of damages.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's finding that the plaintiff had a possessory interest constituting an insurable interest, applying the factual expectancy test.

The majority of the court allowed the cross-appeal on damages, increasing the award to $25,900 to reflect the fair market value of the vehicle and rental expenses, rather than limiting recovery to the cash amount paid.

In an addendum to a majority judgment, the Divisional Court clarified that the applicants were entitled to interest on damages payable out of the guarantee fund under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

The court held that pursuant to the regulations, interest is payable at the Condominium Act rate and may increase the total payment beyond the standard $20,000 maximum limit.

Interest was ordered payable from the date the Warranty Program initially denied the claims.

The appellants purchased two condominiums as tax-sheltered investments.

The vendor failed to convey title, and the appellants obtained an unpaid judgment against the vendor.

The appellants applied to the Ontario New Home Warranty Program for compensation.

The Program and the Commercial Registration Appeal Tribunal denied compensation for business and investment costs, allowing only land and construction costs, and deducted tax savings.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the appellants were entitled to compensation for the entire transaction, including service contracts integral to the condominium purchase, but agreed that tax savings must be deducted from the total financial loss.

The defendants in a motor vehicle accident action settled their counterclaim with the plaintiffs' insurer for $6,000, executing a full and final release and filing a notice of discontinuance.

The defendants later sought leave to deliver a fresh counterclaim for contribution and indemnity, arguing the release did not bar the claim and seeking to set aside the notice of discontinuance.

The Master dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the Master's decision, finding that the proposed amendment was untenable in law due to the clear terms of the release.

The court also held that section 278(6) of the Insurance Act did not apply as the insurer had not made a payment or assumed liability, and there were no grounds to set aside the properly filed notice of discontinuance.

The appellant husband appealed an order varying spousal support.

The parties separated in 1970 and spousal support was increased by consent in 1983 after the respondent wife was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis.

In 1991, the wife became totally disabled, and the motion judge found this constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, applying the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Bracklow v. Bracklow, and held that the wife was entitled to support given the disadvantage imposed by the marriage breakdown, her need, and the husband's ability to pay.