Edward Charles Conway

The applicant brought a motion for interim spousal support.

The respondent opposed, arguing the parties had reached an agreement to waive support in exchange for 49.9% of his successful software company.

The court found the applicant had a prima facie claim for support, as the alleged agreement was unlikely to meet the Miglin threshold.

To address the respondent's temporarily reduced income and the ongoing litigation costs, the court ordered the respondent to release undisputed corporate dividends and pay $300,000 in lump sum interim spousal support.

Following the dismissal of the moving party's motion for leave to appeal, the responding party sought full indemnity costs of $30,618.11.

The court found that the moving party acted unreasonably by overly complicating the motion and filing extensive materials.

However, the court agreed with the moving party that the cost of retaining senior litigation counsel was not entirely reasonable to pass on.

The court fixed costs payable to the responding party at $19,000, representing an amount between partial and substantial indemnity.

The defendants sought costs following a motion regarding a sealing order and restricted production of a document.

The court found that the plaintiff acted unreasonably by refusing to consider an informal proposal and a formal offer to settle that mirrored the eventual order.

The court awarded the defendants costs fixed at $5,000 on a partial indemnity basis from the date the informal proposal was made.

The plaintiff corporation sought a sealing order and a 'counsel eyes only' order for a 34-page document containing sensitive financial information.

The document had previously been disclosed to the individual defendant during family law proceedings involving the plaintiff's principal.

The court granted the sealing order to protect the plaintiff's commercial interests and the integrity of the government procurement process.

On consent, the corporate defendant was denied access to the document.

However, the court refused to deny the individual defendant access, finding that he needed to see the document to ensure trial fairness and to respond to the plaintiff's allegations.

The respondent husband sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that struck portions of his voluminous affidavit material and set parameters for an upcoming interim spousal support motion.

The motion judge had restricted the evidence to whether the applicant wife could establish a prima facie case that an alleged separation agreement was unenforceable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's case management intervention, which was deemed necessary to maintain proportionality given the excessive material filed.

The applicant brought a motion to strike evidence from the respondent's affidavit, alleging mediation/settlement privilege and non-compliance with the Family Law Rules.

The evidence related to an alleged separation agreement concerning spousal support waiver and share division.

The court ruled that the existence and enforceability of such an agreement are trial issues, not to be determined on interim motions for spousal support or disclosure.

The respondent was ordered to remove privileged and non-compliant materials and to confine his evidence for the substantive motions to whether the applicant has established a prima facie case that no enforceable agreement exists.

The applicants sought a mandatory interlocutory injunction to reverse actions taken by the respondents and a secured creditor, including the seizure of shares, removal of directors, and termination of employment, alleging an invalid notice of default and oppression.

The court granted the injunction, finding the applicants established a prima facie case that the default notice was invalid, the shareholders' resolutions were null and void, and that the respondents conspired with the secured creditor to circumvent a unanimous shareholder agreement.

The court also found irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favored maintaining the status quo, reinstating the applicants to their positions and setting aside the impugned acts.

Following a trial that determined the validity of a separation agreement, the court addressed costs.

The self-represented applicant sought full indemnity for all action costs, totaling $14,684.00.

The respondent argued for costs limited to the trial of the issue, suggesting $2,582.00.

The court awarded the applicant $3,000.00, inclusive of HST, for the costs related specifically to the trial of the issue, payable by the respondent within 90 days, noting that other costs could be sought in the overall resolution of the proceeding.

This trial determined the validity of a separation agreement signed by the parties on July 30, 2012.

The respondent sought to set aside the agreement, alleging lack of signature, improper witnessing, unfairness due to non-disclosure and overvaluation of assets, and undue influence.

The applicant relied on the agreement, asserting full financial disclosure and a fair process.

The court found the agreement valid, signed, and properly witnessed, noting the respondent's admission of signature and the witness's confirmation.

The respondent failed to establish non-disclosure, unfairness, or undue influence.

The court emphasized the policy of enforcing fairly negotiated "kitchen table" agreements where parties have openly exchanged information, even without legal counsel, unless there is clear evidence of improvidence or power imbalance.

The separation agreement was declared valid, and the parties were directed to resume their settlement conference for remaining issues.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking a further and better affidavit of documents and various discovery-related remedies in an action arising from injuries allegedly sustained when a wheelchair user drove over concealed stairs in a municipal underpass.

The plaintiffs alleged the municipality failed to conduct adequate searches and failed to produce relevant construction and email records concerning the redesign that replaced a ramp with stairs.

The court found the municipality was technically non‑compliant with documentary disclosure obligations under Rule 30 but held that the plaintiff’s motion was disproportionate and unnecessarily combative.

The court ordered targeted additional searches and an affidavit describing the results but declined to grant broader discovery relief or sanctions.

No costs were awarded and the litigation timetable was reset.

The appellant sought leave to appeal, arguing that 'unreasonable verdict' and 'insufficiency of reasons' constituted questions of law.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the appeal was essentially an attempt to re-argue factual issues already rejected by the lower courts.

The court held that even if questions of law were raised, they did not bear on the general administration of criminal justice as required for leave.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action, which was based on a written settlement agreement reached at mediation.

She argued she did not understand the terms and her counsel lacked authority to settle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding she signed the agreement, accepted benefits, and her counsel had apparent authority.

The respondent cross-appealed the motion judge's refusal to enforce the release term of the agreement.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, varying the order to include an absolute bar to subsequent proceedings.

The Crown appealed from the respondents' acquittals, which followed the trial judge's finding of a Charter violation and exclusion of marijuana evidence under s. 24(2).

The trial judge rejected the police officer's evidence that the discovery of the marijuana and seizure of toy guns were simultaneous, and found the continuation of the search after confirming the guns were toys was inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility findings, standing determinations, or s. 24(2) analysis, which are entitled to substantial deference.

The appellant pleaded guilty to six criminal offences and was sentenced to 75 days, reduced by five days for an alleged Charter breach related to a delayed bail hearing.

The appellant appealed the sentence, arguing the five-day reduction was insufficient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's exercise of discretion.

The appellant appealed her conviction for mischief.

The trial judge had convicted her of both mischief and impaired driving.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Judge acquitted the appellant of impaired driving but sustained the mischief conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant, finding that the trial judge's finding of mischief was inextricably linked to the conclusion that she was impaired, and the evidence of requisite knowledge for mischief was very weak.